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ABSTRACT

An abstract of
o f the dissertation of
o f Terri Hinson Silvis for the Doctor ooff Philosophy
in Urban Studies presented April 4, 2001.

Title:

The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A Case Study ooff Policy Learning,
Leaming,
Coalition Building, and Paradigm Expansion

The goals of
o f policy analysis include understanding the objectives ooff public
policies, ascertaining how to structure policies to influence behaviors and fulfill
stated policy objectives, and creating improved policy-making processes.
Identifying underlying values that influence the behaviors and attitudes of
o f policy ·
makers and stakeholders is crucial to fully understanding public policies, and
analysis procedures that seek to explore values should be operationalized within
policy-making processes.
o f this study is to explore the potential for infusing value
The intent ofthis
considerations in the policy assessment process by analyzing the federal lowCredit],
income housing policy known as the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit [the Credit].
The Credit has evolved since its inception to become the primary means through
which low-income rental housing is developed or preserved by the federal
government, and the program enjoys popularity among a variety ooff bi-partisan
actors. The Credit reflects several deep core values held within the American
political culture, incorporates values that are widely accepted within the nation's

po!icy learning-both
political economy, and exemplifies policy
Ieaming-both during the initial creation
of
o f the program and its subsequent evolution.
Focusing on the constructs of
o f political culture, political economy, and
policy learning, the case study process was intended to facilitate the
operationalization of
o f the Advocacy Coalition Framework, a model of
o f analysis
created by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. The Credit case study was
_completed
completed primarily by employing policy history techniques, the findings from
which were corroborated by survey research. The study incorporated three phases:
historical analysis, stakeholder survey analysis, and paradigm analysis.
The case narrative explores beliefs, values, and norms that influenced
decision-making during the evolution of
o f the Credit program, considers actors and
attributes of
o f the policy subsystem, and identifies advocacy coalitions. The policy
analysis process completed is incorporated into a new policy-planning tool, the
Coalition Maximization Model. The Coalition Maximization Model creates a
means through which to apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework's theoretical
constructs during the policy-making process, and the model's descriptive and
prescriptive capacity should be further tested by applying it to other social policy

concerns, such as child care, job training, or health care.
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CHAPTER ONE
NATURE OF INQUIRY AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Over the past two decades, housing costs especially for low- and very lowincome households in our society have become increasingly burdensome. Since its
inception in 1986, the Low-income Housing Tax Credit has evolved to become the
primary means through which low-income rental housing is developed or preserved
(Stegman, 1991; Wallace, 1995; McClure, 2000). In spite o f shortcomings, the
Credit has experienced enhanced bipartisan support, increased utilization and
funding, and escalating popularity in the real estate investment community.
Because o f its economic and social importance, as well as its political popularity,
the question o f why the Credit has enjoyed increased popularity and usage over the
past 15 years stimulated this research.
Assuming that the goals o f public decision-making include creating public
policies that are widely accepted and achievable, the goals of policy analysis
include: (1) understanding the intended objectives o f public policies; (2)
ascertaining how to structure policies (and thus specific programs) to influence
behaviors and fulfill stated policy objectives; and (3) identifying policy-making
processes that will facilitate the creation o f more favorable policy alternatives
(Aaron, Mann & Taylor, 1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier, 1999;
Patton & Sawicki; 1986, MacRae & Wilde, 1985). This research was completed
contemplating these policy analysis goals. This chapter introduces the justifications
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for and importance o f this policy analysis, identifies the concepts explored during
the research process, briefly introduces the research methodology, and discloses
anticipated research results. The above policy analysis goals infer that both
descriptive and prescriptive policy analyses should be completed, with descriptive
analysis being the historical examination o f policies (previous or current) and
prescriptive analysis results in recommendations o f "actions because they will bring
about a particular result" (Patton & Sawicki, 1986, p. 39). According to Aaron,
Mann, and Taylor (1994), identifying the underlying values that influence
behaviors and attitudes o f actors (e.g., policy makers and stakeholders) is critical to
understanding public policies, and policy analysis procedures that seek to explore
values should be operationalized within policy-making processes. Thus, policy
analysts should incorporate value considerations into both descriptive and
prescriptive analysis procedures when examining policy alternatives.
To explore the potential for infusing value considerations in policy
assessment process (e.g., during identification o f policy alternatives), I used casestudy procedures to analyze the federal low-income housing policy known as the
Internal Revenue Code [IRC] §42 Low-income Housing Tax Credit [LIHTC or
“the Credit”]. My intent for this policy analysis was to explore why the Credit, in
contrast to other low-income housing initiatives, has enjoyed tremendous
popularity and usage over the past decade. I believe that the Credit program has
received broad support in spite o f criticisms largely because it reflects several deep
core values held within the American political culture, that it incorporates values
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that are widely accepted within the nation's political economy, and that it
exemplifies policy learning in that actors within the policy process-both during the
initial creation o f the policy and its subsequent evolution—have incorporated lessons
learned from previous federal housing programs to create a more successful
program.
The case study was selected as an appropriate research method (Feagin,
Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991; Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993) and was completed using
policy history techniques, supplemented by survey techniques. The analysis
focused on the constructs of political culture, political economy, and policy
learning using a lens o f policy analysis called the Advocacy Coalition Framework
[ACF], a theoretical framework created by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993;
Sabatier, 1999). The case study process was intended to facilitate the
operationalization o f the ACF so that its constructs can be applied during the
policy-making process. The remainder o f this chapter provides an overview o f the
ACF, briefly introduces the case study research methods, and discusses why the
Credit program is a compelling subject for the policy analysis.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework
Emphasizing the role o f values in the policy analysis process, Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith (1993) proposed the ACF as an alternative to the traditional
hierarchical model o f policy-making that they term ed the “stages heuristic” model.
The stages heuristic divides the public policy process into functionally distinct sub
processes such as problem identification, agenda setting, policy adoption, policy
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implementation, and policy evaluation. It is a model that has been useful in its
ability to construct a more “manageable” policy-making process (Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier, 1999); however, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
claimed that the stages heuristic is limited as a causal and descriptive framework
because o f its emphasis on distinct cycles and actors. The result is a model (and by
inference, a planning approach) that lacks consideration for the complex interplay
o f stages and actors within the broader policy-making process and socio-economic
environment. In creating the ACF, the authors acknowledged the abundant
complexities and dynamics o f policy-making and incorporated the importance and
influence o f multi-levels o f actors. Noting that conflicts over analytical issues may
in fact reflect deeper disputes over values, the two analysts also emphasized the
importance o f understanding underlying values, coalition-building, and policy
learning. Importantly, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith emphasized that only by
considering policy evolution over time (a period o f at least 10 years) can analysts
begin to understand more fully the nature of policy change. Based on the
application o f the ACF in 34 national and international studies during the 1980s
and 1990s, Sabatier amended the ACF (1999). Clarifying relationships among
actors and linking actions within and across coalitions, his intent was to further the
ACF's capacity to identify causation and to advance predictions (Sabatier, 1999).
By incorporating the ACF constructs into policy-design procedures, this research is
intended to further Sabatier's goal o f expanding the application o f the ACF.
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I do not allege that merely understanding the values o f stakeholders and
encouraging collaboration will result in resoundingly successful policy-making, as
numerous barriers exist to successful policy-making based on values. Extremists
exist on most policy issues, and there are times when agreement (or even
cooperation) among stakeholders is unlikely. Additionally, coalitions in power have
vested interests in ensuring that their values are widely publicized and accepted
(Lindblom, 1988); these powerful coalitions generally have access to resources that
help maintain their positions, increasing the likelihood that the values o f minority
stakeholders are not heard. Furthermore, there are potential limitations to the ACF
itself as an explanatory model. For example, Sabatier conceded that the studies
completed to date suggested that the paradigm is more effective when analyzing
cases where there is considerable political conflict coupled with intense technical
complexity (1999). Specifically, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith had earlier allowed
that ACF policy learning hypotheses might have limited applicability to social
policy issues that are generally considered less "analytically tractable" (1993).
Issues that are narrow in scope, where there is significant quantitative data, and
where results are less subject to varied interpretation are generally considered to
have greater analytical tractability. For example, according to Sabatier and JenkinsSmith, environmental and energy policy issues such as water quality, nuclear
power, or natural gas arguably have a narrower realm for disagreement and are thus
less likely to encounter debates on "facts" than issues that are generally considered
to be more highly subjective (Sabatier, 1999), such as welfare reform or
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discrimination. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, social policy issues (such
as welfare reform and discrimination) arguably are analytically intractable issues,
are less likely to be viewed objectively, and consequently are more open to
individual interpretation-allowing subsystem participants to promote and defend
their own beliefs and prohibiting policy learning and collaboration across
subsystems. Though the usefulness o f studying coalitions as a means of
understanding the values o f the actors as well as policy change over the long term
has been substantiated by numerous researchers (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993;
Sabatier, 1999), Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) expressed concerns about the
ACF's applicability to social policies because their general lack o f quantitative data
might make policy learning tenuous.
This may be a valid observation in many cases, but social policies today
increasingly incorporate factors that can be quantitatively considered; when these
factors are combined with an understanding o f values and incorporation of
discourse around those values, policy learning can occur. By focusing on values,
researchers may overcome barriers to intractability, resulting in policy learning in
spite of subjective interpretations. And the tractability o f issues may change over
time as more resources are committed to research and more data is gathered, as
alluded to in the study o f airline deregulation by Brown and Stewart (1993).
Indeed, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith allowed that some issues become more
tractable over time and also discussed the use o f content analysis as a means o f
arriving at quantitative data on value issues, which would enhance tractability.
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Although the vast majority o f studies have focused on policy issues that lend
themselves to quantification (such as environmental policies, water policies, even
wage discrimination policies), education and school desegregation-both social
policies-have been assessed using the ACF (Sabatier, 1999). However, the ACF
has not been applied to housing policy (Sabatier, 1999) and because low-income
housing policy in particular incorporates characteristics o f both social policy and
economic policy, it has the potential to be a convincing example o f how the ACF
can be expanded and applied to other social policies, such as health care (physical
and mental), welfare reform, and criminal justice.
The Research Approach
This LIHTC case study takes the form o f a policy history and considers
information intended to reveal characteristics o f political culture, political economy
and policy learning as they are reflected in the Credit program. Information was
gathered that describes the creation of the Credit program, analyzes subsystem
actors and agendas, specifies program goals and objectives, and identifies
beneficiaries. This type o f information is commonly the focus o f case studies using
policy histories (Derthick, 1979; Katz, 1995). Exploring the political, economic,
cultural, institutional, and structural aspects that potentially influence the policy
making process, policy histories are the study o f decision-making by public and
private institutions, including origins, implementation, and consequences o f
decisions. Over the past decade, the field o f policy history has gained interest as a
research methodology and offers analysts a means by which to explore the
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interrelationships among social, political, economic, and institutional actors. This
LIHTC case study incorporates policy history as both its methodology and as a
means by which to apply the ACF, allowing for both descriptive and exploratory
research while focusing on specific concepts o f political culture, political economy,
and policy learning. Phase I o f the case study, the "historical analysis,"
encompasses the chronological ordering o f events and documentation leading to the
passage o f the Credit legislation and subsequent amendments. This process
included gathering and analyzing legislative history via transcripts from
Congressional subcommittee hearings as well as copies o f legislation,
governmental and private studies, and other archival resources. The historical
assessment enabled me to consider the Credit within a political and economic
context while observing the program's evolution from its initiation in 1986 to the
present. In Phase II, the "stakeholder analysis," surveys and interviews o f key
participants in the Credit program were completed, supplementing findings from
the archival data. Research for Phase HI, the "paradigm analysis," included making
observations on political culture, political economy, and policy learning via the
application o f the ACF to the Credit program.
The Credit
As previously explained, the Credit program is a fitting topic for applying
the ACF to social policy because low-income housing policy in particular
incorporates aspects o f both social policy and economic policy. Additionally, the
Credit is worthy o f further policy analysis for significant social, political,
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economic, and institutional reasons. First, as a pressing social issue, housing costs
especially for low- and very low-income households in our society have become
increasingly burdensome over the past two decades. Second, as a political policy,
the Credit has evolved since its inception to become the primary means through
which low-income rental housing is built (Stegman, 1991; Wallace, 1995;
McClure, 2000) or is preserved by the federal government, creating an estimated
94% o f all low-income rental apartments (The Enterprise Foundation [EF], 1997).
Third, the Credit has significant economic importance as a policy, representing
private investment estimated to be in excess o f $12 billion (EF, 1997). Fourth, the
Credit, now the largest federal low-income housing program, is the only lowincome housing program under the jurisdiction o f the Internal Revenue Service
[IRS] rather than under the U.S. Department o f Housing and Urban Development
[HUD], representing an important institutional shift. Over the last ten years, in spite
o f criticism, the Credit has experienced increased bipartisan support, increased
utilization and funding, and increased popularity in the investment community. The
program is unique in that it is one o f the few federal low-income housing programs
to receive expanding participation nationwide, to incorporate provisions
encouraging public/private/nonprofit partnerships, to require social services for
low-income residents, and to allow for broad decentralized decision-making.
Indeed, the Credit program has been so improved that early critics of the program
conceded that it had achieved significant enhancements in efficiency, and they
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supported not only its continuation but its expansion (Stegman, 1999; Orlebeke,
2000 ).

Social Importance
The Credit program warrants additional analysis because o f its considerable
impact on affordable housing, a policy area that has experienced severe problems
since the 1980s. There are two parts to the housing affordability equation:
household income and housing cost and availability. Household income determines
one’s ability to pay for goods and services, and the factors contributing to low
household income are numerous and complex. Nonetheless, the following
generalizations are widely accepted: (1) labor-market forces are primarily
responsible for the extent o f poverty; (2) the distribution o f poverty is determined
by changing demographic patterns (especially unwed mothers, family breakups, the
aging process and ill health); (3) discriminatory forces often contribute to poverty
(Schiller, 1995). Notably, minorities and immigrants also continue to have higher
poverty rates than other populations (Joint Center for Housing Studies [JCHS],
1997 & 1999). Largely due to the types o f jobs available (e.g., services or retail
versus high tech or other professional or specialized fields), over the past two
decades the income gap between highly-educated, highly-skilled workers and lesseducated, low-skilled workers has widened-with real incomes o f high school
graduates, ages 25 to 35, actually decreasing between 1979 and 1995 (JCHS,
2000). The effect o f labor market trends on the income gap between the wealthy
and the poor is exacerbated when coupled with other forces contributing to
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poverty-primarily demographic trends of increasing single-parent and singleperson households and increasing numbers o f immigrant and minority households
(JCHS, 2000).
When coupled with broader national trends, however, the income picture
for the nation’s poor is more complex. As a result of sustained economic growth
throughout the 1990s, nationally household incomes rose in 1998 to their highest
levels since 1990, and the poverty rate fell overall. Nationwide the poverty rate fell
from 14.8% in 1992 to 12.7% in 1998 (Department ofHousing and Urban
Development [HUD], 2000). Simultaneously, due in large part to welfare reform
combined with long-term economic expansion, welfare rolls dropped by more than
50% from an estimated 14.9 million households in 1996 to 6.1 million in April of
2000 (HUD, 2000). Regarding the renter population specifically, this economic
“recovery” started from a substantial base, and thus the national economic progress
may not be as dramatic as it initially appears: Statistically, low-income households
are over-represented among renter households, and during the decade between
1985 and 1995 low-income households (defined by HUD as households with
incomes at or below 50% o f area median income [AMI]) comprised the fastest
growing segment of the rental market, growing at a rate o f 13.5% or 14.4 million
households (JCHS, 1997). Since 1995 many o f these renter households have
entered the workforce via welfare-to-work programs, obtaining predominantly lowpaying positions in retail sales, services, or clerical support (HUD, 2000).
Consequently, with respect to the rental housing market, even though poverty rates
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have fallen and economic expansion has raised household incomes overall, the
1990s arguably began with an inflated population o f poor renters and ended with
fewer poverty-level households and fewer households on welfare rolls but a
significant population o f poor workers in need o f affordable rental housing.
The second part o f the affordable housing equation is housing cost and
availability. Current data from the Census Bureau’s American Housing Survey and
the Bureau o f Labor Statistics reveal that in 1997 and 1998 rents increased at a rate
twice the rate of inflation (HUD, 1999); furthermore, rental markets strengthened in
1999 contributing to rents that rose faster than inflation for a third consecutive year
(JCHS, 2000). Simultaneously, in spite o f a numerical increase in the number o f
federally subsidized rental units (from 2.2 million to just over 5 million, between
1977 and 1995) (JCHS, 1997), in the 1990s the number o f subsidized units
available to the nation's very poorest households decreased: Current U.S. Census
data shows that the number of affordable rental units available to "very very lowincome households" (defined by HUD as households with incomes at or below
30% o f AMI) decreased 5% or 372,000 units between 1991 to 1997 (HUD, 1999);
and, as o f the end of 1999, approximately 90,000 low-income housing units had
been lost as a result o f prepayment o f HUD mortgages or Section 8 “opt -outs” by
private owners (JCHS, 2000).
These housing market trends—higher real rents coupled with a loss o f
affordable rental units—manifested in higher rent burdens on America’s poorest
population, among whom are significant numbers o f cost-burdened working poor
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who receive no form o f federal housing assistance. As o f 1997, approximately 5.4
million very Iow-income renters received no rental housing assistance and lived in
conditions with "severe housing problems," defined by HUD as housing with
extreme problems with plumbing, heating, electrical systems, and maintenance
(JCHS, 2000). In the same year, HUD documented that the “worst case needs"
(renters earning less than 50% o f AMI and paying at least half o f their gross
income per month for substandard units) had increased since 1974 by 66% to 6
million households. Notably almost 69% o f these 6 million, or 3.6 million, were
classified as "very very low-income renters" who spent at least half o f their
incomes for housing (JCHS, 1997). The result: between 1996 and 1998, in the
midst o f one o f the strongest economic environments in the nation's history, renters
in the bottom quarter o f the income distribution saw real incomes actually decline
while real rents increased by 2.3% (JCHS, 2000). Collectively, these trends
corroborate a housing affordability problem that is attributable to job markets,
demographic trends, and housing markets.
Economic and Political Importance
The Credit has evolved since its inception to become the prim ary means
through which low-income rental housing is developed or preserved by the federal
government (Stegman, 1991; Wallace, 1995; Ernst & Young, 1997; McClure,
2000; Orlebeke, 2000). Moreover, the Credit program enjoys popularity among a
variety o f actors (i.e., developers, local elected and administrative officials,
professionals, nonprofit advocates, lenders, investors) that is unprecedented for a

14
low-income rental housing program. As has been the case with many previous
federal housing policies (e.g., the Housing Acts o f 1937, 1961, and 1964; the
Economic Recovery and Taxation Act o f 1981), by linking housing policy to
economic policy, proponents broadened political support to achieve low-income
housing objectives.
The Credit creates an estimated 100,000 units annually, representing over
90% o f all subsidized low-income rental apartments produced across the nation,
40% o f all multi-family rental housing over the past decade, over one million lowincome housing units in total (JCHS, 2000), and private investment estimated to be
in excess of $12 billion (EF, 1997). Furthermore, the Credit program has been
successful in attracting capital and economic development to distressed and
deteriorating neighborhoods as a means of addressing local community
development as well as affordable rental housing issues. By incorporating nonprofit
set-asides in Credit allocations, the program has encouraged socially conscious
investors as well as private corporate investors and syndicators to partner with
nonprofits to address local needs. Examples o f socially responsible investors that
purchase Credits include The Enterprise Foundation through its subsidiary, the
Enterprise Social Investment Corporation, as well as the Low-income Support
Coalition through its subsidiary, the National Equity Fund. As a result, the Credit
has emerged as a community revitalization tool as well as an affordable housing
finance tool, attracting for-profit developers, nonprofit advocates, local officials,
and investors.
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Politically, the productivity and popularity o f the Credit program is
especially compelling when compared to the slow but steady reduction o f support
for other federal housing programs. For example, the Credit has enjoyed increased
political support as well as a recent increase in budget allocation (Joint Committee
on Taxation [JCT], 2000) while other low-income rental housing programs have in
general experienced disfavor or budget cuts. Despite recent increases in HUD’s
Section 8 voucher programs (HUD, 1999; Orlebeke, 2000), for the past 15 years
federal low-income housing policy has been characterized largely by cuts in HUD
and Rural Development [RD] (previously known as Farmers Home Administration)
housing programs and staff, by numerous proposals to restructure and even
eliminate HUD, and by discontinuation o f programs such as the Low-income
Housing Preservation program (passed as part of the Low-income Housing
Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990). The Credit, on the other
hand, received an increase in December o f 2000 in its allocation from $1.25 per
person to $1.50 per person in 2001 and $1.75 per person in 2002, to be thereafter
increased annually indexed to inflation (JCT, 2000).
In addition to the above-mentioned economic benefits that enhanced the
Credit's political popularity, other characteristics have made it politically
acceptable. First, Credits are off-budget expenditures in that they result in
government revenues foregone rather than direct government revenues spent. Offbudget expenditures are typically less visible and more politically acceptable than
alternative means (Derthick, 1979; Danziger, Sandefur & Weinberg, 1995;
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Howard, 1997). As an additional and related advantage, the tax losses to the
government (or revenues foregone) occur into the future yet the benefits (units
produced) occur in the present. Second, the Credit program began as a low- and
moderate-income housing program. Arguably, this moderate-income focus
enhanced the initial acceptability o f the Credit among many constituents while
subsequent provisions that allowed for increased flexibility to serve lower-income
households increased the program's popularity among advocates and community
development professionals. Third, expiring contracts and H U D’s recent efforts to
restructure existing subsidized housing programs1 have induced many private
landlords to sell eligible subsidized low-income housing developments (e.g., HUD
Section 221(d)(3) and Section 2362), leaving the Credit as one o f the only
remaining tools for preserving valuable low-income rental-housing stock.
Institutional Importance
Finally, the Credit program deserves further analysis because it represents
an important institutional change in low-income housing policy. Since the 1960s,
with the exception o f rural housing programs administered by RD, the federal
department charged with housing the nation’s poor has been HUD. Since the
1980s, HUD has come under increasing attack from members o f the legislative
branch, the executive branch, constituents, and local officials. The department was
plagued by scandals during the Reagan Administration, by internal conflict during
the Bush Administration, and by downsizing and massive reorganization efforts
during the 1990s. The fact that the Credit, now the largest federal low-income

housing program, has been placed under the jurisdiction o f the IRS in conjunction
with local housing agencies and not HUD is notable.
This is not to say that the Credit program has not received valid criticism.
Indeed, the most commonly cited concern is whether or not the program is costeffective in terms o f government revenues foregone and public benefits received
(Stegman, 1991; Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999). Yet after 10 years of
implementation, especially in comparison to other low-income rental housing
policies over the past 60 years, the Credit enjoys a more positive status than many
o f its predecessors, even among its critics (Stegman, 1999; Orlebeke, 2000). It is
the question o f w hy the Credit maintains such significant support among a variety
o f actors in spite o f criticisms that stimulated my interest in using the Credit
program as a case study for the ACF. Again, I believe that the Credit program has
received broad support in spite o f criticisms largely because the policy reflects
several deep core values held within the American political culture, incorporates
values that are widely accepted within the nation's political economy, and
exemplifies policy learning. Applying the ACF to the Credit will identify policy
analysis procedures that can facilitate the creation o f successful social policies, in
essence creating the "operational insights" that lead to better governing (deLeon,
1999, p. 29).

CHAPTER TWO
POLICY HISTORY AND STAKEHOLDER SURVEY RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY

For analyzing the low-income housing tax credit [LIHTC or Credit], the casestudy methodology incorporated three phases: historical analysis, stakeholder survey
analysis, and paradigm analysis. The primary research methodology used was the
policy history case narrative; a secondary research tool, stakeholder surveys and
interviews, was used with the explicit intent of providing corroborating data for
information gleaned during the policy history stage. This chapter briefly explores the
case-study methodology and provides pertinent examples o f how policy histories have
been applied to case study analysis. Additionally, because stakeholder surveys and
interviews were completed (intended to corroborate observations resulting from the
policy history), the chapter outlines the survey and interview methods used.
Policy History Methodology
In What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations o f Social Inquiry (Ragin &
Becker, 1992), Abbott (1992) advocated that the case-narrative approach allows the
researcher to examine cases (or phenomena) as events engaged in perpetual interaction
with their environments, resulting in an interplay of actions that he called a "plot.”
These plots or agendas intersect and have varying causes and consequences. Thus
“things happen because o f constellations o f factors, not because o f a few fundamental
effects acting independently” (p. 68). The case-narrative approach permits exploration

o f this type o f fragmented causality and aptly reflects the complexity and interaction
o f policy-making processes. Among the researchers who have used the policy history
methodology successfully in case analyses are Derthick (1979) and K atz (1995). In her
study of Social Security, Derthick examined the nature o f the program and the policy
making process to answer questions about why Social Security, a policy o f such
importance and with such consequential implications for the future, has historically
generated relatively little discord and controversy. Using interviews, archival data, and
oral and written histories, Derthick examined the politics o f Social Security,
explaining how the policy was successfully institutionalized over 40 years and why it
experiences trouble today. She explored the various roles and objectives o f program
executives, members o f Congress, Congressional subcommittees, advisory councils,
political executives, and interest groups. She assessed who benefited from the program
and how, and she considered the underlying values and circumstances that influenced
decision-makers.
In Improving Poor People, Katz (1995) incorporated almost 30 years o f
historical research in the field o f welfare policy. In a policy history, he revealed how
historians can contribute to the public policy-making process by defining the
presumptions on which welfare policy can be formed. Katz provided a comprehensive
overview o f the history o f the American welfare state, identified policy "pitfalls," and
offered lessons for expanding the public discourse on welfare policy. He considered
the evolution o f the "underclass" and explored questions relating to government's
inability to redesign welfare systems that are satisfactory to the public. By asking why
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public policy has not been able to abolish poverty and urban deterioration, why certain
public policies have failed, and by searching for examples with potential for success,
he showed how policy histories add value to the policy-making and policy-analysis
processes. In light o f the works o f Derthick and Katz, o f articles in the Journal o f
Policy History, and o f the ACF's basic premise that full comprehension o f policy
change requires a long-term perspective, using policy history as a means o f
completing an LIHTC case study is appropriate in this study.
The majority o f the archival data was gathered during research Phase I, the
historical analysis. During this research phase, variety o f documents published
between 1985 to 2000 were gathered and reviewed. Archival documents included
Congressional records, subcommittee testimony, legislation, government studies,
academic analyses, and industry articles. After a thorough review o f the documents,
the Credit program history was categorized into identifiable evolutionary stages and
explored for indicators o f political culture, political economy, and policy learning.
Specifically, historical documents w ere used to identify key actors and institutions, the
subsystem stakeholders; to create listings o f stakeholder concerns and beliefs as
reflected in the documents; and to identify the stable parameters applicable to the
policy issue, as described by the ACF. The policy history was categorized into phases
using a combination o f chronology and the attributes o f activity within the policy
arena. After the information was categorized, it was evaluated to detect indications of
policy learning over time and identify key stakeholder values.
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Survey and Interview Methodology
During the LIHTC case-study research Phase II, the stakeholder analysis,
written surveys and personal follow-up interviews were conducted with key decision
makers and practitioners in the Credit industry. The purpose of the surveys and
interviews was to explore values and policy learning to see if survey responses
supported policy history observations. The individuals interviewed represented a
variety o f actors, and the sampling set included people with both long-term and short
term experience with the Credit program. For logistical and economic reasons the
majority o f the participants were Oregonians, although several had experience with the
Credit program in other parts o f the country. The intent o f the stakeholder surveys and
interviews was to solicit answers related to the constructs of political culture, political
economy, and policy learning. Thus, survey and interview questions were structured
so as to elicit indicators o f policy learning over time as well as underlying reasons for
policy acceptance.
Sampling Selection
The selection o f appropriate sampling techniques is critical for increasing the
validity o f survey research (Sheskin, 1985; Fowler, 1988). In this endeavor, the
validity o f the results was enhanced by the careful selection of respondents. To this
end, I endeavored to ensure that participants represented a reasonable sampling o f the
various stakeholders and decision-makers involved in the Credit policy-making and
implementation process since the program’s inception (Sheskin, 1985). I completed
both a pilot study and a main study, incorporating 40 stakeholders. Ten stakeholders
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were asked to participate in the pilot study and 30 in the main study. Participants had a
broad range o f experience and functions and included representatives from the
following categories:
•

Federal and state politicians

•

Bureaucrats and administrators (federal and state)

•

Private developers who currently use or have previously used the Credit

•

Non-profit developers who currently use or have previously used the Credit

•

Tax credit consultants

•

Tax credit syndicators and direct investors

•

Conventional lenders (construction/bridge/permanent)

•

Local housing authorities

•

Attorneys specializing in Credits

•

Accountants specializing in Credits

These categories include all the relevant professional stakeholders who are involved in
and who are knowledgeable about the LIHTC program. Although Credit project
residents also have a vested interest in the program, in that they are its beneficiaries,
they were not included in this survey since the Credit program and its mechanics are
essentially invisible to them. An additional sampling goal was to include at least three
representatives from each group in the survey and interview processes and to ensure
that the selection captured an array o f experience and insight. By including
representatives from all professional stakeholder categories and with a range o f
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experience, I anticipated that diverse perspectives, perceptions, and priorities would be
disclosed.
Survey Approach
To enhance reliability, I used the dual survey approach of administering
written surveys followed by personal interviews (Dillman, 1978; Sheskin, 1985). After
calling potential respondents to request their participation in the research process, I
distributed the initial surveys along with a self-addressed stamped envelope and an
introduction letter (Appendix A). In the letter, I explained the process for completing
and returning the survey and the fact that a brief follow-up interview would be
conducted by a research assistant (Frey & Oishi, 1995; Sheskin, 1985). The research
assistant was flexible in availability (thereby being more responsive to the needs o f
participants) and was professionally trained in successful interview techniques. When
the research assistant called respondents to schedule interviews, she also reminded
them to return their surveys if they had not done so, which likely served to enhance
response rates. These interviews, most o f which were executed via phone, were taped.
The use o f personal interviews in addition to written surveys was twofold: to
allow participants an opportunity to expand on issues or add to responses from their
surveys, via open-ended questions, and to explore the same issues introduced in the
written survey, using different types o f questions posed in varying ways, with the
intent o f increasing reliability (Converse & Presser, 1986; Frey & Oishi, 1995;
Sheskin, 1985). After completion of stakeholder interviews, I followed up with thankyou letters to all participants, and the assistant promptly completed the transcripts o f
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the interviews. During the main study, 30 stakeholders were queried. O f the 30
stakeholders approached, 25 surveys were returned (83.33%). Five respondents did not
return the survey but participated in the interview process, so that 30 stakeholder
interviews were completed (100%). These high response rates enhanced the reliability
o f the survey process.
Reliability and Validity
In considering the types o f survey and interview questions to be included,
issues o f reliability and validity were o f concern (Converse & Presser, 1986; Litwin,
1995; Sheskin, 1985). The questions posed needed to appropriately measure and
explore the constructs being considered and to provide reliable results (Litwin, 1995).
The dual survey approach was important; the use o f both written survey instruments
and personal interviews was intended to increase the reliability o f the results by
allowing questions addressing the same constructs to be asked in different ways (openand close-ended formats) at different times. In How to M easure Survey Reliability a n d
Validity, Litwin defined validity as how well a survey or index measures what it is
intended to measure (1995). According to Litwin, there are four types o f validity: face
validity, content validity, criterion validity, and construct validity3. Construct validity
is the most valuable test and considers how meaningful the survey instrument will be
in practical application. The most reliable construct validity is established by testing a
survey instrument over several years in a variety o f settings. However, construct
validity can also be tested over the short term by using several different questions to
obtain the same result; this is referred to as convergent validity (Litwin, 1995).

Convergent validity was the goal o f the dual survey technique used in the Credit
survey process and was enhanced by the pilot survey process. During the pilot test, 10
stakeholders-one from each category—completed the survey and interview. After
completing the interviews, the research assistant explained the purpose o f the research
more fully to the pilot test participants, queried them on the clarity of the questions,
and asked for suggested potential changes to the research tool. Based on this feedback,
the survey and interview instruments were revised. Only slight revisions for
clarification o f some questions were needed, and the survey and interview tools used
in the main survey are provided in Appendices B and C.
Coding Results
After collecting the surveys and interview transcripts, I began the survey
analysis process by creating numeric codes for answers to the questions posed, for
professional categories, and for actor categories. Coding numbers 1 through 30 were
reserved for all potential answers to survey and interview questions that dealt with
LIHTC program goals. O f these 30 numbers, 26 were used to categorize and tally
answers. The numbering system was especially effective because positive and
negative attributes could be assigned to the same code number for each program goal,
thus indicating whether the respondent felt a program goal was good or bad, achieved
or not achieved. To identify respondents’ professional affiliations, numbers 31 through
50 were reserved for professional codes, o f which 31 through 46 were used. Numbers
51 through 60 were used as actor codes, representing the 10 stakeholder categories
originally identified. As a means o f enhancing coding validity, the research assistant

(who by then was well-acquainted with the research goals, concepts, and survey tools)
compared my coding sheet to the potential survey and interview answers, adding code
numbers where needed to ensure that all potential answers could be accurately
accounted for. After finalizing the coding system, I assigned numbers to the surveys
and interview transcripts, inserted answers for each question as a number from the
coding sheet, and coded all answers. Subsequently, the research assistant checked my
coding for her agreement with coding and for errors, and minor changes were made to
reconcile our interpretations in coding results. Additional detail on the coding system
and the coding results is provided in Appendices D, E, and F. A ranking and weighting
analysis was completed for several questions, while a simple frequency analysis was
used for descriptive questions on respondent attributes (i.e., demographics,
professions). A synthesis o f survey and interview results is included in Chapter Three,
and the relevant concepts that the policy history, surveys and interviews were intended
to explore are described more fully in Chapter Four. The ways in which survey
responses corroborated policy history observations are examined further in Chapters
Six and Seven.

CHAPTER THREE
SURVEY AND INTERVIEW RESPONSES: A SYNTHESIS

The purpose o f completing the stakeholder surveys and interviews was to
gather information from people actively involved in administering and implementing
the Credit program and to assess that information for indications o f values and policy
learning. As stated in Chapter Two, during the main study 30 stakeholders were
queried. O f the 30 stakeholders approached, 25 surveys were returned (83.33%). Five
respondents did not return the survey but participated in the interview process, so that
30 stakeholder interviews were completed (100%). This chapter synthesizes survey
and interview responses that will be referenced in the policy history and policy
analysis chapters as corroborating data. Some o f the terminology used in the interview
quotes are specific to the Credit program and will be explained further in Chapter
Five.
Survey Responses
The survey instrument (Appendix B) was comprised o f eight questions. The
first question asked related to why organizations chose to invest in certain Credit
projects and not others. The question was posed only to syndicators, lenders,
developers, and administrators and thus was answered only by fifteen or 60% o f the
respondents. Although five responses were requested, only 53% o f the respondents, or
8 o f 15, provided a fifth response. Consequently, all but the top four answers were
discounted. Ranking and weighting the responses, the following responses emerged as
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the primary reasons for investing in a Credit project and, given the roles o f
respondents, were consistent with expectations:
Ranking
#1
#2

Most Frequent Answer
Effectiveness in meeting housing goals
Promote quality real estate development

#3

Financial viability

#4

Sufficient return on private investment

Question #2 queried all respondents regarding what they considered to be the
greatest advantages offered by tax credit program. A listing of potential advantages
was provided, with instructions for respondents to rank them in order o f importance
(e.g., using N/A if the response was not perceived as an advantage, 1 for the most
advantageous, 2 for the second most advantageous, etc.) Possible answers to this
close-ended question were based on information obtained during the literature review
phase. Again using the ranking and weighting approach, among the top advantages of
the Credit program (as perceived by those who use and allocate Credits) was
"effectiveness in meeting housing goals," though the roles played by the private sector
(specifically its equity funding and the partnerships forged with public and nonprofit
organizations) emerged as the most prominent advantages. Importantly, the
respondents included stakeholders from the nonprofit sector and reflects the value that
they put on the equity and skills contributed by their private sector partners to Credit
projects, the community at-large, and their own organizational growth.
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Ranking

Program Characteristic
Private investments leverage

#2
#3
#4

Private sector involvement in low-income housing
Effectiveness in meeting housing goals
Facilitates public/private partnership

#5

Facilitates local control and is a means for influencing
community revitalization (2 answers tied for #5 ranking)

#6
#7

Nonprofit growth and development
Flexibility

Survey question #3, also a close-ended question, queried all respondents
regarding what they considered to be the greatest d/sadvantages o f the Credit program.
Again, a listing o f potential responses for ranking was provided and was based on
information obtained during the literature review phase. Complexity and inefficiency
(both economic and administrative) received the most rankings as the greatest
disadvantages of the program and is consistent with many o f the criticisms by
academics early in the program’s history (Stegman, 1991). Also highly ranked was
“unfair preference to nonprofits” as a disadvantage. The preference in many Qualified
Allocation Plans [QAPs] for nonprofit sponsors and the increasing percentage of
allocations made to nonprofits nationwide spurred substantive debate within the
industry in the late 1990s (National Council o f State Housing Agencies [NCSHA],
1997), and thus the presence of this response was not surprising. Although "displaces
private investment" was ranked last and was not the most prominently mentioned
disadvantage in this or other questions, its presence as a perceived disadvantage is
notable as this concern has potential to become a local and national policy issue, on
both philosophical and economic grounds.
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Highest
Ranking
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8

Program Characteristic
Complex
Economically inefficient
Administratively inefficient
Gives unfair preference to nonprofits
Has complicated monitoring requirements
Inflexible
Insufficient subsidy
Displaces private investment

The respondents were next asked how long they had been involved with the
program. The placement o f this question was intentional. The questions to follow were
repetitive inquiries on program advantages and disadvantages (though asked in a
different format), and this background question served to interrupt the thought process
and discourage respondents from simply repeating their answers. The purpose o f this
question was to ensure that the majority of respondents had sufficient experience to
provide a “long-term” perspective. O f the 25 respondents to the survey, 6 or 24% had
less than 5 years experience while 19 or 76% (the vast majority o f respondents) had
between 5 and 14 years.
In question #5 respondents were again asked what they considered to be the
top three advantages o f the program. The question, presented this time in an openended format, was intended to be a cross-check for the close-ended question #2 as well
as an opportunity for respondents to put forth advantages not listed in the previous
question (see Appendix B). Again the housing and private investment goals emerged
as the two most prominent advantages o f the program.
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Ranking
#1
#2
#3

M ost Frequent Answer
Leveraging o f private dollars
Effectiveness in meeting housing needs
Private sector involvement in low-income housing

Likewise, in question #6 respondents were asked what they considered to be the top
three <//sadvantages o f the program. Also presented in an open-ended format, this
question was intended to be a cross-check for the close-ended question #3 and
provided an opportunity for respondents to put forth disadvantages not previously
listed. The top three answers were clearly reflective o f those given in question #3:
Ranking

Most Frequent Answer

#1

Economic inefficiency

#2

Complexity

#3

Insufficient subsidy

The purpose o f question #7, another close-ended question, was to focus on
program outcomes (as opposed to advantages or disadvantages o f the program) that
were most valued by participants. The top three-ranked program goals pertained to
actual housing produced and private investment activity stimulated—mirroring top
ranked program advantages and clearly priority goals o f the program based on
subcommittee hearings and testimonies. Issues related to equity, local control,
community, and residents-all appearing in the historical archives as material if not
primary goals-followed in the rankings.
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Highest
Ranking
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8

Program Characteristic
Effectiveness in meeting housing needs
Private sector involvement in LI housing
Leverage Private Investment
Community Revitalization and Development
Locally-determined government objectives
Integration of low-income housing in non low-income
neighborhoods
Efficient distribution of housing benefits
Enhanced self-sufficiency o f residents

The last survey question, question #8, contained several sub-questions intended
to provide demographic and other background information. The majority o f
respondents (20 of 25 or 80%) were between 30 and 55 years o f age, with h alf o f these
being between 36 and 45 and the other half being between 46 and 55 years o f age. Of
the 25 respondents, 16 or 54% reported having Masters or Doctoral degrees (four
participants held doctorate degrees, o f which 3 were Juris Doctorates), and all but one
respondent had at least a Bachelor's Degree. Given the high level o f technical
expertise required for the implementation o f this complicated program, the educational
attributes are not surprising. The response that was surprising, however, was the most
frequently identified academic of liberal and fine arts, followed by economics,
finance, business administration and law. The majority o f respondents, 19 or 76%,
were Democrats; thus the sampling could be considered more "liberal" than the
population in general. To identify which actor categories were represented, the
respondents were asked to indicate for which professional category they felt best
described their current role in the industry. O f the 25 written survey respondents, the
following responses were given:
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Professional Category
Elected official (local or federal)

Responses
2

Bureaucrat/Administrator

4

Private Developer
Non-profit Developer
Consultant
Syndicator/Investor
Lender/Financier
Local Housing Authority

1
3
2
3
4
2

Attorney

3

Certified Public Accountant

1

Observations from Interview Transcripts4
The following is an overview of highlights from the stakeholder interview
responses. The interview tool (Appendix C) contained 13 questions, and the first few
questions served as open-ended "cross-checks" for several written survey questions.
The remainder o f the questions focused on exploring stakeholder values and probed
for indications o f policy learning. Because many o f the responses were similar, the
quotes on the following pages do not comprise a comprehensive listing but rather are
representative o f the most frequently given or most compelling answers. Question #1
o f the interview tool asked respondents to identify the top three advantages of the
Credit program that came immediately to mind. This question served as a cross-check
for survey questions #2 and #5, in which respondents identified the greatest
advantages o f the Credit program. Using the ranking and weighting coding system, the
following were the top three ranked advantages:
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Ranking

Most Frequent Answer

#1
#2
#3

Leverages private investment
Effective in meeting housing goals
Driven by locally determined objectives

When asked "why" they responded as they did, the following comments were given:
•

you can do many different types o f housing in many different areas

•

QAPs help prioritize housing goals as needed

•

the program is complicated but gets it good housing built to meet local needs

•

it is beneficial all the way around-a "win/win" situation

•

the program connects nonprofits with a much larger community and expertise

•

there is a reasonable risk for a reasonable return

•

the Credit builds over 1/3 o f multi-family housing in the country now

•

it increases private sector leverage and increases comfort the level o f lenders
for underwriting risk

•

it brings financial discipline to low-income housing investment

•

your not being told by HUD how to run your project

•

competition enhances the efficiency o f process to get better result

•

the program eliminates egregious bureaucrats and puts the responsibility for
monitoring for the public good on the investors

•

it is a bi-partisan effort; it's great for Republicans and Democrats

•

in some cases the Credit has leveraged more money than is available through
HUD
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•

I don't think the credit would have survived some attacks if it were not for the
money leveraged

•

it is a politically acceptable way to put money into problems o f the low-income
housing

• the Credit is oversold as a private sector investment in the low-income
community; they are making money or they wouldn't do it
• the partnering o f private and nonprofit actors brings together different values
•

for administrators it IS administratively efficient because syndicators and
partners must do the monitoring; public officials only check the information
Question #2 o f the interview tool asked respondents to identify the top three

rf/sadvantages that came immediately to mind, serving as a final cross-check for
questions in #3 and #6 o f the written survey. Again using the ranking and weighting
system, the following were the top three ranked disadvantages and are consistent with
the disadvantages identified during the survey process:
Ranking

Most Frequent Answer

#1

Program is too complicated

#2

Program is economically inefficient

#3

Program is administratively inefficient

It is important to note that some respondents emphasized that the disadvantages o f the
program, in comparison with other federal housing programs such as those run by
HUD, are minimal and that the Credit program is the "best thing going" as far as
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federal low-income housing programs are concerned. Otherwise, in response to the
question why, the following comments were given:
•

the limited partnership structure is very costly

•

the layering o f subsidies is needed to reach very low incomes and is
administratively inefficient

•

you cannot use the Credit for small in-fill project; economies o f scale are
needed

•

the inefficiencies are long-term because o f the costs o f monitoring costs

•

the program requires significant expertise that is expensive and increases costs
per unit

•

direct grants by government to housing developers are probably more
economically efficient ways o f achieving the goal

•

the Credit displaces private investment

•

the program administratively inefficient because it is inconsistently
administered across the country

•

the necessary blending o f funds from numerous funding agencies lead to
overlapping compliance requirements that are cumbersome and often
conflicting

•

there is some perception o f competition with private market, whether or not it's
a reality
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Overall, the general attitude o f many respondents was reflected in a comment made by
a Credit investor who previously was a nonprofit developer that used Credits to build
housing: "Of course, we haven't come up with more efficient or creative ways and
certainly have found less economically efficient ways."
The remainder o f the questions posed were open-ended queries intended to
search for stakeholder values and indications o f policy learning. For example, when
asked how they thought the Credit program differed most dramatically from other
federal low-income housing program-both good and bad—the following responses
were given, many o f which reflected stakeholder values or policy learning:
•

residents' incomes can rise and they do not lose their housing

•

more private investment is generated so it is not just a government program

• it is more complicated than other programs for housing
• it is more flexible than HUD programs
• for-profits have a greater stake in community, so they share meeting the social
needs o f society with nonprofits; it creates a socially responsible private sector
• because of investors, the rate of return and long-term asset management seems
more important
• there are consequences for noncompliance that are extreme
•

Treasury vs. HUD oversight is a positive

•

it is less bureaucratic than HOME and has more discipline in compliance than
Rural Development
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•

the government puts money into it once

•

it has produced a decentralized way o f producing low-income housing

•

it relies on the private investor to monitor compliance with the goals o f the
program

•

the program targets working families, unlike other programs such as HUD 811
or 202 programs (which are for the elderly and disabled)

•

it is politically popular-which is not true with other programs
In question #7 a listing o f Credit program goals and objectives as gleaned from

the policy history archives was provided. Consistent with terminology o f the
Advocacy Coalition .Framework (ACF), respondents were given the definition o f “core
values” are those that they were not willing to compromise and “secondary values” as
those that are important but which may be subject to compromise to achieve goals.
The intent o f the question was to identify information on values that could be
referenced in the policy analysis phase o f the research, and the responses unveiled the
following goals and objectives primary stakeholder core and secondary values:
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CORE
Value
Ranking
1

CORE Value
Responses

SECONDARY
Value Responses

N /A *

Credit program goal/ objective
ranked

26

3

I

Affordable housing development

2

17

12

1

3

13

15

2

Stabilization or revitalization of
communities
Facilitation of residents’ self-sufficiency

4

11

17

2

5

11

15

4

6

11

15

4

Involvement o f private sector in lowincome housing
Leverage of private funds in
public/private partnership model
Efficient means of providing needed
housing subsidies

Equitable distribution of subsidies based
on local goals/objectives/needs
5
23
2
Introduction of affordable housing in
8
non-low-income communities.
* N/A indicates both Not Applicable or No Answer. Only one respondent refused to answer this
question, as he felt that values were moral issues not appropriate for discussion.
9

7

19

2

When asked the follow-up question regarding what personal or professional values
they have compromised in order to work successfully with the Credit program,
nineteen out o f 30 respondents, or 63%, said "None." The following is representative
o f the other responses given:
•

seeing some people make lots o f money o ff a program to help very poor people
when the money could go to lower rents rather than profit

•

providing direct subsidies would be more efficient

•

not being able to serve most needy in the highest quality housing

•

doing a deal even if it is not what the community needs most

•

sacrificing community needs to meet program requirements

•

when profits seem more important than housing
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•

being inconsistent to accommodate deals or players, especially if the housing is
needed

•

accepting a mediocre project-that is frustrating

•

bowing to public pressure to get at least something done

•

the perception o f local need does not always match reality, and what gets
funded sometimes is not really what is needed

•

compromising economic efficiency for political considerations

Asked what values they would absolutely not sacrifice, many participants gave similar
responses, and the following is representative o f those answers given:
•

integrity o f the program

•

fairness

•

alignment o f interests

•

delivering on promises to and return for the community

•

helping the really needy obtain affordable housing

•

long-term project viability for short-term gain

•

appropriate use o f resources

•

honesty or professional ethics

•

fiscal responsibility

•

showing respect for residents

•

"The entire process is a compromise, although I'd like to say I won’t
compromise on any core values b u t . . . "
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As a query on policy learning, respondents were asked which changes
implemented since the program's inception have been most important. Although some
respondents were not aware o f specific changes, most o f the administrators,
accountants, attorneys, and investors were. The m ost frequently cited positive changes
were as follows:
•

the nonprofit "option to own" provision helps ensure future affordability

•

the changes in "student occupancy" issues allows some people who are trying
to get ahead keep their housing

•

permanency has stabilized the program and has helped to increase investor
equity pay-in

•

imposition o f long-term affordability to 30 years from 15 better serves public
objectives (by a syndicator, private developer and attorney)

•

more codification has made the program easier; the program now attracts more
investors which has helped drive up equity pay-ins

•

clarification o f eligible basis items has been helpful in putting deals together

•

clarification on how to use HOME dollars with credits has helped reach lower
incomes

•

enhanced compliance monitoring in 1993 helped stop abuses

•

the IRS has become more flexible on some administrative issues giving states
more local control

•

enhanced auditing procedures maintain the integrity o f the program
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•

a shift to an allocation plan process from a "first come first serve" basis (as
seen in the early years) helps ensure there are good projects serving needy
populations

•

implementation o f the 10% test was good because you don't have to build
project before end o f the year

•

standardized rental rates has improved underwriting

•

allocation agencies limiting the amount o f credits to be given to one developer
in a reservation has helped spread out the benefit

As a follow-up question, participants were asked how they would modify the program.
Apparently, more respondents were prepared for this question, as everyone seemed to
have ideas:
•

increase the per capital allocation amount to $1.75 and index the rate annually
thereafter to inflation5

•

streamline administrative compliance and reporting

•

there should be less than catastrophic remedies for being out o f compliance

•

there needs to be increased consistency nationwide on how states assess
projects

•

give a 130% "basis booster" to difficult populations (such as 30% AMI or
special needs populations)

•

enhance enforceability for social services programs promised by developers

•

target allocations to lower incomes
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•

eliminate some of the subsidy layering issues, allowing projects serving very
low incomes to use multiple subsidies

•

eliminate the 10% carryover requirement

•

allow private sector participation in allocation processes; it is too state
controlled and too political

•

there should be more reservations for nonprofits

•

provide more administrative flexibility

•

do not treat grants as taxable income to the partnerships

•

Credits should be simply sold as a commodity and not tied to the property,
which creates a need for a partnership structure that is expensive; they should
just sell the credits like other investments to the highest bidder

•

obtain more timely and affordable technical guidance from the IRS (e.g., a
Private Letter Ruling from the IRS can take 12-18 months and costs $10,000)

Participants were then asked to reflect further on the program and identify what they
thought was the most significant or poignant lesson they had learned over the
years-something that had changed their way of working or thinking. Some o f the most
interesting answers were given to this question and reflected shared values but also
conflicting goals:
•

everyone involved is working towards a common goal

•

your must have a competitive application; just a well-known name doesn't get
you funded
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•

you must pay attention to details

•

you have access to good new partners

•

you must always protect your interests

•

it is so complicated, even the experts make mistakes

•

you must take your fiduciary responsibilities seriously

•

just when I think I understand it, I don't

•

it is important to work with credible partners and pay attention to the capacity
o f everyone on development team

•

mixed-income communities are important and effective for revitalization

•

it is not a simple program, and education increases efficient use o f the program

• politics is very much a part o f the process and is a negative
• sometimes you just have to walk away from a deal
•

the for-profit support has built strong national support for program

•

locals can support quality low-income housing and improve the community too

•

you can involve the public and private sector in "win/win" situation

•

if there is enough incentive, it will be done

•

these developments really do change the lives o f people

•

people with money aren't all that bad

•

I'm not sure the program is really meeting the needs o f the neediest o f families

•

teamwork with the private sector has changed nonprofit thinking

•

community-based resources seem more important now
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•

it is not really low-income housing its lower-income housing

• probably the program is more amenable to private developers than it used to
be; there no longer is a bias to private or nonprofit
• you should not make non-qualified nonprofits take this on;it doesn't do them
any favors
•

in the end it is really about the people and their homes; improving peoples
lives.
Switching the focus to the "outcomes" o f the program, a final cross-check

question was inserted, and respondents were asked what they considered to be the
most important results o f the Credit policy. The following are representative o f the
responses given and mirror the "lessons learned" identified in the previous question as
well as the values, advantages, and disadvantages:
• enhanced resident self-sufficiency
• the capacity building for charities
• the building o f decent, quality housing
• the positive impacts made on local communities
• the private money leveraged
•

the creation o f an industry; now there is a whole private sector devoted to lowincome housing that wasn't there before

• the program requires nonprofits to be sophisticated in management
•

the government really is a partner

•

the realization o f the importance o f caution

•

the realization that quality housing can be constructed for the working poor

•

the program is out o f the budgetary process so you don't need annual allocation

•

the creation good housing in rural areas

•

the stabilization o f families

•

the tool created for community revitalization

•

the integration o f services into housing through allocation plans is positive

•

the involvement o f lending institutions in multi-family low-income housing is
good

•

the trend towards nonprofits is good for communities

•

the strong bi-partisan support

•

the quality housing built has often changed communities' conversations about
what type of affordable housing can and should be built; a reverse from the
public housing model to market-driven approach.
Lastly, because the Credit program is used nationwide but the majority o f

respondents were from Oregon, it was important to try to glean what differences, if
any, existed between how Oregon and other states implemented the program.
Primarily, this question was asked for use in potential future research endeavors, but it
provided some very interesting answers that, upon reflection, explained some of the
responses previously given. Although a few stakeholders worked with the program
across the nation, most participants reported working in Washington, Idaho, Utah,
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Oregon, California, Arizona, Arkansas, Minnesota and Nevada. From those
interviewed who work with the Credit program in other states, the following responses
were given:
•

In Washington the scoring is more objective than in Oregon (not as subjective)
because o f the point system;

•

Oregon awards in a timely manner, has more effective outreach officers, and
has local/state subsidies to enhance affordability;

•

In Idaho and Utah, for-profit developers primarily use Credits and generally
there are smaller projects;

• Competition in Oregon is not as high as some other states so it may not get as
effective targeting; also there is a more subjective allocation system (not a
point system or lottery system);
• Oregon is more political and more non-profit oriented; it considers less
developer experience or capability and is inconsistent and less professional
than other states in both allocation and administration;
•

Because Oregon is a more liberal state overall, there is more soft money at the
state and local level;

•

Oregon is well-organized as far as integrating and coordinating housing
resources, which is different than other states;
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•

Oregon is much more user friendly and more flexible and accessible because
o f the application process and Regional Field Representatives; also it's cheaper
to use as far as fees to the state than others are;

• Generally Oregon is more open and cooperative than other states,
• Washington is more administrative and objective which has advantages and
disadvantages;
• Oregon doesn't have as good a documentation as other states because they
don't have good legal help in putting agreements and documents together; they
are good people and trying hard b u t . . . on the other hand, other states' people
aren't always as dedicated as those in Oregon-or as accessible;
•

Oregon is more subjective and less numbers-based in the selection of projects
for allocation. This is good because it is more likely to fund the most needy
projects in many instances;

•

There is more interplay with HOME and state (Housing Trust Fund) subsidies,
creating seriously leveraged deals. In many ways it is more complicated than in
other areas of the country (because o f rules that come with various monies) but
also pushes rents down further than you see in other parts o f the country;

•

Oregon seems to be more flexible in administration that Washington;

•

Oregon focuses more on nonprofit developers and people trying to make
program work versus acting like bureaucrats trying to justify their existence;
there is more give and take.
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In summary, the intent o f this chapter was to introduce the survey and
interview data discussed that will be utilized throughout the remainder o f the text. For
the most part, the data will be referenced in Chapters Six and Seven-the policy history
and policy analysis. In preparation for the policy history and analysis, the focus o f the
next chapter shifts from research methodology and results to construct development
and literature review.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RELEVANT CONCEPTS: VALUES, CULTURE, AND COALTIONS

Central in the historical evolution o f democracy and capitalism is the notion o f
"ethos." The "fundamental character" of a culture, the distinguishing attributes o f a
community, and the "moral elements" that influence actions or behaviors (Webster's,
1996)—ethos is ubiquitous, underlying all aspects o f civil societies. This chapter
explores the role o f ethos in the policy-making arena, the concepts o f political culture
and political economy, and the specifics o f the Advocacy Coalition Framework
[ACF], as created by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993; Sabatier, 1999). These ideas
are pertinent in examining the success o f the Credit program, and a basic
understanding o f these concepts and their importance within the public policy realm,
and policy-making in particular, are equally important. The first section, on Values
and Public Policy, discusses why values and norms have been largely ignored by
policy analysts, provides examples o f how a few researchers have attempted to
incorporate values into their policy discussions, and considers how the focus on values
in policy analysis can be expanded. In the sections on political culture and political
economy, relevant terms are defined and trends in American political culture and
political economy are explored. In the final section on the ACF, a more detailed
explanation o f this paradigm is provided along with observations from researchers
who have applied the model.
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Values and Public Policy
The practice o f making critical connections between values and public policy
is not new. Consideration o f values by politicians (as expressed in policy priorities) is
manifested in the use o f public opinion polls, and numerous researchers have included
discussions on the influence o f values, attitudes, and norms on public policy-making
in their work (Aaron et al., 1994; Gans, 1995; Katz, 1995; McClosky & Zaller, 1984).
In The War Against the Poor (1995), Gans explored how widely held values become
ensconced in language and influence how policy issues are considered and discussed.
For example, Gans argued that terms such as "deserving" and "undeserving poor" and
"the underclass" contributed to the demoralization o f poor people and popularize the
conviction that morality characterized behaviors o f the poor rather than the condition
o f poverty itself. Katz, in Im proving Poor People (1995), described how welfare
policy in America has reflected the ongoing tensions between democratic and
capitalist values: public versus private provision of services, capitalist as opposed to
socialist-based alternatives, and local versus federal administration. The writings o f
Gans, a sociologist, Katz, a historian, and others have made important, indeed
groundbreaking, contributions by assessing the influence o f public attitudes on social
programs, public discourse, and proposed reforms (Aaron et al., 1994; Danziger,
Sandefur & Weinberg, 1994; Gans, 1995; Katz, 1995). However, although a few
authors have come close, lacking is any real attempt to operationalize value
connections into a model o f policy analysis that would serve to enhance policy
making, especially in social policy realms.
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[n Values and Public P olicy (1994), contributing authors explored the
relationships between values, norms, and public policies. They considered the effects
o f feedback loops wherein public policies are influenced by norms and values, and
alternately how public policies facilitate changes in values. They espoused the
importance o f understanding the formation o f preferences as being essential for
investigating incentives and behavioral responses. In the introductory chapter, Aaron
et al. promoted the importance o f including values in policy analysis and explained
why researchers have historically omitted value considerations from their analyses.
The editors maintained that social scientists historically have assumed that values,
norms and attitudes were beyond the realm o f public policy analysis. Focusing instead
on incentives and responses, policy analysts have oversimplified the analytical process
by accentuating rules, programs, and policies rather than value judgements. They also
recognized several barriers to completing policy analyses based on value-judgements,
including difficulties with quantification, the disinterest by researchers in the subject
matter, and the interpretation o f values and norms as givens not subject to change.
Nevertheless, they argued, because value judgements shape public policy, are too
prevalent to ignore, and change over the long-term, policy analysts must find creative
ways o f incorporating value assessments into policy-making and policy-analysis
procedures.
For example, insight into the influential role o f values (and changes in values)
in public policy was provided in the essay by Yankelovich "The Affluence Effect"
(Yankelovich, 1994). Yankelovich described how economic affluence and the public's
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perception o f continued affluence have contributed to the evolution o f values. He
divided the links between perceptions o f economic expectations and how people view
work, pleasure, life choices, and alternate life styles into three stages. In stage one,
when affluence is new, conservative and traditional values are maintained, and people
remember economic hardships, remain concerned about the future, and focus on work,
savings, and sacrifice. In stage two, the state o f affluence is more widely experienced
and accepted, and people give greater importance to expanded life choices.
Individualism, self-expression, and pleasure are emphasized; tolerance for social
divergence is expanded; and aversion to risk is diminished. In stage three, fear o f
losing affluence contributes to people feeling trapped, and there are increased
apprehensions surrounding job, income growth, and social policy. Emphasizing that
certain core American values tend to remain consistent (e.g., equality, freedom,
achievement, democracy), Yankelovich explored in detail the value changes
experienced since World W ar II and came to two conclusions. First, "empirically
based understanding o f the nation's value system and how it has changed is not a
complete answer, b u t . . . [analysts should] understand in practical terms, which
present and proposed policies reinforce these [core and changing cultural] values and
which ones ignore or violate them . .." (p. 50). Second, augmenting an operating
knowledge o f values with accepted economic analysis practices could enhance the
efficacy o f public policy development (pp. 50-51).
A more tangible example of how to incorporate values into public policy
considerations was provided by Akerlof and Yellen in "Gang Behavior, Law

Enforcement and Community Values" (Akerlof & Yellen, 1994). These two authors
argued that in certain types o f criminal activity, such as group crime associated with
gangs and organized crime, traditional approaches to crime and punishment based on
comparisons o f potential benefits and penalties associated with committing a crime are
incomplete. Rather, the beliefs, norms, values, and expectations held by the
community at-large, which can tolerate, report, or take proactive steps against crime,
potentially play important roles in facilitating or discouraging criminal activities. The
authors advocated using an analysis model that considers influencing factors on the
community, on law enforcement, and on the criminals-including costs, benefits, and
attitudes-to assess and create criminal justice policies. The ways in which community
residents view gangs and police (e.g., fear o f gang reprisals, distrust o f local police) as
well as views on the potential benefits o f reducing gang activity and perceptions on
fairness in the justice system affect if communities will tolerate criminal behavior.
Simultaneously, perceptions o f criminals o f costs and benefits as well as expectations
o f community cooperation or lack o f cooperation with police also influence criminal
behavior. Considering these and other variables, Akerlof and Yellen promoted a model
intended to determine which policies government should create in order to control
gang behavior in light o f community behaviors, which in turn reflect community
attitudes. The authors stressed the importance o f including value assessments in
policy-making processes and identified relationships among specific variables: the
financial costs o f monitoring crime, the social costs o f crime, neighborhood income,
community reporting propensities, and attitudes about the fairness o f punishment.
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Collectively, the contributing authors o f Values a nd Public Policy investigated the
status o f and explored how public policies might alter American values and norms.
Although this work makes an important contribution to the discourse around the
formal inclusion o f values in public policy analysis, for the most part these authors
stopped short o f operationalizing o f these goals into a workable, reproducible
framework.
Another compelling example o f social research that focuses on the role o f
values in creating public policies is found in Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions fo r
Change (Danziger et al., 1995). Contributing authors recorded trends in poverty and
income disparities, analyzed a variety o f public programs and policies related to
poverty issues, and examined the public's attitudes towards poverty policies.
Reflecting a variety o f research goals, contributing authors explored the history and
extent o f poverty, analyzed policy tools that have been used in antipoverty efforts,
assessed barriers to effective antipoverty policies, identified unanswered questions
related to poverty and public responses to poverty, and proposed numerous social
policy reforms. O f particular interest is the w ork o f Garfinkel and McLanahan (1995).
In their essay "Single-Mother Families and Government Policy," these researchers
considered the condition o f single-mother families in the United States, the potential
effects o f single-mother families on children, and the government's attempts to address
related issues. The authors focused on conflicting American values associated with
social policies—for example, compassion versus belief in self-reliance or sense o f

R e p ro du ced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56
community versus self-interest-and considered how low-income single mothers and
the policy alternatives to assist them are viewed by middle- and upper-income society.
Garfinkel and McLanahan (1995) pointed out that, in addition to morality
judgements often passed on single mothers, an increase in the percentage o f married
women in the workforce has diminished society's patience w ith unemployed single
mothers. However, rather than sufficiently funding job training and child care
programs (resources with the potential for increasing earning capacity), policy-makers
in the U.S. have created programs that compensate for low earnings such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC]. More attractive to recipients than cash-transfers
"because o f its simplicity and anonymity" (Garfinkel & McLanahan, 1995, p. 216), the
EITC is also politically popular because it appears to reward work (reflective o f
America's work ethic) and is more consistent with the American propensity to provide
income transfers through less visible tax credits, a practice that has roots in our
nation's historic aversion to taxes (Lindblom, 1988) and which has given rise to the
"hidden welfare state" (Howard, 1997).
Garfinkel and McLanahan elaborated on the potential effectiveness o f
expanding subsidized child care and income support programs for children as means
o f facilitating increased earned income among single mothers, and they provided
examples o f successful programs implemented in France and Sweden, where child
care is made available to parents of all income levels. The authors assessed public
values ensconced in programs targeted to "welfare mothers" and argued that the
programs with real potential to increase the earned incomes o f single mothers, such as
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job training and child care, have not been sufficiently funded. They did not, however,
explore why financial support for job training and child care programs-which
arguably reflect the widely held American values o f self-reliance, employment, and
the welfare o f children—has not been increased, why broad popular support has not
been generated, nor how expanded public and political support could be amassed.
Understanding and identifying values that are ingrained in our political culture
and how they manifest in our political economy are potentially powerful tools for
identifying successful public policies and program characteristics. Stakeholders have
different roles and different principles, but some values are likely to be shared. Some
core values and cultural norms create a strong, widespread cultural base that is rarely
subject to change and can be capitalized on in policy-making. Alternatively, other
values are subject to change based on social, economic, collective, and personal
experiences, and these values must be considered on an ongoing basis, as policy
making is continuous. Given this, enlightened policy analysis should focus on
identifying stakeholder values and on questions o f how, and if, proposed policy
approaches and specific programs have characteristics that are likely to fulfill or
conflict with identified values. The following sections provide the conceptual
foundation for creating a replicable, values-based method o f policy
analysis-essentially operationalizing the ACF by expanding its usefulness to the
decision-making stage o f the policy analysis process.
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Political Culture
Political culture has been defined as “a set o f widely shared beliefs, values, and
norms concerning the relationship o f citizens to the government and to one another in
matters affecting public affairs” (McClosky & Zaller, 1984, p. 17). With roots dating
back to the 1930s in the University o f Chicago’s Social Science Division (Almond &
Verba, 1963), the study o f democratic political culture considers the influence o f
philosophies incorporated into theories o f political economy and o f notions such as
capitalism in particular, on policy decisions. In Contemporary P olitical Culture:
Politics in a Postmodern Age (1989), Gibbins stated that values and norms can be
viewed as social artifacts that make up the "glue" o f society. Because o f their
influence on decision-making in both private and public realms, understanding values
and norms is essential for increasing our knowledge about public policy. Indeed, the
study o f political culture is an attem pt to identify variables that have formative
influences on individuals, groups, and society-seeking to understand the importance
o f values and norms over the short and long run. In his introductory chapter, Gibbins
laid a foundation for understanding political culture by introducing four primary
theories o f political culture:
1)

The civic culture theory holds that cultural preconditions facilitate the
evolution of stable, effective governments. Without the creation and maintenance
o f an agreed-upon culture, behavioral and structural changes would threaten
society and destabilize its institutions. For civic theorists, the study o f political
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culture focuses on the underlying values that do or do not exist and on which the
successful evolution o f governmental institutions depends.
2)

The system s theory o f political culture removes these cultural preconditions;
rather the survival o f polities depends on the products (or outputs) o f its systems.
Political systems (or institutions) are influenced by the values and norms o f the
society within which they exist, but the existence o f systems is not dependent on
cultural preconditions. Systems theorists study outputs to explore the values and
norms reflected therein.

3)

M arxist theory posits that political culture is part o f a society’s
“superstructure.” Cultural values and norms are determined by the social and
economic base and thus differ among classes, with society reflecting the conflicts
between the cultural differences between the ruling and working classes. For
Marxist theorists, the study o f political culture is secondary to class study and is
merely reflective o f economic and social class conflict.

4)

Hegemony theory asserts that values o f many types play meaningful roles in
the creation and maintenance o f a culture. Values and norms emerge from popular
consent; culture is not intrinsic (as civic theory maintains) nor determined by the
economy or social class (as Marxists would have it). Rather, political culture is
affected by conflicts over power. For hegemony theorists, the study o f political
culture is an historical account o f its evolution through both political and economic
forces.

Also germane are the writings o f Girvin (1989) in “Change and Continuity in
Liberal Democratic Culture," who explored political culture by dividing it into macro-,
meso-, and micro-levels. Girvin stated that political culture evolves from many
subcultures, among which there are shared convictions that create doctrines. Although
the presence o f subcultures creates diversity, there remain central values which most
citizens respect. These core values (Gibbins, 1989; Van Horn, Baumer & Gormley,
1992) create a macropolitical culture, allowing members o f a given society to
experience conflict and mediation without destroying the common sense of identity or
established institutions. The values embodied within macropolitical cultures are rarely
contested and reflect long-held beliefs such as industrialism, capitalism, and
democracy. Within this macropolitical culture are other norms that also have long
term impacts. Girvin placed these norms within the meso-level and referred to them as
“rules o f the game.” While the macropolitical culture (or the “core value" system)
establishes the game, mesolevel values influence how the game is played. Norms such
as political preferences and interpersonal behavior are allowed to vary, change, and be
debated. In turn, mesolevel values are influenced by activities at the microlevel, where
daily political activities and debates occur. Revolutions occur when the macropolitical
culture is not able to sustain its legitimizing functions, and the macrolevel culture is
eventually reshaped by microlevel activities. In stable democracies, many aspects of
political culture have proven to be capable o f change, sustaining core values at the
macrolevel while experiencing dramatic changes at the meso- and micro-levels.
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Understanding different ways o f thinking about political culture is essential
when re-examining the works o f previous observers and critics o f the American civic
culture or the "American ethos" (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). One o f the earliest of
these was Alexis de Tocqueville. Based on his observations of America during travels
in the early 1830s, the French aristocrat and “intellectual theorizer” (Kershner, 1983)
created for the world a picture o f American culture during the Jacksonian era,
providing commentary on potential problems and promises for the nation’s future.
Tocqueville’s political observations remain relevant and provide a base from which
other research has flourished. Specifically, he identified numerous characteristics
inherent and often conflicting within the political (democratic) and economic
(capitalist) structures (Kershner, 1983; Eisenstadt, 1988), including:
•

Equality o f opportunity and representation

•

Limited government

•

Civic participation, through local governments and voluntary associations

•

Individualism

•

Self-interest

•

Competition, accomplished by a strong work ethic

•

Right to pursue personal wealth and hold personal property
In America, Tocqueville saw the potential for reconciling “public virtue and

private interest” and thus reconciling “liberty and equality” (cited in Eisenstadt, 1988).
According to Tocqueville, macrolevel capitalist values o f self-interest, individualism,
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competition, and personal property could help guarantee that political freedom was
sustained and tyranny avoided. Alternatively, democratic values o f civic participation,
institutions such as the free press, and the welfare o f the whole could help ensure that
self-interest (maximized by the welfare o f the whole) was tempered, thus transforming
private interest into a mirror-image o f public virtue and maintaining balance
(Eistenstadt, 1988). In C ivic Culture, which compares the political cultures o f five
democratic nations, Almond and Verba (1963) identified many o f these macrolevel
values as uniquely American, having roots in the revolutionary experience (e.g.,
limited government, local control, and citizen participation), in nonpolitical attitudes
associated with capitalism (e.g., personal property and self-interest) and public welfare
(e.g., voluntary associations), and reflected in the microlevel activities o f daily life.
Reflective o f Gibbins' hegemony theory o f political culture, McClosky and
Zaller explored the evolution o f public attitudes towards democracy and capitalism in
The American Ethos (1984). Studying the "political culture o f the United States-its
principal values, their sources, and historical development” (p. 16), these authors used
survey data gathered in the 1950s and the 1970s to evaluate the “tension” that exists
between two o f the “principal components o f the American political culture” (p. 17):
capitalism and democracy. In addition to the widely held values o f freedom o f
religion, compassion, and patriotism, these authors found the basis for the “cultural
foundations o f capitalism" as identified by Tocqueville. Dominant were values they
referred to as "values o f business and capitalism,” supported by the “Protestant ethic”
as envisioned by Max W eber and sustained by secular influences found in America’s

revolutionary and bourgeois past. Freedom and individualism were viewed by
Americans not as isolationist or selfish but as principles that would liberate m en from
tyranny and facilitate personal accomplishments and achievements, allowing selfdetermination and encouraging self-reliance. Capitalist notions o f economic
competition, pursuit of profit, personal ownership o f property, hard work, personal
achievement, ambition, and limited government were consistent with the idea o f the
self-made individual. Protestant values emphasizing moral restraint, temperance,
sobriety, thrift, honest labor, and prudence complemented the bourgeois capitalist
values o f hard work and entrepreneurism. Hence through the secular manifestation o f
Calvinist values in America’s democratic and capitalist society, w ork became viewed
as a moral activity and wealth accumulation as an acceptable and expected end-result.
Consequently, the capitalist values o f profit maximization, self-interest, achievement,
and competition became part o f America's ethos6, but they were to be tempered by
self-restraint, compassion, and commitment to freedom and equality. These often
conflicting capitalist, democratic, and religiously-based principles o f the American
political culture are reflected in the Constitution, the federalist system, the
Representative democracy, and current social and economic debates. With political
culture as a defining framework, one can view the constructs o f political economy as
the coalescence o f political culture in the processes o f social, political, and economic
decision-making.
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Political Economy
Classical political economists such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl
Marx were concerned with empirical questions investigating the interrelation o f social,
political and economic constructs and occurrences, often questioning whether policy
implementation by the public or the private sector (socialist versus capitalist models)
achieves more successful outcomes. Because o f the interconnectedness o f constructs,
political economy offers an alternative means o f considering public policy that allows
public policy analysis to move beyond distinct disciplines such as political science,
economics, history, and sociology to integrate contemporary social, political, and
economic questions (Stone & Harpham, 1982). The classical political economists
observed that different values and perspectives permeated decision-making as well as
analysis, and they observed that the narrow, fragmented focus resulting from
individual perspectives lead to incomplete evaluation o f important questions. Classical
political economy evolved as a philosophy that promoted exploring issues by focusing
on the relationships among market systems, social institutions, and political decision
making structures. As with classical political economists, contemporary political
economists find themselves grappling with two critical and related issues: (1) how
value systems and goals influence decision-makers and participants in systems and
institutions; (2) how differing value systems and goals are manifested in preferences
for public versus private provision o f goods and services (again, socialist versus
capitalist perspectives). To understand the influence o f these components, policy
analysts must move beyond studying institutions generally considered by political
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scientists (e.g., interest groups, legislators, and administrators) to frame questions in
ways that integrate political and economic actors, institutions, and phenomena as well
as social goals and underlying values. The remainder o f this chapter explores specific
social, political, and economic features o f the American political economy as they
relate to broader the political culture.
Social Features o f Political Economy
Using different approaches and studying different phenomena, the works o f
both Katz (1995) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) provide some insight into
the social doctrines that have influenced policy-making within America’s welfare
state. Katz, as previously discussed, used an historical approach to study the evolution
o f welfare policy in the United States; Verba et al. used survey data to investigate
civic participation in America. Among the social influences explored in their works
are compassion for and commitment to poor relief, belief in a strong work ethic, desire
to control the behaviors o f others to achieve intended results, commitment to civic
participation and volunteerism as a means o f implementing goals, and belief in
equality, as expressed in the importance o f all people advancing according to their
individual potential. Observing that Americans are generally driven by
humanitarianism and compassion to alleviate poverty and to assist in the welfare o f
neighbors and the less fortunate, K atz also noted that Americans share a general
“dislike" for welfare, that they distinguish between the “deserving” and “undeserving”
poor, and that they give credence to a “culture o f poverty.” For example, rather than
provide for the poor through government-sponsored programs, Americans historically
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have preferred to use volunteer efforts to change the behaviors associated with
poverty. Generally, the intended behavioral changes have been characterized by an
overriding concern not to erode the recipients’ will to work, thus encouraging the poor
to better themselves, work hard, be moral, and be independent or self-sufficient. These
principles, ingrained in our political economy, have resulted in the evolution of
welfare programs that are locally controlled, volunteer-driven, and self-help oriented.
Where government welfare programs do exist, these ideals have contributed to a
distinction between programs considered “public welfare,” which are means-tested
and largely grudgingly accepted, and "social insurance" programs, which are available
to all and more widely accepted (Katz, 1995). The results are social insurance
programs that serve the masses (regardless o f income) and public w elfare programs
that serve the poor-creating "have" versus "have not" class distinctions that have
become institutionalized and have contributed to demoralization o f the poor and
classification o f an "underclass" (Bartelt, 1993; Katz, 1995; Gans, 1995).
Political Features o f Political Economy
Again, according to Katz (1995) and Verba et al. (1995), specific political
values have influenced the evolution o f policies within the American welfare state.
Many o f these political features overlap and often conflict with social and economic
goals, are consistent with the American political culture (as explored above), and are
evident in numerous government programs. For example, the value o f local control
resonates in the political popularity o f block grant programs. Block grants have
specified policy objectives but general administrative guidelines, providing local
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governments with significant discretion in spending o r allocation methods as long as
general policy goals are met. For example, community development block grants
[CDBGs] have broad community development goals and can be used in a variety o f
ways by local jurisdictions, including improvement or construction o f community
facilities and affordable housing as well as the creation o f economic development
programs. Similarly, although the purpose and logistics o f the program are more
specific, low-income housing tax credits [LIHTCs] are allocated by state and local
agencies based on locally- determined needs and criteria. Furthermore, limited
government in conjunction with civic participation (reflecting the political culture
principle o f voluntarism) is illustrated by the “franchise state,” defined by Alan Wolfe
(cited in Katz, 1995) as government using private agencies or firms to accomplish
public purposes, creating essentially a “third-party government system” (Salamon,
1995). Exemplified by public partnerships with private for-profit and nonprofit
organizations, this third-party model has become a standard means o f providing an
array o f social and welfare services in the United States. Including but not limited to
housing, education, and health services, this practice has resulted in government
agencies at all levels (local, state, and federal) delivering less than 50% o f the social
services that are government-funded (Salamon, 1995. p. 224).
Regarding the political power o f civic voluntarism, however, Verba et al.
(1995) found that although civic participation is encouraged in our social and political
history but rarely is equality realized in daily political endeavors. With the single
exception o f the right to vote, Verba et al. found that meaningful civic participation

increases with personal characteristics such as income, education, and occupational
status (e.g., professional or managerial). This unequal participation in "meaningful
civic activity" (defined as civic participation that is likely to influence the outcomes o f
policy decisions) creates a system wherein those lacking certain attributes are victims
o f “participatory distortion” (Verba et al, 1995). Because personal characteristics
render some participants more influential than others, equal levels o f participation in
civic activities do not lead to equal influence in public decision-making processes,
creating "participatory distortion." This concept is consistent with Lindblom's
assessment o f elites (1988). According to Lindblom, with the resources to influence
decision-makers (local and national) and the media (and thus public opinion), civic
elites can discourage tendencies toward dramatic change, encourage systemic
incrementalism, and effectively inhibit civic participation. Accordingly, "participatory
distortion" results from conflicts between American capitalist and democratic
principles. The discussion that follows briefly examines other features o f our capitalist
economic system, in light o f the inherent tensions that exist between capitalist and
democratic goals.
Economic Features o f Political Economy
This discussion o f economic attributes within the American political economy
is not exhaustive, but it exemplifies the interrelationship o f social, economic, and
political features, especially as it relates to conflicts among many commonly-held
principles. The works o f Lindblom (1988) and McClosky and Zaller (1984) identify
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several characteristics o f our capitalist economic system that are relevant to the
present research:
•

Importance o f personal property as related to personal liberty

•

Belief in the superiority o f the free m arket and the pursuit of self-interest

•

Commitment to efficiency

•

Pursuit o f maximum effectiveness
From the nation’s inception, bom out o f the roots o f capitalist revolution,

freedom, liberty, dignity, and independence have manifested in the belief in the
individual's right to own property. Indeed, the “ American reverence” for the right o f
private ownership o f property prompted Tocqueville in the 19th century to comment
that “in no other country in the world is the love o f property keener and more alert,
and nowhere else does the majority display less inclination toward doctrines which in
any way threaten the way property is owned” (cited in McClosky & Zaller, 1984, p.
138). Interestingly, in 20th century America, a dissonance between the capitalist value
o f private property ownership and the democratic value of freedom has emerged. The
pursuit o f self-interest as manifested in the belief in the superiority o f the free market
system is still a paramount characteristic of the American political economy
(McClosky & Zaller, 1984). However, McClosky and Zaller (1984) maintained that
contemporary "industrial capitalism” has changed the way in which the general public
views the right to hold private property: there has evolved concern that property
ownership amassed in large corporations can threaten rather than enhance freedom.
Historically, the value o f private property ownership has been reflected in support o f
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laissez-faire policies and strict limitations on government intervention in the
marketplace, and this tension between government intervention and ffee-market forces
continues to distinguish the American political economy (Lindblom, 1988; McClosky
& Zaller, 1984; Verba et al., 1995). Contemporary policy-makers must pursue a
balance between individual rights to the pursuit o f wealth and anxiety over threats to
freedom that can emerge from pow er amassed by big business and monopolies.
In regards to the political economy principles o f efficiency and effectiveness,7
history also has shown the relationship between the democratic and capitalist systems
to be characterized by "strained collaboration." For example, during the Progressive
Era at the turn o f the century, nationwide reforms in municipal government and the
new professionalism o f Public Administration resulted in institutionalizing capitalist
goals o f centralization, efficiency, and science into government policy-making (Katz,
1995). This institutionalization, which has incorporated goals o f efficiency and
effectiveness into public policy-making, at tim es inherently conflicts with other goals
in the political culture. For example, the most efficient and effective means o f
achieving wealth redistribution and alleviating o f the affects o f poverty may be direct
capital grants to poor people (a sentiment voiced by several stakeholders interviewed),
but this approach conflicts with values o f self-help, hard work, and behavior
modification.
What has emerged from the interrelationships o f the principles discussed is a
system designed to protect individual freedoms but not interfere too much with the
free market and competition (McClosky & Zaller, 1984), to protect personal liberty
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but not give the citizenry at-large too much control over their government (Lindblom,
1988), to create a system that ensures equality before the law yet recognizes the
inevitability o f income inequality (Verba et al., 1995). While certain macrolevel
values within our political culture remain stable, other specific characteristics within
our political economy are continuously challenged and evolving as America’s mesoand microlevel values change. Understanding how changing cultural values reflected
in our capitalist democracy interact with stable democratic values is a powerful tool
for policy analysts (Aaron et al., 1994).
The Advocacy Coalition Framework
One analytical tool that incorporates values into policy studies is the Advocacy
Coalition Framework [ACF] authored by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993).
Rejecting the traditional hierarchical model o f policymaking in favor o f this new
paradigm, the authors attempted to formally incorporate into a model o f analysis the
complexities and dynamics o f policy-making, the influence of multi-levels o f actors,
and sway of values in policy change over time. The five fundamental premises o f the
ACF are that (1) technical analysis and data are critical to decision-making; (2) a full
understanding o f policy change requires at least 10 years; (3) policy is made through
subsystems comprised o f public and private institutions and stakeholders; (4) policy
subsystems are intergovernmental and interactive, functioning within a broader
context o f socio-economic phenomena, governing coalitions, and other subsystems (all
o f which create opportunities for and obstacles to coalition building); and (5) “stable
system parameters” exist that are influenced by core values and priorities, driving
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policy decisions and interactions among coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993;
Sabatier, 1999). Additionally, nine hypotheses are contained within the model and
comprise the building blocks or working constructs o f the framework. Even though all
nine hypotheses may not be applicable to a specific policy case, they should be
considered during the analysis o f policies when applying the framework. This section
provides a more detailed explanation of the paradigm along with observations from
researchers who have applied the model.
In Policy Change and Learning (1993), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith included
the works o f several researchers who applied the ACF in their respective areas o f
expertise. To test the ACF, analysts completed qualitative analyses of education and
airline deregulation policies as well as quantitative analyses o f environmental and
energy policies. Overall, the authors found that the fundamentals o f the framework
were supported by their studies, but they also offered several suggestions for
amendments. In her analysis o f change in the Canadian education system, Mawhinney
(1993) found that as a "new lens," the ACF's focus on constitutional rules,
fundamental cultural values, and social structure (i.e., "stable parameters") were
meaningful, and that political culture was particularly significant in explaining the
emergence o f a "francophone coalition" (pp. 79-82). She recommended that the ACF
be strengthened to better explain relationships between dominant coalitions and
intergovernmental relations in order to explore the processes by which powerful
subsystem actors can exploit external events to enhance their positions. H er
commentary is reflective of Lindblom's observations o f elites and power structures,

previously discussed, in that Mawhinney found values and preferences o f dominant
national groups (or elites) imposed by the government on local minority interests. In
their assessment o f airline deregulation, Brown and Stewart (1993) concluded that
political compromises, changes in the forum for debate over deregulation, and
accumulated knowledge over time (i.e., increased issue tractability) all contributed to
productive discourse among competing coalitions. However, they recommended that
the analysis o f policy change be expanded from the identification o f conditions
conducive to policy change to the analysis o f tactics employed by policy advocates to
promote policy change. For example, the model should identify tactics used by
coalitions to interpret events, or "exogenous conditions," that advanced their policy
preferences or discredited the policy agendas o f other coalitions.
Applying the ACF to California's w ater policies, Munro (1993) observed
that the process o f policy-making in the late 1970s and early 1980s supported the
explanatory power of the ACF but made several recommendations for
improvement o f the model. First, Munro maintained that the ACF's usefulness
was limited by its insufficient emphasis on the roles played by extremists within
coalitions. According to Munro, coalitions appeared to be more "fluid" than the
model suggested, and extremists and pragmatists played different roles in
advocacy groups by influencing the formation o f effective coalitions. Second, he
believed that the ACF did not consider that, in addition to analytical tractability,
policy learning will likely be affected by p o litica l tractability, wherein long-term
subsystem interests are forced by "political actors, external perturbations . . . and
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long-term socioeconomic changes" (p. 126) to participate more fully in debates,
policy learning processes, and policy change. Third, he found that the ACF
underestimated the importance o f "systemic beliefs" in influencing the pace and
characteristics of long-term change. Specifically, conflicts among deeply-held
core values prevented passage o f productive legislation and policy learning was
restricted to secondary aspects of belief systems, resulting in "self-interested
policy learning" (p. 125). Recognition o f the power o f systemic beliefs on the
potential for policy change was also put forth by Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair
(1993). Based on their study o f the politics of offshore energy, in addition to
finding reasons for supporting several ACF hypotheses, the researchers
recommended that the ACF be modified to recognize that there exist a few
deeply-held core beliefs, maybe even only one over-riding value, that for some
actors will absolutely not be compromised. Coalition members may eventually
allow for flexibility o f all other values as long as their "bottom line" belief is not
affected (for example, the bottom line o f profit.) The ACF attempts to account for
inflexible beliefs via the bifurcation o f core beliefs into "deep core" and "policy
beliefs", in addition to "secondary" beliefs-all o f which are discussed in more in
Chapter Seven (Sabatier, 1999).
Sabatier's ultimate goal (1999) was to encourage research that would advance
the ACF from a model through which to understand policy into a theory that explains
the policy-making process, describes causation, and makes predictions in a variety o f
policy areas. The ACF was applied in 34 national and international studies during the

1980s and 1990s (Sabatier, 1999), and the usefulness o f coalitions as a means o f
understanding actors involved in policy change over the long-term has been
corroborated. The emergence o f multiple actors at various levels o f government
upheld the intergovernmental relations emphasis included in the framework, and the
importance o f values has been generally substantiated. Nevertheless, Sabatier (1999)
outlined five areas in which the ACF needs "elaboration, refinement, and testing" (p.
152). First, he called for the completion of empirical research that would relate ACF
variables to actual policy change. To date analyses have included assessments o f
coalition beliefs and collaboration, neglecting the impact o f beliefs and collaboration
on policy change. Second, Sabatier called for research exploring the obstacles to
collective action and coordination within coalitions. Third, factors contributing to the
development o f subsystems over time should be explored, especially factors that have
influenced the transition of emerging subsystems into maturity. Fourth, longitudinal
and panel surveys on belief systems should be completed to identify elements that
influence the creation and evolution o f elitist beliefs. Fifth, the ACF should be applied
to various stages o f the policy process.
The research goals o f this Credit policy history are consistent with several o f
Sabatier's recommendations for further research and were spurred by my interest in the
success o f the Credit program as well as the attraction of the ACF as a model for
understanding all types o f policy-making. As stated in Chapter One, this research is
intended to expand the ACF by relating the model to policy change via an analysis of
the low-income housing tax credit; to advance the application potential o f the ACF to
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social policies; and to explore how ACF can be applied to various stages o f the policy
process through creation o f a policy-planning tool. Although it has been asserted that
the ACF policy learning hypotheses may have limited applicability to social policy
issues that are generally analytically intractable (1993), the tractability o f issues may
change over time as additional resources are committed to research and more data is
gathered. This potential is alluded to in the study o f airline deregulation by Brown and
Stewart (1993) and can be pursued by the continued application o f the ACF to social
policies. In addition to social implications, how decision-makers address issues related
to poverty such as housing, job training, child care, and health care has tremendous
economic implications, and achieving a better understanding o f why some social
policies are successful while others are not is critical for achieving informed policy
making. Moreover, the fact that issues surrounding social policies are more likely to
be value-laden (Aaron et al., 1994; Danziger et al.,1994; Gans, 1995; Katz, 1995)
necessitates the application o f a value-oriented theory such as the ACF.

CHAPTER FIVE
OVERVIEW OF POLICY A ND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

To facilitate a better understanding o f the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
[Credit] program and its place within the broader policy setting, it is important to place
the Credit within the historical context o f federal low-income housing policy. This
chapter provides an overview o f federal housing policy in general and a description o f
the Credit in particular. Federal low-income housing policy as described below is
characterized by four eras, between 1937, w hen federal public housing programs were
first implemented and 1990, the end of the Reagan-Bush era, during which time the
Credit was created. The program in its current form, resulting from its evolution since
1986, is then described in detail.
Federal Housing Policy in the Twentieth Century
1937 to 1960: Post-Depression Policies—Low-income Housing. Jobs and the Economy
In the aftermath o f the Great Depression, the federal government responded to
the need to house the nation's working poor by enacting the 1937 Housing Act, which
established local public-housing authorities and federal public-housing finance
(Stemlieb & Listokin, 1987). The federal government had broken its tradition o f
limited involvement with previous Depression-Era legislation providing emergency
housing for the poor (namely the Emergency R elief and Construction Act o f 1932, the
National Industrial Recovery Act o f 1933, and the National Housing Act o f 1934), but
the 1937 Housing Act was the first step tow ards direct government involvement in

housing low-income citizens (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 1988; Stemlieb &
Listokin, 1987; Case, 1990). However, instead o f emphasizing on low-income housing
goals, the 1937 Act was presented in the rubric o f its New Deal predecessors. By
posing the policy as an economic incentive, supporters could more effectively achieve
low-income housing objectives. Like the Emergency Relief and Construction Act o f
1932, the National Industrial Recovery Act o f 1933, and the National Housing Act of
1934 (which established the Federal Housing Administration [FHA]), the Housing Act
o f 1937 was touted as a means for stimulating the lagging construction industry and o f
creating badly needed jobs (Stemlieb & Listokin, 1987; Wallace, 1995).
Although a variety of federal housing acts were enacted in the early 1940s,
primarily in response to the housing needs o f veterans (many o f whom were lowincome), it was not until the Housing Act o f 1949 that a national housing policy goal
o f ensuring a decent and affordable home for every American was affirmed.
Subsequently, other post-war programs encouraging the private-sector to provide lowincome housing and central-city urban-renewal needs were passed to facilitate the
realization o f the goals set forth in the 1949 Act (Stemlieb & Listokin, 1987; Wallace,
1995). The Housing Act of 1954 established the Federal National Mortgage
Administration [Fannie Mae or FNMA] to provide government mortgage guarantees
and encourage home ownership, and the Housing Act of 1959 authorized low-cost
government loans for the construction o f low-income elderly rental housing.
In summary, the legislation passed between 1937 and 1960 established a
federal policy preference for increasing the low-income housing supply and
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stimulating economic activity through subsidies for the private sector rather than by
promoting the direct provision o f housing by the government. The policies were
promoted not only as providing for the nation's housing needs, and low-income
housing in particular, but also as means o f achieving job creation and urban
development.
1961 to 1970: The Community and Private Sector in Low-income Housing
The decade between 1961 and 1970 brought forth legislation that emphasized
community development and private sector incentives to provide low-income housing.
Expanding on activities begun in the 1950s, the Housing Acts o f 1961, 1964, and 1965
broadened eligibility among low- and moderate-income households for federal
programs8, authorized new below-market-interest-rate mortgages [BMIRs] for rental
housing construction, and created low-cost home-improvement loan programs for
urban renewal areas (Wallace, 1995; Case, 1990). The Housing Act o f 1965 created
the Department o f Housing and Urban Development [HUD] as a Cabinet-level
agency, authorized lease subsidy programs (the precursor of the Section 8 programs),
and approved the leasing o f privately held units by public housing authorities [PHAs],
further including the private sector in the supply o f low-income housing (Stemlieb &
Listokin, 1987).
A marked departure from urban renewal and a significant philosophical shift
for the federal government, the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act o f 1966 infused low-income housing policy with low-income community
activism. The Model Cities program created by the Act was intended to help low-
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income residents in certain troubled neighborhoods achieve better lives through
community-based decision-making. Through the federal block grants w ere distributed
throughout cities for community-identified needs, the government once again found
itself the low-income housing funding provider. However, the community-based
Model Cities experiment was brief, and the Housing Act o f 1968 continued supplyside policies to private-sector developers through subsidies for the construction o f
low-cost single and multifamily rental housing.
The decade ended with passage of the Housing Act o f 1969 (the Brooke
Amendment); the Act established an official limit on the percentage o f income to be
paid by public-housing tenants (Stemlieb & Listokin, 1987) and increased
affordability for tenants. Unwittingly, the Brooke Amendment furthered the negative
perception o f direct public provision of low-income housing by the government by
simultaneously increasing the financial liability o f PHAs. PHAs were responsible for
raising operational revenue through rents, but revenues were capped by the 1969 Act
while operating costs continued to rise. Over the years, the discrepancies between
capped rental revenues and rising operating expenses contributed to deferred
maintenance, administrative cutbacks, and overall financially unstable PHAs.
Between 1961 and 1970, federal low-income housing policy shifted between
emphasizing direct and indirect government activities and the prominence o f nonprofit
community-based versus private investor provision o f low-income housing. Whether
through public direct or indirect investment, however, there was an increased
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emphasis on low-income housing as part o f community revitalization and grass-roots
community-based efforts-reflective o f the social policy trends of the times.
1970 to 1979: Shift to Demand-Side Policies and the Beginning o f Devolution
In the 1960s, policy-makers passed authorizations to increase the production o f
low-income housing via HUD programs, but Congressional appropriations for housing
activities did not match authorizations (Wallace, 1995; Orlebeke, 2000).
Consequently, actual production was not as high as authorizations intended going into
the 1970s and, overall, the housing activities o f the 1970s reflected the Republican
administrations’ views that a sufficient number o f low-income housing units had been
produced through supply-side financing subsidies. For example, the Housing Act o f
1970 authorized HUD to experiment with housing allowance programs, expanding on
Lyndon B. Johnson’s limited rent-supplement program and representing an
unprecedented legislative shift from supply-side policies towards demand-side
alternatives (Stemlieb & Listokin, 1987).
Seeking to further diminish the federal government’s role in mandating the
supply o f low-income housing, the Nixon Administration’s Housing Act o f 1974
replaced categorical grants for housing with Community Development Block Grants
[CDBGs] (which allowed but were not earmarked for housing production), created
home ownership programs, and promoted the demand-oriented Section 8 rental
assistance program (Stemlieb & Listokin, 1987). The Housing Act o f 1977, passed
during the Carter Administration, continued the block grant approach by authorizing
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Urban Development Action Grants [UDAGs] for use in distressed urban communities,
but it did not specifically target funding for low-income housing.
In addition to decreased housing production, problems also arose with the
existing federally-funded housing stock. Although the number o f subsidized housing
units produced as a result o f the 1960s housing acts had increased, so had the number
o f HUD mortgage foreclosures-resulting largely from inferior property management
or lax underwriting provisions by HUD. HUD's policy response was one o f rapid
property disposal, resulting in widespread rent increases and tenant displacement and
jeopardizing much of the low-income housing stock previously created (Stemlieb &
Listokin, 1987). Concerned by the loss o f existing low-income housing stock, in 1978
the Carter Administration successfully legislated the Housing and Community
Development Amendment. As a result, HUD was required to manage and dispose of
foreclosed projects in a manner that would preserve their low- and moderate-income
character; revitalize neighborhoods; maintain decent, safe, and sanitary conditions;
and minimize tenant displacement. In effect, the 1978 Act effectively encouraged the
expansion o f nonprofit low-income housing organizations, by granting them first
refusal o f HUD foreclosures, and created project-based Section 8 rental subsidies, to
ensure the continued existence o f low-income rental units.
Except for a brief but dramatic increase in new production of 85,000 lowincome housing units by HUD in 1975 and 1976, most o f the decade was
characterized by relatively little political support for supply-side subsidies, as tenantbased Section 8 programs gained increasing popularity among Congressional members
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and landlords (Orlebeke, 2000). Demand-side subsidies were prioritized until later in
the decade, when HUD's disposition o f properties led to the creation o f the "projectbased" Section 8 subsidy programs to preserve low-income housing units, reinforcing
the supply-side precedent. Although demand-oriented approaches had been gaining
strong support, at the end o f the decade policy-makers were not yet willing to shift
entirely away from the popular supply-side low-income housing policies o f the past.
1980 to 1990: Privatization and Establishment o f the Credit
Housing legislation in the Reagan-Bush era emphasized deregulation and
privatization, using both supply- and demand-side policies. The Economic Recovery
and Taxation Act [ERTA] o f 1981 significantly increased the benefits o f real estate
investment (through provisions for tax deductions and advanced depreciation), as the
Republican Administration and Congress sought to facilitate the direct private
provision of low-income housing. The remaining housing legislation o f the decade
reflected this free-market approach to low-income housing. For example, the 1983
Housing Act authorized the Section 8 voucher program (along with some rental
rehabilitation grants) to encourage landlords to use federal low-income housing
subsidies. Section 8 vouchers were tenant-based subsidies, and the rents that landlords
could charge were not capped at federally determined fair-market rents, as with
Section 8 certificates, making the subsidies more attractive to private owners
(Stemlieb & Listokin, 1987; Apgar, 1990; Wallace, 1995).
The Tax Reform Act o f 1986 removed many previous tax incentives for
investment in real estate. Specifically, as a result of the Act, the value o f real estate

investments as tax shelters diminished with extension o f depreciation schedules from
19 to 27.5 years for residential rental properties and with the passage o f passive loss
rules9 (Cardato, 1991; Garson, 2001). However, the Act targeted for low-income
housing incentives for production through the Low-income Housing Tax Credit
program. By allowing reduced tax liabilities for low-income housing investors, the
Credit provided an equity-raising mechanism for both nonprofit and for-profit lowincome housing providers. The Housing and Community Development Act o f 1987
encouraged the sale of public-housing properties to resident management corporations,
to residents, and to other low-income families, and the 1987 Act established grants to
encourage nonprofit development o f home ownership programs for low-income
families. Continuing the trend towards privatization and devolution, the National
Affordable Housing Act o f 1990 created the Homeownership and Opportunity for
People Everywhere [HOPE] program that promoted the conversion o f public housing
into private or nonprofit low-income housing cooperatives and also created the HOME
Investment Partnerships program -a popular block grant program widely-used for lowand moderate-income housing needs, with 15% set-aside for community-based
nonprofit activities (Wallace, 1995).
Overall, consistent with the capitalist philosophies o f the Republican
Administrations o f this period, the federal government throughout the 1980s sought to
further remove itself from directly providing low-income rental housing, using both
supply- and demand-oriented approaches. These changes have resulted in what
Orlebeke (2000) described as “a three-pronged strategy of vouchers, block grants, and
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tax credits [that] has achieved reasonably good results and attracted an unusual degree
o f political consensus” (p. 489).
The Credit - Program Description
The Low-income Housing Tax Credit was established by Section 252 o f the
Tax Reform Act o f 1986. It is contained in the Internal Revenue Code [IRC] §42 and
replaced previous tax incentives for private investment in low-income housing. The
provisions of the original legislation were subsequently amended by the following: the
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act o f 1988, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Acts o f 1989, 1990, and 1993-the latter o f which provided for the
permanent status o f the Credit as a part of the IRC (Housing Development Reporter
[HDR], 81:0011, 1994).
The Credit is a supply-side subsidy with substantial precedence within the
history o f federal low-income housing policy. Credits are allocated by the federal
government, via the Internal Revenue Service [IRS], to state and local housing
agencies in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and all U.S.
possessions. Historically, Credits have been allocated at a per capita rate o f $1.25, the
rate specified in the Tax Reform Act o f 1986. In December o f 2000, Congress passed
the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act o f 2000; this Act included an increase in the
per capita allocation o f the Credit from $1.25 to $1.50 in 2001 and to $1.75 in 2002,
and indexed thereafter to inflation (Joint Committee on Taxation [JCT], 2000). State
and local housing agencies (i.e., the "allocation agencies") are required to create
Qualified Application Plans [QAPs] to establish clear Credit allocation guidelines.
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QAPs must be subject to a public hearing and must guide the Credit allocation
process.
Credits are appropriated by allocation agencies to low-income housing projects
once, but the tax credits (or tax benefits to the investor) are taken annually over a 10
year period. For example, a project may receive a one time Credit allocation o f
$90,000 in 2000 from an allocation agency, but the investor will receive $90,000 in
tax benefits every year for a maximum o f 10 years (so long as the project is in
compliance with the program requirements). Thus, the purpose of the Credit is to
provide incentives for private corporations, individuals, and other entities to invest in
quality, affordable low-income housing. New construction, substantial rehabilitation,
and acquisition/ rehabilitation projects are all eligible, and the legislation provides for
two types o f Credits: 9% Credits and 4% Credits.
The 9% and the 4% refer to tax credit rates [TCRs]. For buildings placed in
service in 1987, TCRs were established by the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 at 9% for new
construction projects and 4% for acquisition/rehabilitation projects. The Act stipulates
that the 4% and 9% TCRs should be recalculated on a monthly basis by the IRS in
order to yield, respectively, present values o f 30% and 70% o f project costs that
qualify for Credits (Novogradac, 1999). Although current TCRs fluctuate generally
between 3-4% and 8-9%, the Credits are still referred to throughout the industry as 4%
and 9% Credits (or less frequently the 30% and 70% Credits).
To calculate how many Credits a project is eligible for, all expenditures related
to the construction or substantial rehabilitation of low-income units in a project are
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calculated, and the expenses paid for with federal subsidies (such as CDBG o r other
grants) that are not loaned to the project are subtracted. For example, assuming that
the construction-related costs o f a new development are entirely financed by nonfederal funds (e.g., investor equity, private lending, and/or state subsidies) and that
they total $1,000,000, a 9% Credit project (with a TCR o f 9%) could qualify for
$90,000 o f Credits per year or $900,000 o f Credits over the 10-year life o f the Credit
subsidy ($1,000,000 x .09 x 10 years). Similarly, to calculate how many 4% Credits a
project is eligible for, this amount is multiplied by 4% (or the then current TCR) and
multiplied by 10 years to calculate the total value o f the Credit. In the above case, the
maximum amount o f Credits allocated would be $40,000 annually and $400,000 over
the 10-year Credit life ($1,000,000 x .04 x 10 years).
Because the 4% Credit generates fewer actual tax benefits and thus less
investor equity, 4% Credits have been less valuable than 9% Credits; thus, historically
competition for 4% Credits has not been as great as for 9% Credits. However,
legislation passed since 1986 has amended the program to enhance the use o f 4%
Credits. The 4% Credit can now be coupled with other subsidized financing
mechanisms, such as bond financing, and the amount o f required bond financing has
been reduced from the original 70% to 50% -both o f which have increased the appeal
o f 4% Credits as a housing development tool. Over the past few years, a variety o f
technical improvements and increasing competition for 9% Credits has resulted in
higher demand for 4% Credits. Importantly, increased investor demand for the
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purchase o f both types o f Credits was great enhanced by the permanent status granted
to the Credit by Congress in 1993.
Recipients o f Credits (e.g., for-profit and nonprofit housing developers or
housing authorities) “sell” them to investors to raise project equity. In return, the
investors receive direct credits to their annual tax liability for 10 years. For example,
investors might pay $0.75 per dollar of 9% Credits and receive $1.00 in Credit through
the tax benefit. In the example above, an investor purchasing 100% o f available
Credits and paying $0.75 per dollar of 9% Credits would provide up front $675,000 in
project equity for $900,000 in direct tax credits, taken annually over 10 years. Thus,
tax credits flow over the long-term to the investor in exchange for equity paid in up
front, at a discount. Investors also receive passive tax losses and project depreciation,
all o f which increase the internal rates of return on the equity investments. During the
first few years o f the Credit program's existence, investors were paying as low as
$0.25 to $0.30 on the dollar for Credits. Over the past decade, however, market prices
for Credits have increased to between $0.70 and $0.80 on the dollar.
Numerous factors have contributed to this rise in Credit pricing: technical
corrections passed since 1986, elimination o f the sunset provision in 1993 which
heightened the stability o f the Credit as an investment option, increased expertise
among low-income housing tax credit professionals, and competition for a limited
supply o f Credits have driven up the prices that investors are willing to pay.
Additionally, declining inflation throughout the 1990's led to increased attractiveness
o f the LIHTC. Because investors put money into projects up front at a discount (and

thus "lock in" their annual monetary return for 10 years), declining inflation means
that the fixed amount o f Credits (or financial benefits) they receive annually will be
more valuable. Thus, anticipation of declining inflation combined w ith technical
changes, additional experience with the program, and the stability that permanency
gave the Credit as an investment alternative to contribute to higher Credit prices being
paid by equity investors.
Equity investments may be made through direct placement (e.g., large
corporations with substantial annual tax liabilities such as Pacificorp or USBancorp10)
or through Credit syndicators, local or national entities created to underwrite and
package investments and sell them to investors through the creation o f “upper-tier”
limited partnerships. In either case, the equity is funneled down to the low-income
housing project through a limited partnership that has as its parties a general partner
[GP] with typically a .01% ownership interest and a limited partner [LP] (the “lowertier” limited partnership in the case of syndications) with typically a 99.99%
ownership interest11. Figures 1 and 2 on the following pages further illustrate the
structure and the flow o f benefits from the Credit program to the partners involved.

90
FIGURE 1
SYNDICATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
* Housing Investment or
Upper Tier Limited
Partnership, Investor

Corporate
Investors, LP

Tax Credit
Syndicator, GP
** Project LP,
99.99% Ownership
Interest
Nonprofit or ForProfit Sponsor, GP,
0.01% Ownership
Interest
Affordable Housing or
Lower Tier Project
Limited Partnership,
Owner

Affordable
Housing
Project

The upper-tier LP invests in several lower-tier LPs.
** If a syndicator is not used, the upper-tier LP can be eliminated and the
Direct Investor owns 99.99% o f the partnership.
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FIGURE 2
FLOW OF CREDITS AND BENEFITS
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As discussed previously, the developer (or tax-credit applicant) receives an
allocation o f tax credits through an application process administered by a state or local
housing agency (the “allocation agency”). The system was intended to be flexible and
more responsive to local housing needs and markets, but the legislation does outline
the following allocation guidelines:
•

Credits must be allocated by "allocation agencies" based on a Qualified
Allocation Plan [QAP]. Although the method for determining Credit awards
varies among allocation agencies, many have opted to use systems wherein
competitive applications for Credits are submitted and scored. Using this
method, awarding agencies can prioritize local goals by allotting "bonus
points" for applications that meet certain criteria (e.g., providing on site social
services, serving special needs populations or large families).

•

Projects must designate or “set aside” at a minimum 40% of the units for
households earning 60% o f Area Median Income [AMI] or 20% o f the units
for households earning 50% o f AMI. Only those units designated as serving
low-income households are eligible to receive Credits, and the percentage o f
the total project units designated as low-income units is termed the “applicable
fraction.” Allocation agencies may give bonus points to projects that exceed
these minimum standards.

•

Maximum rents are established based on a theoretical household sizes of 1.5
persons per bedroom. F or example, a 2-bedroom unit is assumed to house a 3
person household. If the monthly rent for this unit is set at 50% o f AMI, then
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the maximum allowable gross rent (rent plus anticipated utility costs) cannot
exceed 30% o f the monthly income for a 3-person household earning 50% o f
AMI. Allocation agencies establish allowable rent schedules annually, based
on information provided by HUD.
•

According to the original legislation, qualified low-income projects must
restrict rents for a minimum o f 15 years—five years beyond the maximum 10
years that tax credits can be taken by investors. This was subsequently
expanded. An amendment to the program passed in 1990 requires that Credit
units have an extended use period o f at least 30 years, including the original 15
years. In year 14, however, the owner can request that the allocation agency
find a party to purchase the units at a restricted price. If a buyer cannot be
found, the units can be sold but low-income tenants must be allowed an
additional three years upon notice o f the sale o f Credit projects to vacate the
properties, effectively making the minimum federal affordability period 18
years (Stegman, 1991). States can specify in their QAPs even longer
affordability requirements.

•

Allocation agencies must set aside at least 10% o f the state’s annual Credit
allocation for use by qualified nonprofit organizations that have as a part o f
their mission the advancement o f low-income housing. To qualify for the setaside, nonprofit groups must demonstrate “material participation” in the
development, ownership, and operation o f the Credit project, and they must not
be affiliated with or controlled by a for-profit organization. QAPs may provide

94
bonus points for projects with established community support or nonprofit
sponsorship in order to achieve broader community development objectives. In
1997, over 30% o f the Credits nationally w ere allocated to nonprofit
developers, well in excess o f the 10% minimum set-aside requirement. This
trend has spurred much debate and friction within the industry between forprofit and nonprofit sponsors, with some for-profits claiming that nonprofits,
both experienced and inexperienced, have an unfair advantage in the allocation
process (National Council o f State Housing Agencies [NCSHA], 1997).
•

Project selection criteria must be included that are appropriate to local
conditions and housing needs, and they m ust give preference to projects that
will serve the lowest income tenants for the longest period o f time.

•

Allocation agencies may give bonus points for-indeed can require-on-site
resident social services plans for Credit projects. Resident services program
requirements, or guidelines, are outlined in QAPs, with the intent to encourage
strategies that facilitate self-sufficiency among low-income tenants (e.g., job
training, child care, and education).

•

Difficult-to-Develop Areas [DDAs] and Qualified Census Tracts [QCTs] were
established to encourage investment in economically distressed areas. Areas
designated as a DDA or QCT by HUD can qualify for 30% more in Credits
(referred to in the industry a "basis booster" provision).
Overall, selection criteria generally include assessments o f the greatest unmet

housing needs, project location and characteristics, project sponsor characteristics, use
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o f public housing waiting lists, and service to special needs and other very low-income
tenant populations. Allocation agencies are charged by the Credit legislation to ensure
that QAP criteria are adhered to in the allocation process, that development costs are
reasonable, and that only enough Credits needed to complete the project are allocated.
The latter requirement is accomplished through an ongoing analysis o f the
development financing package, resulting in a “gap analysis” prior to final Credit
issuance. After such issuance, allocation agencies must implement monitoring
procedures to ensure that projects adhere to federal and state program requirements,
over the term o f the compliance period. To enforce agreements, non-compliance with
Credit program requirements can result in a recapture o f Credits allocated. Such a
recapture results in a loss o f financial benefits to the investors or limited partners
[LPs], since the LPs receive Credits in exchange for equity investment in affordable
housing developments. Provisions are typically negotiated into Partnership
Agreements making general partners [GPs], which are responsible for property
management and program compliance, liable for any recapture o f Credits or losses that
the LPs may experience.
The rules for the allocation, calculation, claiming, and recapture o f Credits, as
described above, were laid out in the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 and the subsequent
legislation intended to improve to the program. The use o f the Credit-and
simultaneously the demand for Credits-has dramatically increased since its inception
largely due to the technical changes and improvements described above but also
because o f the housing, economic, and policy trends described herein. Functioning
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within a sub-specialty o f the real estate industry, Credit practitioners include nonprofit
and for-profit developers, syndicators, direct investors, attorneys, accountants,
bankers, consultants, and property managers, all skilled in the development, financing,
and management o f low-income housing tax-credit projects. As expertise has
increased with demand for-and prices paid for-Credits, industry participants have
found more creative ways to use the program, such as combining 4% and 9% Credits
and serving special-needs populations. There is a wide-array o f stakeholders, the use
o f the Credit is expansive, and there have been numerous technical changes and
entrepreneurial efforts by sponsors to find new ways use Credits. The Credit program
case study can be used to expand the Advocacy Coalition Framework [ACF] to social
policy, as low-income housing policy in particular incorporates aspects o f both social
policy and economic policy, and many o f the technical changes to the Credit program
introduced above will be revisited in the policy history and analysis, as examples o f
policy learning and coalition building factors.

CHAPTER SIX
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The policy history is an examination o f actors and events over time within or
among policy subsystems. Subsystem participants have different agendas, and policy
histories help reveal actors' agendas, values, and incentives as well as a policy's
evolution. This policy history reviews the evolution o f Credit program archival
documents dating from 1985 through 2000, including legislation, subcommittee
hearing records, professional journal articles and studies, governmental studies, and
academic analyses. To better explore the Credit, the archival data has been divided
into six categories, based roughly on chronology but more on the types o f activities,
discussion topics, and actors involved:
Policy Phase I (1985-1986): Initial policy debate and creation
Policy Phase II (1987-1990): Technical corrections and reflection
Policy Phase HI (1988): Philosophical reflection and value sharing
Policy Phase IV (1990-1992): Advanced policy debate and coalition expansion
Policy Phase V (1990-present): Institutionalization and industry specialization
Policy Phase VI (1996-present): Advanced program analysis
What follows is a description o f the six policy stages of the Credit program, wherein I
examine the actors involved, identify values or objectives reflected by the testimony of
actors, and explore the significance of each stage in the Credit’s development. A
complete listing o f the documents considered is included in Appendix G. Observations
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from stakeholder surveys and interviews are included in this chapter, and in Chapter
Seven, where appropriate.
Policy Phase I (T985-1986V Initial Policy Debate and Creation
In the mid-1980s, both the U.S. Senate and the House o f Representatives held
subcommittee hearings on proposed tax reforms, the results o f which were manifested
in the extensive Tax Reform Act o f 1986. Two primary documents provide
information on the people and issues involved in the initial debate that culminated in
the creation o f the Credit program: “Comprehensive Tax Reform,” Hearings before
the Committee on Ways and M eans (1985), and ‘Implications o f H.R. 3838, the Tax
Reform Act,” Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs (1986). Primary actors during this stage o f the Credit's policy record included
Congressional leaders from both parties, private sector interests, and few highlyrespected advocates and local public officials (see Appendix H). On the Congressional
front Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D, IL) was the Chair o f the House W ays and
Means Committee and strongly supported the Credit, backed by Democratic
Representatives Richard Gephart (D, MO) and Representative Charles Rangel (D,
NY). Republican Senator Bob Packwood (R, OR) was the Chair o f the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and was influential in the creation
o f the Credit. In this initial phase, Congressional leaders debated issues surrounding
the massive changes proposed in the Tax Reform Act o f 1986. In regards to reforming
tax laws related to private investment in low-income housing, they were primarily
concerned with avoiding abuses to the system, practicing fiscal prudence, fashioning
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simple yet equitable solutions to problems, and passing laws that would promote
economic growth.
Throughout the extensive hearings, Congressional leaders asked witnesses and
each other pointed questions about the potential impact o f pending tax reforms on lowincome housing. For example, Representative Sam Gibbons (D,FL), recognizing the
need for some type o f federal incentive for economic development and low-income
housing preservation yet searching for prudent alternatives, asked hearing witnesses:
"How do we separate the good [incentives] from the bad?" (U.S. House of
Representatives [USHR], 1985, p. 3783). Likewise, reflecting on the conflicting goals
encompassed in the debate, Representative Rangel (D, NY) emphasized the billions of
dollars being lost in revenue as a result o f tax loopholes and asked his fellow
Congressional members to carefully consider the equity, costs, and benefits of
programs funded via the tax code:
I am asking whether or not, if we have to save money in different areas in
order to reduce taxes for most people, how many people on this panel would be
willing to say, well, w e wish you wouldn't do anything because we are
benefiting from it even though some rich people aren't paying taxes, but if you
have to do something we think the best thing to do is to target the areas that are
hit the hardest, that have not been a part o f the economic recovery . .. (USHR,
1985, p. 3785).
And Representative Judd Gregg (R, NH) followed up on Rangel's query by exploring
alternative possibilities, asking "Has anybody done any studies . .. that compare the
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cost of section 8 housing built from scratch versus the same type o f housing rehabbed
under the tax laws for the tax payer? In other words, tax losses versus direct subsidy?"
(USHR, 1985, p. 3797).
Alternately, private sector interests voiced concerns about the financial affects
o f tax reforms on current property owners, the implications o f proposed tax code
changes on the future of market-rate housing development, and the subsequent impact
on the nation's low-income housing stock. Private sector interests were represented by
real estate trade associations, real estate developers and investors, construction
contractors, mortgage bankers, commercial lenders, and property managers (see
Appendix H). Among numerous written submissions, personal testimonials included
those provided by the National Association o f Home Builders, the National Apartment
Association, the Mortgage Bankers Association, the Council for Rural Housing and
Development (agencies financing and developing low-income and elderly housing),
the Coalition for Low and Moderate Income Housing (a trade association for
businesses and individuals who finance, produce, rehabilitate, and operate
government-assisted housing), and the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships
(at the time, one o f the nation's largest owners and operators o f low- and moderateincome housing).
Comprising a smaller voice were parties representing the nonprofit and public
sectors. Among the advocacy groups represented were organizations such as the
National Housing Conference, an advocacy organization concerned with the provision
o f adequate housing and neighborhood revitalization across the country; the National

Low-income Housing Coalition, an association o f organizations and individuals
concerned with issues o f low-income housing, including tenants o f assisted housing,
tenant advocates, owners o f assisted housing; and the American Association o f Retired
Persons. Most significant, however, were the personal testimonies provided by a few
highly respected representatives from this sector who unwittingly laid the foundation
for the Credit program: James Rouse, founder and CEO o f The Enterprise Foundation
[EF], a nonprofit committed to providing low-income housing by bringing private
investment to low-income communities; Michael Sviridoff, CEO o f the Low-income
Support Coalition [LISC], a nonprofit foundation supporting nonprofit community
development through low-interest loans and grants; and Mayor Wilson Goode, a
Democrat from Philadelphia.
Mr. Rouse was especially prominent and influential during the Congressional
hearings process and provided testimony that laid a strong foundation for the Credit
program that would evolve. As a successful businessman, entrepreneur, and
impassioned advocate, he had a bi-partisan appeal and emphasized the importance o f
creating innovative yet replicable programs. Specifically, he argued for the
preservation o f section 167(k), "a seldom used section o f the IRS code that could help
nonprofit housing corporations rehabilitate housing and sell the equity to businesses or
individuals with a 5-year write-off on the cost o f rehabilitation" (USHR, 1985, p.
3751). He described how The Enterprise Foundation worked with local officials and
community groups to refine the application o f the program, created Enterprise Social
Investment Corporation to package and sell the investments, and encouraged
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community-based, locally-driven approaches using the tax code. Mr. Sviridoff from
LISC talked about how the elimination o f section 8 programs and federal cutbacks had
resulted in LISC-supported projects that "depended increasingly on the Federal
income tax laws to raise—through tax benefits-equity investments equal to about one
quarter o f project development costs from taxpaying corporations and individuals" and
described the limited partnership structure that LISC used to unite nonprofit and forprofit partners (USHR, 1985, p. 3765). Mayor Wilson Goode, specifically lobbying
for the preservation o f historic rehabilitation tax credits, emphasized the community
revitalization and economic development achievements resulting from the multi
faceted local government tool provided by the rehabilitation tax credits, which was
crucial for attracting private capital to urban blighted areas (USHR, 1985, p. 3784).
In essence, Congressional leaders were concerned with simplifying the tax
code while reducing tax loopholes but preserving needed subsidies; private sector
actors were concerned with preserving tax incentives and capital value, reducing risks
associated with investments, enhancing return on investments [ROI], and minimizing
government mandates (i.e., maximizing program flexibility); nonprofit and local
public sector actors, including low-income housing advocates, were concerned with
attracting private capital for socially responsible activities (namely low-income
housing and low-income community and economic revitalization), targeting public
subsidies to the most needy, and creating federal incentives for public/private/
nonprofit partnerships. Table 1 outlines the actors involved in Phase I and identifies
their respective issues as reflected in the archival documents.
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Table 1 - Actors and Issues in Policy Phase I
Avoiding abuse o f the system by setting up checks and
Federal-level elected officials:
balances
Congressional Representatives and
Senators
Ensuring equity and fairness
Targeting the needy
Practicing fiscal prudence
Ensuring program simplicity
Encouraging economic growth
Continuing historical precedence for encouraging
Private Sector home builders,
housing production for economic development in poor
investors, owners, managers, trade
communities
associations
Using tax policies to entice private investment
Maximizing capital value, risk, return on capital, and
profit
Maximizing flexibility
Nonprofit investors and advocates: The Ensuring that public involvement and subsidies
encourage community-based development and
Enterprise Foundation, Low Income
economic revitalization in poor communities thus
Support Coalition, other advocacy
exercising social responsibility
groups
Encouraging public/private/nonprofit partnerships
Targeting the very poorest households
Ensuring equity and fairness
Local elected officials
Avoiding abuse of the system
Targeting the most needy through specific program
requirements

The interest groups initially involved in the Congressional hearings had often
conflicting goals; however, value sharing and coalition building eventually occurred
among private, nonprofit, and local public actors during the policy-making process. In
its testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs
(US Senate, 1986), John Koelemij, on behalf o f the National Association of Home
Builders, expressed succinctly the m ost unifying position o f private, local public and
nonprofit actors:
For the past 50 years, you in Congress and every successive
administration has recognized the social, political, and economic
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impact o f improving housing supply and quality . . historically the use
of tax credits has played a key role in [creating a] strong housing
sector. . . [and creating] rental housing [for] essentially low- and
moderate-income people [requires] subsidies . . . without credits or
incentives [there will be] decreased supply and higher rents . . . (US
Senate, 1986, p. 443)
This testimony signified the beginning o f a loose coalition in which the National
Association o f Home Builders made direct and forceful appeals for the need for
federal subsidies to produce low-income housing, a belief shared by local officials,
nonprofit community development corporations, and low-income housing advocates.
Although there were no explicit references in the archival documents to the Credit
program (the program in its initial form appeared only in the final legislation), specific
provisions of the Credit program as created by the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 reflected
many o f the values revealed in policy Phase I documents.
Policy Phase It 11987-1990): Technical Corrections and Reflection
During the second period, a very active and important phase in the evolution o f
the Credit program, the debates and actions revolved around reflections on and
technical corrections to the program, as proposed by professionals and advocates. In
opening the 1990 Congressional hearings on the impacts, effectiveness, and equity of
the Tax Reform Act o f 1986, Representative Dan Rostenkowski's, Chair o f House of
Representatives' Committee on Ways and Means, aptly summarized the character o f
this policy phase:
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The Tax Reform Act o f 1986 was one o f the most significant revisions to the
tax law passed by Congress since the enactment o f the Federal income tax in
1913. The main goals o f the legislation were to make the tax law fairer to all
taxpayers while insuring tax every taxpayer, whether a corporation or an
individual, paid a fair share of the Nation's revenue needs . . . to make the tax
law more efficient. . . thereby encouraging economic developm ent. . . [and] to
simplify the tax system for individuals where possible. . . . Now . . . it is
appropriate for Congress to review the legislation's impact, effectiveness and
fairness. (USHR, 1990, p. 2)
The most visible actors during this policy phase were representatives from
governmental agencies (Congressional staff and bureaucrats); secondary actors were
additional local and state officials and private-sector representatives. Federal
government actors focused on minimizing the potential for program abuses and
excesses by the private sector as well as on income targeting and uncertainty about the
Credit’s long-run effects. Conversely, in a newly exposed coalition o f interests, local
officials and private-sector actors (including professionals in specialized parts o f the
development field, such as the legal, investment, syndication, and propertymanagement professions) were concerned with correcting technical flaws in the
legislation, increasing certainty and flexibility within the program, and reducing risks
associated with Credit investments. The general theme that echoed throughout the
Congressional testimonies surrounded the need for numerous technical corrections and
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improvements to the Credit program in order to increase private-sector participation in
it, as reflected in Table 2.
Table 2 - Actors and Issues in Policy Phase H
Staff and bureaucracy: General
Exercising caution over potential abuses from
Accounting Office [GAO] and
previous experiences (developers' fees, long-term
administrative staff
affordability)
Avoiding over-subsidization as a potential outcome
as seen in previous programs
Maximizing income targeting
Ensuring adequate controls and monitoring so that
all are treated equally under the program and so as to
avoid abuses to the system
Local and state officials, elected and
Correcting technical flaws to encourage investor
appointed
interest
Reducing risks, increasing certainty, and increasing
financial feasibility
Increasing program flexibility
Private-sector actors
Increasing certainty, decreasing risk, and increasing
financial feasibility to encourage growth in the new
syndication market
Increasing program flexibility

Thus, through a reading o f the relevant documents (Appendix G), it became
clear that the Credit program, by 1990 the largest government program for low-income
housing production available to developers (Stegman, 1991; Wallace, 1995; McClure,
2000) and generating an estimated $12 billion in private equity investment since its
inception (EF, 1997), had not been tested, examined, or thoughtfully crafted. Although
apparently based on concepts discussed in testimonies provided at Congressional
hearings, the Credit program appeared to be almost an "afterthought" in the political
negotiation process—an apparent political response to concerns o f the private sector
and nonprofit advocates about the dramatic reductions in financial incentives for
private investment in low-income housing development contained in the Tax Reform

Act o f 1986. During the debates surrounding the 1986 reforms, coalition members
made strong arguments preserving an incentive for low-income housing production,
for local control, and for community development. They linked low-income housing
historically to tax incentives and connected housing policy to economic development
in general. Their arguments sufficiently compelled Congress to preserve incentives for
private sector investment in low-income housing as part o f the 1986 tax reforms,
without much debate surrounding the actual program structure. After the fact, the
Credit program began to generate significant programmatic scrutiny in both the public
and private sectors, resulting in numerous technical corrections, many o f which were
based on the performance o f past low-income housing programs. In the initial
discussions surrounding necessary technical corrections, traces o f policy learning
began to emerge-primarily through the involvement o f long-term federal officials and
local public and private-sector actors who, for different reasons, brought to the debate
different insights and experiences in a search o f better resolutions for the future.
More specifically, o f primary importance to private sector actors was the
implementation o f technical corrections that would enhance investor interest in the
new Credit program, the most significant o f which was to establish the permanency o f
the Credit. Given the propensity o f legislators to change tax laws in ways that affect
current investment (as seen in the Tax Reform Act o f 1986), potential investors for
and developers o f Credit projects were hesitant to enter the field. Unexpected
legislation revoking Credits would result in losses o f future tax benefits for investors
(who would have already paid for Credit through up-front equity investments) or
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losses from predevelopment efforts by developers (because o f expenses incurred in the
process o f preparing to develop future Credit projects). Robert Lawson, representing
the National Association of Home Builders, emphasized these concerns in his
testimony before Congress: "The low income housing tax credit is the only incentive
to providing moderate housing to low- and moderate-income families. However, the
continued sunsets and some technical problems make it difficult for some investors
and developers to use the cre d it. . . " (USHR, 1990, p. 576). The importance o f this
provision for increasing the attractiveness of the program for Credit investors and
project developers was substantiated by stakeholder responses to interview questions.
When asked to identify what they thought was the most important change made to
Credit program since its inception, time and again respondents names the Credit's
receiving permanent status and the stability that resulted as the most consequential.
Other specific issues o f interest to local officials and private-sector actors
included:
•

Allowing for Carryover allocations o f Credits from one year to the next, a
timeframe more consistent with the real estate development cycle for
construction completion and lease-up, and one which minimized the risk o f
losing Credits;

•

Reducing threats o f recapture, so as not to dissuade potential investor interest;

•

Standardizing state underwriting requirements and rent structures, thus
increasing the certainty o f revenue projections for Credit projects;
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•

Allowing sponsors to lock the tax credit rate [TCR] p rio r to construction
completion and lease-up, thereby decreasing uncertainty and risks associated
with project financing;

•

Allowing investors to use the Credit to preserve the existing low-income
housing stock (specifically via acquisition o f HUD §221 (d)3 and §235 housing
programs), using waivers o f the 10-year holding rule 12 ;

•

Allowing for additional allocations of Credits in difficult-to-develop areas
[DDAs] and Qualified Census Tracts [QCTs], to spur redevelopment and meet
lower-income housing needs.

Federal government staff members, on the other hand, were primarily concerned with
the administrative and monitoring aspects of the Credit program. Reports from the
Joint Committee for Taxation [JCT] and the General Accounting Office [GAO]
resulted in recommendations for:
•

Clarifying reporting requirements,

•

Expanding the use o f Credits to preserve the existing low-income housing
stock (sustaining public subsidies),

•

Eliminating the potential for program abuse resulting from combining federal
subsidies,

•

Examining the sufficiency o f the subsidies in achieving income targeting goals,

•

Assessing the implications and effectiveness o f Credit recapture provisions
(i.e., also to minimize program abuse by developers and investors).
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Many o f the proposed changes indicated policy learning within coalitions (see
Appendix I and Chapter Seven). Furthermore, in response to interview questions about
improvements to the program since its inception, respondents from the public, private,
and nonprofit sectors referenced several o f the changes outlined above as being critical
to the program's success and its favored status, especially as compared to previous
federal housing programs. For example, in regards to changes considered most
important to the program, numerous respondents identified the following: consistent
underwriting has stabilized the program; the imposition o f long-term affordability to
30 years from 15 better serves public objectives; more codification has made the
program easier to use and has attracted more investors; clarifications on how to use
HOME dollars with Credits have helped reach lower incomes; and enhanced
compliance monitoring requirements in 1993 have helped stop abuses (see interview
comments in Chapter Three). Although not all o f the recommended improvements
were implemented in this phase (e.g., permanency was not granted by Congress until
1993), a significant number o f the changes proposed by both government officials and
interest groups were made to the program through the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act o f 1988, the Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1989, and the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1990.
Policy Phase TIT 0 9 8 8 ): Philosophical Reflection and Value sharing
Applicable to this phase are the first extensive public hearings held specifically
on the new Credit program reported in Low -incom e H ousing Tax Credits and the R ole
o f Tax Policy in Preserving the Stock o f Low-incom e H ousing (1988). In addition to
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staff members from the GAO, the Department o f Treasury, the Department o f Housing
and Urban Development [HUD], and Rural Development [RD], influential federal
actors were Representative Charles Rangel (D, NY), Senator George Mitchell (D,
ME), and Senator Alfonse D ’Amato (R, NY)-all strong supporters of the program.
Stepping up their presence were nonprofit foundations and private-sector stakeholders.
New on the scene were representatives from local and state housing finance agencies
and local community and economic development officials, all constituting what
appeared to be a maturing coalition o f broad support. (For a more detailed listing o f
actors, see Appendix H).
In his opening statement to the 1988 Congressional hearings on the Credit,
held by the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Representative Rangel
(Chair) set the tone for the philosophical reflection that occurred during this policy
phase:
This morning, we intend to review the recently passed low-income housing
credit. . . in the urgency to get some type o f tax reform . . . we had to hastily
put together some type o f substitute which we had no idea whether it could
work, but we are hopeful, and the purpose o f this hearing is to find out whether
or not this type o f credit is good housing policy and whether it is good tax
policy. (USHR, 1988, p. 4)
Federal elected officials debated the conflicts between the goals o f housing and
tax policies but expressed support for the potential efficiencies and flexibility that
could be achieved by an unprecedented rental housing program run by the states, in
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partnership with the Treasury Department rather than HUD. Citing the dramatic
reductions in HUD subsidies as contributing to lack o f confidence in the Department's
ability to address the nation's low-income housing needs, Representative Rangel said:
" . . . we cannot believe that HUD would be the place to go for incentives, and that is
why Treasury is going to be the official agency for what we do in this area . . .
nevertheless, we hope that w e can get some encouraging input from [HUD]" (USHR,
1988, p. 4). In addition, federal officials (including Treasury Department staff
members) contemplated how the program might achieve deeper income targeting (e.g.,
minimizing per unit costs o r maximizing benefits to the lowest income groups),
debated the merits of the Credit program as compared to Section 8 housing vouchers
and certificates, and explored how the Credit could be improved to provide long-term
solutions to by-now familiar housing problems. Clearly, federal officials had obtained
an explicit understanding o f the technical changes needed to enhance the attractiveness
o f the program to investors and developers. Senators D'Amato and Mitchell were
especially knowledgeable, as exemplified in their testimonies before the House
Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures on the Credit program's potential as a
low-income housing tool, assuming the passage o f specific technical changes (i.e.,
carryover allocations, permanency, flexibility in decision-making at the state level)
(USHR, 1988, pp. 5, 29-30, 41-44, 78-79).
Meanwhile, representatives from both the private and nonprofit sectors hailed
the program as the "perfect marriage" between the tax code and housing policy, and
they continued to advocate for additional technical changes to decrease investment

risk and enhance private-sector participation in the program. Nonprofit representatives
and community development advocates emphasized the need for additional subsidies
to reach the poorest o f the poor, to increase coordination between housing and taxing
agencies (signifying the official arrival o f intergovernmental issues in the policy
arena), and to continue decreasing risks for investors-now their partners. The growing
partnership between the private and nonprofit sectors was illustrated by statements
made by Patrick Clancy, Executive Director o f Greater Boston Community
Development, Inc.: " [The program's] extension is critically important now if we are
going to maintain the limited momentum that has been built up in utilization o f the
credi t . . . the credit specifically—and investment incentives through the Tax Code
more generally-are an important part o f an overall Federal housing effort and should
be maintained" (USHR, 1988, p. 137). In turn, support for using tax and housing
policies to help meet social goals, and emphasis o f policy precedence, was voiced by
equity investors. Stephen Ross, President of Related Companies, Inc. testified that
"Tax reform has often been justified as a weapon in the fight for social reform . . . tax
policy as a factor in housing development is a consistent thread implementing social
goals since World W ar I I .. . w e cannot afford to forget that vital social needs
motivate these tax programs. A free and productive society cannot maintain itself with
millions o f its citizens and their children either without adequate, decent housing, or
actually homeless." (USHR, 1988, p. 156-158).

114
Likewise, state and local officials advocated for decreasing investor risk (in
order to enhance private-sector investment in local community and economic
development efforts), provided recommendations for enhancing the value o f the Credit
in high-cost and blighted areas (DDAs and QCTs), and made observations as to how
to resolve administration issues among the various local and federal agencies involved
(again, an intergovernmental aspect). Table 3 on the following page restates these
various positions.
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Table 3 - Actors and Issues in Policy Phase HI
Enhance efficiency and flexibility through local
Federal level elected officials:
administration; increase effectiveness o f the Credit
Representatives and Senators
Limited cash, flow from restricted rents, limited capital
Private sector: developers,
appreciation of asset, and limited tax benefits create need to
investors, Federal National
make technical changes and attract more investors
Mortgage Association (FNMA]
Maintain partnership between tax code and housing
Decrease risk to increase ROI and thus attract more
investors
Nonprofit investors and advocates: Need to lower rents to serve lower income households;
CDCs, The Enterprise Foundation, Credits alone are not sufficient to lower rents; additional
state and local subsidies are needed
LISC, national advocate groups
Decrease risk and increase ROI for investors to produce
higher Credit prices, facilitating lower rents
Increase coordination and cooperation between housing and
tax agencies (intergovernmental issues)
Expand Credit for use in homeless and special needs
housing
Staff and bureaucracy: HUD, RD, Credit an improvement over previous programs because of
targeting and controls on developers
GAO
More Credit usage increases need for further study and
assessment
Need to assess costs versus benefits
Concerns over quality o f construction and cost per unit
Potential property maintenance and compliance concerns
Preference for supply-side over demand-side subsidies still
debatable
Federal housing programs should be more compatible
(intergovernmental issue)
Need to incorporate provisions to decrease investor risk by
Local officials: state and local
housing finance agencies, National increasing financial feasibility, thus increasing investor
pricing for Credits by increasing competition for Credits
Council of State Housing
Agencies [NCSHA], and
Need to increase basis for high cost areas for community
community and economic
revitalization and investment
development officials
Need to use Credit to promote mixed-income housing

In summary, during Phase HI, value sharing among actors began to
materialize, and a growing band o f local officials added their voices to those o f federal
bureaucrats and elected officials in discussing policy problems and issues. In contrast
to their federal counterparts, however, local administrators focused less on avoiding
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policy abuses or the merits o f demand-side versus supply-side housing subsidies and
more on lessons learned from community blight and revitalization and from previous
federal housing programs. Nevertheless, among all levels o f government there
appeared to be a commitment to maintaining some flexibility in regards to the
potential use o f Credits, achieving longer-terms o f affordability, and ensuring the
development o f quality affordable housing. Similarly, the views o f private and
nonprofit sectors differed in regards to the relative importance o f and appropriate
depth o f income targeting as well as the need for expanding the Credit for use in
special-needs housing; however, both parties shared with local officials a commitment
to increasing investors’ ROI so as to enhance private investment in the Credit as a
financing tool. Overall, Phase III was characterized by a commitment to further
assessing the effects and use o f the program, protecting the Credit from abuses,
maintaining and augmenting the Credit's support base, and expanding the Credit's
capacity to meet additional low-income housing needs.
Policy Phase IV f l 990-1992V Advanced Policy Debate and Coalition Expansion
In the early 1990s, after a few years of experience with the Credit program and
the technical corrections made during the early years, an advanced philosophical
debate began to evolve. In addition, the coalition o f interested parties expanded to
include several new members such as state governors, new nonprofit developers,
residents of Credit projects (the "end users"), and a greater number o f affected
professionals: the American Institute o f Architects, accountants, attorneys, and the
Public Securities Association (an international trade association o f brokerage firms
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and banks dealing in state and local government securities, mortgage bonds, and U.S.
government and federal agency securities and money markets). During Phase IV, the
Credit’s status as the only remaining significant federal program for the development
o f low-income rental housing was widely accepted. In light of the Credit's prominence
as a federal housing subsidy, o f an acknowledged heightened low-income housing
need, and o f increased intergovernmental and private support for the Credit, lobbying
efforts on behalf o f the Credit’s permanent status were reinforced. In virtually all o f
the testimony provided in the documented hearings (Appendix G), stakeholders
advocated to eliminate the Credit’s sunset provision, extolled the values o f the
public/private/nonprofit partnerships facilitated by the Credit, and proclaimed the
Credit to be an effective intergovernmental means o f fulfilling social objectives o f
local governments. During the interview process, the importance o f the Credit's
permanency, partnerships with the private sector, and social objectives were also
emphasized by respondents, as exemplified by the following quotes:
•

permanency has stabilized the program and has helped to increase investor
equity pay-in

•

it increases private sector leverage and increases comfort the level o f lenders
for underwriting risk

•

the partnering o f private and nonprofit actors brings together different values

•

residents' incomes can rise and they do not lose their housing

•

you can involve the public and private sector in "win/win" situation
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•

in the end it is really about the people and their homes; improving peoples
lives

•

teamwork with the private sector has changed nonprofit thinking.
Importantly, low-income residents and tenant associations also extolled how

the Credit program had changed peoples' lives-through its housing provision and links
with social services—and they advocated for stronger political support for the Credit.
Even stakeholders who could not use the program, such as Habitat for Humanity,
proclaimed support for the permanency o f the subsidy (USHR, 1991). Table 4 below
provides a more detailed overview o f the actors and issues reflected in the historical
documents in the advanced policy debate.
Table 4 - Actors and Issues in Policy Phase IV
Federal level elected officials:
Permanent extension o f the Credit is supported to
encourage continuing and increased private investment
Representatives and Senators
as provider of low-income housing
Private sector: professional lobbyists,
Permanent extension, standardized rents, and more clear
investors, property managers, bankers, program guidelines for the Credit needed to decrease
public securities agencies, architects,
financial risk and increase usage and investment
home builders, public accountants
Local elected and other public officials: Affirmation o f the Credit as the only significant program
housing and community renewal
left for bringing private investment to low- and
agencies, state representatives, state
moderate-income housing and bringing economic
housing finance agencies, state
development to low income areas in need o f economic
treasurers, lieutenant governors, mayors, revitalization
NCSHA
Support for the permanent extension of Credit
Success o f public/private/nonprofit partnerships
Significant economic impact realized
Recognition that multiple goals can be achieved: social
services, housing provision, economic development and
revitalization
Effectiveness as an intergovernmental resource
Nonprofit investors and advocates:
Support for Credit as providing more than just housing;
Habitat for Humanity, United Way, Low provides increased security and safety, achieves social
Income Support Coalition, residents
goods, and changes lives

The actors revealed in the legislative archives predominantly reflected the
"coalition expansion" that occurred during Phase IV. The advanced policy debate was
characterized more by the first in-depth analyses o f the Credit program, specifically as
completed by the GAO (1990), Michael Stegman (1991), and the Joint Committee on
Taxation [JCT] (1992). In 1990, the GAO released the first evaluation o f the Credit.
This study examined Credit projects developed in the first few years of the program
and enumerated four primary findings: (1) developers' fees seemed to be high but were
not exorbitant; (2) the Credit alone did not reduce rents sufficiently to serve very lowincome households; (3) compliance monitoring systems were insufficient; and (4)
program requirements then in place might not be effective deterrents of future
noncompliance. The compliance monitoring and possible noncompliance findings
were consistent with the concerns o f federal administrators; however, the finding that
developers' fees were reasonable alleviated some government concerns about potential
abuse o f the program by private-sector participants. Responses to interview questions
on values revealed that private-sectors actors also shared concerns that abuse be
minimized, in order to maintain the integrity o f the Credit program, and both
academics and practitioners alike agreed with the finding that the Credit alone is
insufficient to serve lower income households.
In 1991, Stegman published “The Excessive Costs o f Creative Finance:
Growing Inefficiencies in the Production o f Low Income Housing” in H ousing Policy
D ebate, a leading housing policy journal published by the Federal National Mortgage
Association [Fannie Mae]. A professor o f public policy and director of the Center for

Community Capitalism in the Kenan Institute o f Private Enterprise at the University o f
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Stegman was one o f the first academics to examine the
Credit and later served as the Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and
Research at HUD (Brookings Institution, 2000). Assessing the program in its early
stages o f development, Stegman examined the Credit as a creative finance tool and
argued that in the end it would be more costly to the government than previous federal
low-income housing programs—without eliminating the problems o f its predecessors.
Stegman made several important observations, but among his many criticisms the
following emerged highly relevant to the policy learning and debates that followed:
(1) the program was exceedingly costly and complicated; (2) the Credit did not
address the policy problem o f long-term affordability or preservation o f low-income
housing stock; (3) without substantial and complicated subsidy layering, the Credit
itself was not sufficient could not create housing for very low-income renters; and (4)
a significant amount o f the equity raised for Credit projects was used to pay for
syndication costs and thus was not invested in low-income housing.
First, while acknowledging that community-based housing developers and
their financial supporters had increased in sophistication since the 1960s, Stegman
maintained that the excessive costs and complications associated with the Credit
would eventually prevent these organizations from focusing on other issues and
programs critical to facilitating increased self-sufficiency o f low-income community
members. He thus raised the issue o f complexity as an important part o f the advanced
policy debate, and it remains pertinent as numerous respondents to the stakeholder
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survey echoed his early criticism o f the program. However, Stegman's concern that
nonprofits would not focus on low-income services has not been realized. An
enhancement over previous federal housing programs, the requirement for social
services plans in Q APs has increased rather than decreased the importance o f selfsufficiency programs for residents (another indicator o f policy learning).
Second, Stegman denounced the program for not adequately addressing the
issues related to the long-term preservation o f the rental housing, an issue whose
importance was increasingly realized when the first Section 236 and 221(d)(3) projects
began expiring in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He argued that without a public
financing program to enable nonprofit corporations to buy out for-profit sponsors at
the end o f 15 years, the 30-year use restriction would become at best a 3-year
extension. Stegman's point is a valued one, and affordability has been taken seriously
by practitioners and administrators within the Credit industry. Industry experts are
working on transition plans for the first expiring Credit projects in the year 2002,
many state allocation agencies give preference to projects with extended affordability
commitments (often up to 50 years), and credit professionals have created nonprofit
purchase options, including in capital plans provisions that allow nonprofit general
partners to assume existing financing upon reaching year 15.
Third, Stegman emphasized that the Credit program required substantial and,
at times, complicated subsidy layering in order to create housing for very low-income
renters. Although the approval o f Credit bonuses in DDAs and QCTs helped improve
the effectiveness o f the Credit in some instances, this criticism remains valid and is
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shared by researchers and practitioners alike (Cummings & DiPasquale, 2000; GAO,
1993 & 1997) and was reflected in responses during stakeholder interviews. Fourth,
Stegman argued that a significant amount o f the equity raised for Credit projects was
used to pay for syndication costs and thus not invested in housing. This was especially
true during the first several years o f the program’s existence, the timeframe o f
Stegman's initial research. The amount used for syndication costs as a percentage o f
the total equity invested has since decreased from a high as 30% initially to less than
10% in a more recent analysis (McClure, 2000)13. The decrease in syndication costs as
a percentage o f equity investment can be attributed to increased efficiencies in
syndication processes as well as increased equity investment per credit dollar
(McClure, 2000), with increased equity investment resulting largely from
enhancements to the program that decreased investor risk as well as from the
increasing sophistication o f Credit industry participants. Again, Stegman was one o f
the first to note this issue as meriting attention.
In 1992, the JCT prepared an assessment o f the long-run budgetary impacts
and potential cost-effectiveness o f the Credit program, as part o f the 1992 hearings
before the House Committee on Ways and Means regarding expiring tax credit
programs. This analytical assessment o f the program’s financial importance reported
several findings, two o f which appear to be most significant for this discussion and
remain an important point o f contention among academics and practitioners. First, the
JCT found that although the Credit could be expected to produce a net addition to
low-income housing stock in the long run, it would not produce a net addition to the
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rental housing stock in the short run. Rather, private investment in the short run
would merely be displaced, with money being shifted to low-income Credit projects
rather than being invested in market-rate units (a continuing concern as expressed by
several respondents in the survey), or because new construction would reduce the
natural conversion o f older market-rate units to low-income use. Whether or not this
is a real or perceived result, at least one private sector actor participating in the
interview process shared this belief when identifying as a disadvantage o f the
program that "the Credit displaces private investment" (see Chapter Three). Second,
the JCT quoted data indicating that Section 8 housing vouchers costs per household
were approximately half that o f Credit subsidies, and the validity both points has
been debated by other policy analysts (Apgar, 1990; Weicher, 1990; Ernst & Young,
1997).
Importantly, the debates o f the early 1990s unveiled highly technical topics.
The first government-sponsored studies gave a representation o f the program to date
and provided interested parties with data to support positions or eliminate concerns.
For example, the GAO's finding that developers' fees were not, in general, excessive
addressed some o f the concerns o f federal administrators, while its finding that
program requirements might not be sufficient to ensure compliance focused policy
makers' attention on strengthening regulations. Its findings that Credits were
necessary to make projects financially feasible substantiated the assertions o f privatesector actors, while the finding that Credits alone were not sufficient to serve very
low-income households strengthened the arguments of nonprofits and advocates that
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the Credit should be made more effective (e.g., through special allocations in highcost areas or by combination with other federal subsidies). Likewise, Stegman's
research raised valid concerns that were subsequently remedied or are currently being
addressed by policy-makers and practitioners. Spurred by the JCT's 1992 criticisms,
debates over potential short-run and long-run effects of the Credit as well as the
superiority o f supply-side versus demand-side policies still ensue. Collectively, these
studies served to stimulate and refine policy debates by subjecting the Credit to more
intense scrutiny, analysis, and criticism.
Policy Phase V (1990 to present): Institutionalization and Industry Specialization
During this period, with broad political support, the Credit achieved
permanency via the Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1993. The significance o f this
event was immense, as a decision by Congress to not award permanency status would
have continued to stymie the program's effectiveness over the long-run. In his 1991
testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means, John Manning, President
o f the Coalition to Preserve the Low-income Housing Tax Credit and CEO o f Boston
Capital Partners, Inc. outlined how the Credit's sunset provisions affected not only
developers and investors but also mortgage lenders, state allocation agencies, and local
redevelopment officials-all o f whom continued to invest resources into enhancing
staff capacity and implement planning and long-term implementation efforts when the
program's future was continually uncertain: "Many such entities are unwilling or
reluctant to make these investments when the fate o f the program has been so
uncertain . .. [and] lack o f permanence also sends the wrong signal to potential
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investors, who are concerned that Congress may retroactively deny tax benefits under
the credit program in the manner that occurred after the adoption o f the 1986 Tax
Reform Act" (USHR, 1991, p. 786).
The program was further institutionalized as it progressed through a second
wave o f technical improvements and clarifications. Additional governmental
assessments o f the program were completed, practitioners improved their application
o f the program, and technical information was accumulated based on increased
expertise. Importantly, discussions moved away from debate on the merits of the
Credit to more detailed deliberations on “how" the Credit should function rather than
“i f 1the program should be continued, and the level o f technical available information
available to policy-makers and practitioners increased. Overall, there transpired a
dramatic evolution in and enhanced sophistication o f professionals in the Credit field
and, after the establishment o f permanency, the program's popularity was
characterized not only by increased competition for the purchase o f Credits recordhigh equity investments but also aggressive competition between nonprofit and forprofit developers for Credit allocations.
In 1995 the percentage o f Credits allocated to nonprofit developers nationwide
had reached approximately 34%, and the discourse surrounding nonprofit versus forprofit development models had become so intense that the NCSHA sponsored special
deliberations on the subject at the opening session o f its annual Housing Credit
Conference in June o f 1997 (NSCHA, 1997). Representing private sector developers
on the panel were Jeffrey Goldstein o f Boston Capital (an investor o f debt and equity)

and Daniel Markson of National Housing Corporation (a private developer);
participating as nonprofit spokespeople were M ark Sissman o f The Enterprise
Foundation and Mary Tingerthal o f the National Equity Fund (both syndicators o f
nonprofit-sponsored Credit projects). The tone o f the discussion, set by NCSHA
Executive Director John McEvoy, was one o f exploration. As the professional
association o f Credit allocation agencies, NCSHA's stated intent was to ensure fairness
within the allocation system and to encourage ongoing dialogue about the realities ofj
issues surrounding, and differences between for-profit and nonprofit developed Creditfunded housing projects. Given the steady increase in Credit allocations to nonprofit
developers in the 1990s, for-profit developers were primarily concerned with "leveling
the playing field" and eliminating what they believed to be unfair advantages
bestowed on nonprofit developers during the Credit allocation process. Mr. Markson
synthesized the concerns o f for-profit developers when he said: " . . . I'm a developer
who is concerned with getting shutout o f a livelihood that I've spent 16 years building
expertise and putting my time and effort into . . . in no way does the level playing field
advocate the elimination o f nonprofit participation or the ten percent set aside . . . [but]
allocate Credits upon the long-term viability o f the deal and not the tax status of the
sponsor" (NCSHA, 1997, p. 5). Nonprofit advocates Sissman and Tingerthal
countered that (1) for-profit developers still received over 60% o f the Credits
nationwide, (2) nonprofit development proposals, submitted by trained real estate
professionals, were not nearly as uncompetitive or inefficient as some for-profit
counterparts appeared to believe, and (3) there were numerous public policy reasons

why nonprofit development projects often received "bonus points" during allocation
processes—including the propensity o f nonprofit developers to commit to longer terms
o f affordability, to build larger units in difficult-to-develop areas, and to serve special
needs populations.
These issues are identified in Table 5 on the following page, which gives an
overview o f the actors and issues o f concern reflected during the Institutionalization
and Industry Specialization policy phase.

128
Table 5 - Actors and Issues in Policy Phase V
Establishment of increased need for and recognition of
Federal level elected officials:
Credit program as providing housing, services and private
Representatives and Senators
investment - support for permanency grows
Higher than needed Credit subsidies and excessive
developer fees are a concern with RD projects
Need to be address to encourage better coordination
among Credit and other federal housing programs
Provision o f social services to increase self-sufficiency o f
low-income residents is an improvement over previous
housing programs
Need to compare of public housing development with tax
credits to other HUD-funded programs
Need increased intergovernmental coordination among the
ERS, states, and localities
Private sector: professional lobbyists, Need permanent status and standardized rents to decrease
investors, property managers, bankers, risk to investors and thus increase investor interest in
public securities agencies, architects, Credit, stimulate competition and increase Credit prices
(allowing more money to go into housing per Credit dollar
home builders, public accountants
invested by the federal government)
See increasing use of Credit by nonprofits, commitments
State and local public officials:
housing and community
to longer terms of affordability, and economic
revitalization of distressed areas
redevelopment agencies, NCSHA,
housing finance agencies, mayors,
state representatives, state treasurers, Incentive for public/private/nonprofit partnerships
governors
GAO and Congressional staff

Nonprofit organizations: Habitat for
Humanity, LISC, residents of Credit
projects
Industry journals

Multiple goals achieved (housing, partnerships, economic
development, community revitalization)
Significant economic impact
Flexible program meets many varied local needs
Increased safety and security comes with community
development —more than just housing —Credit meets
numerous social goals and changes fives
Education o f potential investors and developers is needed
mainly to increase Credit activity
Shared knowledge and experiences (property
management, investors, developers); evolution of
mechanics o f Credit programs; explanations of technical
changes and updates

Academic journals

Expressed concerns over efficiency and effectiveness
Vlade recommendations for improving state allocation
processes
Reviewed nonprofit vs. for profit development costs
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Phase V was also characterized by governmental staff analyses and testimonies
before Congressional subcommittees and the further incorporation o f policy learning
through incorporation of “lessons learned” into technical changes, often based on staff
reports on the Credit program. For example, assessments o f projects using Credits in
conjunction with RD programs showed that, when combined, the tw o programs
resulted in higher than necessary federal subsidies because there was no overlapping
program oversight (GAO, 1992). Subsequently, detailed subsidy-layering reviews at
the state level for all Credit projects were required to ensure that only the minimum
necessary subsidies were allocated. Second, a review o f Credit projects used with RD
funds found there to be excessive developers’ fees, primarily resulting from RD's lack
o f centralized underwriting procedures in regards to developers' fees (GAO, 1992).
This finding was consistent with early criticisms o f federal low-income rental-housing
programs where higher-than-reasonably allowed profit margins made developers and
owners wealthier, and restrictions on developer fees in Credit program were
implemented. As a result o f information presented by Congressional staff and the
GAO, in order to avoid the common abuses and criticisms o f past low-income housing
programs and to preserve the integrity o f the Credit program, advocates and
stakeholders supported many o f the checks and balances implemented by public
officials. Specific examples o f supplementary monitoring techniques included the
addition o f gap analyses by state housing agencies, federal subsidy-layering reviews,
requirements for identification o f potential conflicts o f interests on Credit applications,
financial feasibility assessments by state agencies (development and operations), and
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standards for allocations and auditing developed by the NCSHA consistent with IRS
guidelines.
In 1993, the GAO completed another evaluation o f the Credit program,
focusing exclusively on the use o f Credits by public housing agencies [PHAs]. This
important study represents how very entrenched the Credit had become an accepted
and politically popular affordable housing tool. In examining populations served and
housing built, the GAO report found that PHAs using Credits could not serve incomes
as low as those served by the PHAs' other federally-funded housing programs.
Although successful in scattering low-income family housing throughout middleincome communities (thus avoiding further concentration o f poverty), PHAs served
fewer large families with Credits and, in order to serve very low-income households
PHAs, needed to use additional subsidies such as Section 8 certificates, consistent
with numerous other studies before and since (Stegman, 1991; GAO, 1997;
Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999; McClure, 2000). PH As were, however, able to use
the more flexible Credit program to develop more concentrated housing for elderly
and small families, build in a variety o f neighborhoods, including middle-income
communities, and construct a greater variety o f unit types. PHAs built townhouses,
flats, walk-ups, low- and high-density projects, studios to 3+ bedrooms, representing a
greater variety o f housing types than projects built with traditional public housing
development funds. At its essence, however, this study indicated that, for about the
same level o f federal expenditure, traditional public housing projects served
households with much lower incomes than did projects funded with the Credit;
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nonetheless, by this policy phase the Credit had become firmly entrenched in the
fabric o f low-income housing policy at the federal, state, and local levels.
Furthermore, program changes proposed by government agencies (such as subsidylayering reviews and longer affordability requirements) were in general accepted
rather than challenged by practitioners, intensifying government support for the
program.
In addition to more federally-sponsored studies, numerous references to and
studies o f the Credit program by academics and practitioners began to appear in
H ousing P olicy Debate (e.g., Listokin, 1990; Nenno, 1990; Stemlieb & Hughes, 1990;
Stegman, 1991 & 1999; Wallace, 1995; Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999; Roberts &
Harvey, 1999; McClure, 2000; Orlebeke, 2000), and articles on the program began to
appear in established industry journals and private publications (e.g., banking, legal,
accounting, and planning journals ). Essays by leading CPAs in the Credit field
appeared in the N ational R eal E state Investor (e.g., Fortenbach & Novogradac, 1990)
and in Urban Land, a planning professionals magazine (e.g., Hobart & Schwartz,
1997), and industry experts began creating Credit-specific journals and references.
Contributors described the Credit program for entrepreneurs and explained how to
participate, and journals provided advertising space for new professional resources
such as the Low-incom e H ousing Tax C redit H andbook, which is still released
annually with legislative and industry standards updates. Novogradac & Co., one o f
the leading CPA firms specializing in Credit accounting and education, began
publishing A ffordable H ousing Finance, providing special sections on the Credit and
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discussing trends and common problems related to development, property
management, and Credit policy. The Enterprise Foundation [EF], parent company o f
Enterprise Social Investment Corporation [ESIC], a syndicator o f Credits, added
“LIHTC Talking Points” to its web page, in an effort to further inform nonprofit
developers about the Credit as a low-income housing and community development
resource: explaining the Credit program, providing legislative updates on the Credit,
and outlining ESIC's priorities for community development and investment. Beginning
the policy phase period by achieving the Credit's permanency status (in 1993) and
further institutionalizing itself through a progression o f technical improvements and
data assemblage, the Credit industry was well positioned for Phase VI and advanced
policy analysis.
Policy Phase VI (1996-present'): Advanced Program Analysis
Phase VI is characterized by further evolution o f the Credit industry as defined
by increasing technical expertise, higher levels o f academic interest in the program,
and additional studies by the GAO (1997b) and HUD (Abt Associates, 2000). These
studies signified the “maturation” o f the program via the expansion o f the assessment
phase o f policy analysis. Reviewed here are several studies most exemplary o f an
advanced analysis phase, with a listing o f analysts and interest areas included in Table
6 on the following page.
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Table 6 - Issues in Policy Phase VI
Need for improved oversight, auditing and compliance
Federally-sponsored research
findings (staff and administrators) monitoring

Academic findings

Non-academic and locallysponsored research findings

Over the long-term, the Credit reached lower incomes and
achieved greater affordability than required
Overall, costs are reasonable, with the differential between
nonprofit and for-profit developments attributable mainly to
types o f housing produced
Syndication costs have decreased so that more Credit dollars
are invested in the projects
Credits still require additional subsidies to have decreased
rents
The value of housing produced is less than the value of
governments costs o f the Credit over the long-term
Increasingly safeguards were put in place to prevent
developers from taking excessive fees or charging excessive
construction costs
The subsidy is too inflexible
Housing is still expensive and nonprofit developed housing is
more expensive than for-profit developed housing
Increased investor interest in projects has increased
competition and Credit equity pay-ins
Credit program has become more cost effective than
vouchers, especially for very low-income families
Credit projects are more expensive to develop than other
types o f housing but adds economic value to communities as
well (often the economic development impetus in distressed
areas)
Nonprofit developed housing is not more costly than for
profit developed housing when one considers type and
location

In 1997 the GAO (1997) released a study ordered by Representative Bill
Archer (R, TX), the Chair o f the House Ways and Means Committee who had
expressed strong doubts about the program's effectiveness. However, the GAO study
substantiated claims o f the program’s long-range improvement and success, finding
that, although more attention should be paid to monitoring and reporting to ensure
program compliance, the program was functioning overall as intended or better than
intended. The incomes o f households served were significantly lower than required,
and a variety o f housing was being developed in rural, suburban, and urban areas. In
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addition, the Credit was being used extensively not only for urban revitalization and
community development but also for preservation and renovation o f existing HUD
expiring-use projects, and record high-rates were being paid for Credits by investors.
Also in 1997, a study by Ernst &Young (requisitioned by NCSHA) echoed
many o f the GAO findings and additionally found that (1) the Credit was arguably
more cost-effective for the federal government than Section 8 vouchers in some
instances, (2) in tight housing markets, Section 8 vouchers are less effective than
Credits in providing affordable housing the Credits, and (3) unlike vouchers Credits
added more value overall to the community via increases in real estate values and new
jobs created. This last point is fairly obvious, as the Credit is a supply-side subsidy,
encourages community revitalization, and facilitates additional construction activity.
Regarding the first finding on the cost-effectiveness o f Section 8 vouchers, Ernst &
Young's assertion that the Credit is more cost-effective in some cases is attributable in
part to their research methodology. For example, the administrative costs for Section 8
programs are absorbed annually through PHAs and HUD; in contrast the
administrative costs o f the Credit program to the government are predominantly
absorbed once, at the time o f initial investment. Although allocation agencies and the
IRS complete audits, much o f the compliance reporting costs are passed on to the
owners and investors over the long run (a point confirmed by comments from
administrators in stakeholder interviews). As for the second finding that Credits are
more effective in meeting housing needs, this finding is consistent with research o f
others (Apgar, 1991) and the Credit's intent o f being used to meet the greatest "unmet
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housing need." When available housing is plentiful, it is likely that Section 8 vouchers
will be more readily accepted by private owners and renters will receive in turn
decent, affordable housing. On the other hand, vouchers are less effective when
demand for housing is high and supply is limited (Apgar, 1990). Credits can be
targeted by allocation agencies so that they are used to develop housing in tight,
underserved, or blighted housing markets (Ernst & Young, 1997).
In 1999, the GAO released its most recent study, Tax Credits: Reasons fo r
Cost Differences in Housing B uilt by For-Profit and Nonprofit Developers. This study
was timely, as discourse within the policy subsystem over nonprofit allocations had
increased (NCSHA, 1997). Strong competition in the marketplace for the allocation o f
Credits encouraged for-profit developers to focus on the relatively high percentage o f
Credits allocated to nonprofit developers which, in 1997, increased to over 30% o f
Credits allocated nationwide (NCHSA, 1997). Further, the higher costs o f nonprofit
units have been a point o f criticism by some analysts and for-profit developers
(Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999; NCSHA, 1997). However, the GAO indicated that
while Credit units built by nonprofit developers cost more, on average, than units built
by for-profit developers, nonprofit developer costs were not necessarily higher when
differences in the units’ characteristics were taken into account. For example,
nonprofit developers tended to build more expensive types o f housing projects than
for-profits, including larger family units, high rises, or projects located in difficult
neighborhoods needing revitalization-findings also supported by other analysts
(Mclntire, 1996; White & Bole, 1997; Roberts & Harvey, 1999).
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Also in 1999 Jean Cummings and Denise DiPasquale, two well-known
housing policy and finance analysts14, published “The Low-income Housing Tax
Credit: An Analysis o f the First Ten Years” in Housing Policy Debate. One o f the
most recent academic studies, this analysis found that over time the Credit program
has become more efficient, with higher equity dollars going into projects and lower
internal rates o f return being tolerated by investors. In general, the researchers gave
the Credit program a favorable review. They found that the structure o f the program
was generally flexible and decentralized and that the program had achieved many of
its goals, including attracting private investment to low-income housing and achieving
community revitalization in some depressed areas. Their primary concerns were with
how to improve the Credit's ability to serve the lowest income households, how to
ensure sufficient project operating costs into the future, and how to maintain
affordability after year 15. Stegman, in his commentary on this research (1999),
strongly supported Cummings and DiPasquale saying they had provided the most
conclusive information and study o f the Credit program to date. Although he
expressed the need for feedback from advocates on some o f the points and voiced
strong concerns regarding the future affordability o f Credit projects after year 15, he
agreed that the program has become increasingly efficient and effective, especially in
contrast to his 1991 review. Also in response to Cummings and DiPasquale, Benson F.
Roberts, Vice President for Policy at Low Income Support Coalition, and F. Barton
Harvey III, Chairman and CEO o f The Enterprise Foundation (1999), approved
Cummings’ and DiPasquale’s observations that the Credit has become more efficient;
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however, they took issue with several points related to income targeting, the financial
viability o f Credit portfolios, higher development costs associated with Credit
projects, and future affordability o f developments.
Many o f Cummings and DiPasquale's findings were further addressed or
supported by ‘T h e Low-income Housing Tax Credit Program: A National Survey o f
Property Owners” (Abravanel & Johnson, 1999). This report contained the first
national survey o f project owners and included information from owners on projects
placed in service between 1992 and 1994. The survey found that although Credits
made real estate deals economically feasible, Credits were less effective in achieving
lower rents without additional subsidies. They found that the majority o f properties
were meeting owners’ expectations for financial performance and occupancy rates
were high, although about 25% expressed some concern over cash flow. In most cases,
owners planned to maintain their properties for low-income occupancy after the
compliance period ended, with a minority being considered for conversion to market
rate (typically projects not meeting cash flow o r other financial expectations).
Interestingly, owners not only cited civic, social, and financial motivations for
development decisions but notably stated that, given a choice, helping low-income
people or addressing a problem property for having entered into a tax-credit deal was
more influential in their decision-making than financial reasons, including about onethird o f for-profit entities (Abravanel & Johnson, 1999, p. ii). This civic motivation
was corroborated by the stakeholder survey and interview responses, wherein a more
than expected number o f respondents emphasized social responsibilities, helping
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residents through creating affordable housing, and improving communities as reasons
for participating in a Credit project. Specific responses made by private-sector and
nonprofit professionals and public officials included the following:
"[The Credit program] creates a socially responsible private sector."
"Everyone involved [is] working towards a common goal."
"[The Credit program] has increased my focus on targeting money to real
needs o f communities and people."
"You can involve the public and private sector in win/win situation."
"[The program] can help facilitate self-sufficiency."
"[The program] puts good housing in rural areas." (private sector actor)
"The quality housing built has often changed communities' conversations about
what type o f affordable housing can and should be built; a reverse from the
public housing model to market-driven approach."
In 2000 Kirk McClure, associate professor in Urban Planning at the University
o f Kansas, published ‘T he Low-Income Housing Tax Credit as an Aid to Housing
Finance: How Well Has It Worked?” That same year Charles Orlebeke, a professor in
the College o f Urban Planning and Public Affairs at the University o f Illinois in
Chicago, published “The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy: 1949 to 1999."
McClure discussed improvements in the program, higher equity investments,
increased competitiveness in the marketplace for Credits, and made suggestions as to
how the program might achieve greater effectiveness. Both authors recognized the
Credit’s pre-eminent position as the affordable housing tool provided by the
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government, and Orlebeke emphasized the historical precedence in the American
political economy o f linking tax advantages to real estate investments, in general, and
to low-income housing in particular. The tone o f the more recent research sharply
contrasts with earlier documents where debates were over if the Credit was beneficial
as a low-income housing program and, philosophically, whether it should exist as a
federal policy-indications o f policy learning.
Notably, in this most recent policy phase the debates have been primarily
stimulated over technical issues and have resulted in suggestions for improving the
efficiency and effectiveness o f the program. Academics, advocates, and practitioners
all lobby for greater flexibility as well as program changes to allow the Credit to
achieve greater efficiencies and effectiveness. As reflected in both the literature and
the stakeholder surveys, suggestions for program improvements have included the
following: eliminating the limited partnership structure (a costly feature); expanding
the bonus percentages from DDAs and QCTs to projects that target very low-income
or special needs housing; streamlining compliance reporting procedures nationwide;
reduce costs o f and time for IRS administrative rulings (referred to in the industry as a
"Private Letter Ruling"). In response to the query of how the program could be
improved, specific quotes from stakeholder interviews included the following:
"Target only 50% area median income and require 100% tax credit units."
"Streamline administrative compliance and reporting requirements."
"Increase consistency nationwide on how states assess projects."

"Give the 130% basis booster also to difficult-to-serve populations, such as
people at 30% area median income or special needs populations."
"Enhance enforceability for social services programs promised by developers."
"Address some o f the subsidy layering issues."
"Provide more administrative flexibility."
"Credits should be simply sold as a commodity and not tied to the property,
which creates a need for a partnership structure that is expensive; they should
just sell the credits like other investments to the highest bidder."
"We need more tim ely and affordable technical guidance from the IRS. For
example, a Private Letter Ruling from the IRS can take 12-18 months and costs
$ 10,000 ."

Using the historical information discussed in this chapter, advanced policy
analyses, responses from the stakeholder surveys and interviews, as well as the
constructs developed in Chapter Four, policy learning by coalition members and
between coalitions as well as indications o f coalition members' values and agendas are
further explored in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN
VALUES, COALITIONS, AND POLICY LEARNING: A POLICY ANALYSIS

The analysis provided in this chapter will facilitate the operationalization o f the
Advocacy Coalition Framework [ACF] so that its constructs can be applied during the
policy-making process. This narrative explores beliefs, values, and norms that
influenced decision-making during the evolution o f the low-income housing tax credit
[LIHTC or Credit] program, considers actors and attributes o f the policy subsystem,
and identifies advocacy coalitions. Both political culture and political economy, as
discussed in Chapter Four, heavily impacted the successful evolution o f the Credit,
and this assessment incorporates these precepts as well as those included in the ACF,
including policy learning. In Theories o f the Policy Process (1999) Sabatier
reorganized the original nine ACF hypotheses from his earlier work with JenkinsSmith (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) into three categories: hypotheses o f advocacy
coalitions (3 hypotheses), policy change (2 hypotheses) and learning across coalitions
(4 hypotheses). A consideration o f these hypotheses is central in assessing the ACF's
explanatory power in regards to specific policies. This policy analysis uses the policy
history and stakeholder surveys to briefly explore the ACF hypotheses, o f which a
majority (seven out o f nine) are applicable in a final assessment o f policy-making and
policy learning surrounding the Credit. The observations in this chapter are
substantiated by specific examples from the Credit case study and data from the
stakeholder surveys and interviews.
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Beliefs, Values and Norms
The Credit policy history was instrumental in identifying the values o f political
culture and political economy that emerged as dominant among Credit program
stakeholders. As described earlier, the American political culture incorporates
numerous fundamental characteristics that have created the cultural and social
background against which Credit policy-making has occurred. Furthermore, specific
provisions o f the Credit program reflect constructs of the American political economy,
elements that are in essence the means through which we maximize the norms and
values reflected in the political culture. Principles o f political culture and political
economy can be characterized as "deep core" and "core policy" values, as defined by
the ACF. According to the ACF, deep core values are those that are embraced by
society as "fundamental normative and ontological axioms" while core policy values
take the form o f "fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for
achieving core values" (Sabatier, 1999, p. 133). In other words, deep core values are
venerated as absolute, indeed almost mystical in essence; core policy values are more
tangible means through which deep core values can be achieved. In order to discuss
norms and values o f American political culture and political economy in the rubric o f
the ACF, and to explore those attributes o f the Credit that reflect principles o f political
culture and political economy, the constructs were correlated. Correlation was
accomplished using archival documents to identify issues important to stakeholders in
light o f the political culture and political economy constructs, and the working
document for this process are included in Appendix I. The most frequently shared
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political culture values were classified as deep core values; the most frequently shared
principles o f political economy were deemed core policy values. The results o f the
analysis are summarized in Table 7, wherein pertinent political culture and political
economy constructs defined by the literature review and identified via the policy
history were re-classified using ACF terminology.
Table 7 Prominent Political Culture and Political Economy Constructs Reflected in the Credit
Core Policy Value
Political
Deep Core Value
Political Economy
rcpvi
Culture
1DCV1
Local control
Civic participation and
Civic
Local control
participation and
equality
equality
Private property and
Individual self-interest
Individual selfPrivate property and
free-market system
free-market system
interest
Thrift and
prudence
Individualism

Efficiency,
effectiveness and hard
work
Competition and selfsufficiency

Thrift and prudence

Efficiency, effectiveness
and hard work

Individualism

Competition and selfsufficiency

The values identified in Table 7 were further explored by the stakeholder surveys and
interviews. Tables 8 and 9 (on the following page) synthesize responses to survey and
interview questions designed to explore stakeholders' prioritization o f values. As
illustrated, certain Credit program attributes reflect deep core and core policy values
(defined in Table 7).
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Table 8 Most Frequently Stated Credit Program Advantages
Values Reflected
Program Advantages *
Thrift and prudence - DCV
Effectiveness in meeting housing goals
Effectiveness - PCV
Thrift and prudence - DCV
Efficiency in leveraging private funds
Efficiency - CPV
Belief in market forces - CPV
Maximizing role o f private sector in meeting Self-interest - DCV
Belief in market forces - CPV
housing needs
Means for creating new public/private
partnerships
Local control
Means for influencing community
revitalization

Self-interest - DCV
Belief in market forces - CPV
Local control -DCV
Civic participation and equality - DCV
Local control - CPV

Flexibility

Local Control - CPV
Belief in market forces - CPV
Civic participation and equality - DCV
Promotes residents’ self sufficiency
Local control - CPV
* Survey Questions #2 and #5; Interview Question #1
Table 9 Most Frequently Stated Credit Program Disadvantages
Program Advantages *
Values Reflected
Thrift and prudence - DCV
Economic and administrative inefficiency
Efficiency - PCV
Programmatic inflexibility
Local control - CPV
Belief in market forces - CPV
Complexity
Effectiveness - CPV
Efficiency - CPV
* Survey Questions #3 and #6; Interview Question #2

The policy history also revealed specific Credit program or policy-making attributes
that maximize values. Referred to as "secondary aspects" by the ACF, these attributes
are distinct provisions essential for realizing core policy values or, in the words o f
Sabatier (1999) "instrumental decisions .. . necessary to implement [the] policy core"
(p. 133). Secondary aspects are identified in Table 10, which assigns program
attributes to the principles outlined in Table 7.
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Table 10 Secondary Aspects Reflective of Deep Core and Core Policy Values
Secondary Aspects
Deep Core
Core Policy
Value
Value
Credit's administration shared by two levels of government:
Local control
Civic
(a) the IRS in charge of general oversight; (b) state and local
participation
housing finance agencies [HFAs], charged with allocating and
and equality
administering Credits in their communities
Testimonials of individuals and organizations before
Congressional subcommittees
Legislative requirements that HFAs publish and hold public
hearings on the QAPs, establishing local procedures by which
Credits are awarded and administered
DDA and QTC designations help attract investment to very
low-income and/or blighted areas
Nonprofit set-aside requirements for community-based
development organizations
Investors have the right to earn a reasonable return on their
Private
Individual
investment and achieve reasonable profits
self-interest
property and
free-market
Developers are allowed a reasonable fee for services
system
Credit rental housing developments are not publicly owned.
Limited partnerships hold the properties in which investors
hold ownership interests
Thrift and
Efficiency and Minimum amount o f Credits needed are allocated to projects
prudence
effectiveness

Individualism

Competition
and selfsufficiency

Credits allocations must consider the greatest housing need
and market assessments
Preservation and renovation of existing affordable units
Minimum rehabilitation requirements
Long-term affordability requirements
Maximum allowable rents
Financial viability assessments by HFAs and subsidy-layering
reviews
Monitoring systems to track Credit program compliance
Recapture provisions to ensure program compliance
Maximum allowable developer fees are capped
Competitive application processes with clear allocation
guidelines
Requirements to include resident services plans to facilitate
self-sufficiency

In support o f the policy history observations made in Table 10, Table 11 synthesizes
responses from stakeholder interviews. Specifically, interview question number seven
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(Appendix C) queried stakeholder values as embodied in specific Credit program
attributes.
Table 11 Core Value Rankings per Interview Question #7
Ranking
Credit goals and objectives
#of
ranked
responses
1

26

2

17

3

13

4

11

5

11

6

11

7

9

Values reflected

Thrift and prudence - DCV
Effectiveness - CPV
Civic participation and equality
-DCV
Belief in market forces - CPV
Local control - CPV
Civic participation and equality
Facilitation of residents’ self-DCV
sufficiency
Individualism - DCV
Self-sufficiency - CPV
Local control - CPV
Involvement of private sector in Belief in market forces - CPV
low-income housing
Belief in market forces - CPV
Leverage of private funds in
public/private partnership
model
Thrift and prudence - DCV
Efficient means of proriding
efficiency - CPV
needed housing subsidies
Equitable distribution of
Civic participation and equality
-D CV
subsidies based on local
Local control - CPV
goals/objectives/ needs
Affordable housing
development
Stabilization or revitalization of
communities

Identifying meaningful beliefs, values, and norms was an important first step in
applying the ACF to the Credit program. The Credit program, as a low-income rentalhousing policy, has received broad support in part because values held as significant
within our political culture and political economy resonate within program provisions
illustrated in Tables 7 though 11. The analysis in the following pages reflects on the
cast o f actors, identifies advocacy coalitions, applies the ACF hypotheses, and makes
observations on policy learning.
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Subsystem Actors, Attributes, and Coalitions
When the Credit program was created as part of the tax reforms o f 1986, the
program was largely conceived to satisfy various constituent groups, including real
estate developers, rental project owners and managers, low-income housing advocates,
investors, and a handful o f local elected officials-all o f whom had testified before
Congress about the need to preserve some type o f federal incentive for the production
o f low- and moderate-income housing. As time passed, membership in this policy
subsystem began to expand. Practitioners and government administrators gained more
experience with the program, and efforts were initiated to promote changes and
improvements to the program. Investors and developers lobbied for program changes
that would increase financial return and reduce investment risk; low-income housing
and community development advocates lobbied to use Credits for special-needs
housing, to create difficult-to-develop [DDA] and qualified census tract [QCT]
designations as a revitalization tool, and to deepen income targeting via subsidylayering allowances. Local officials and administrators lobbied to improve
intergovernmental coordination and to include provisions that would heighten investor
interest in the program. Federal agencies assessed the program's effectiveness,
expressed concerns over preventing abuses, and made recommendations for enhanced
monitoring o f compliance and administration.
Within the policy subsystem, advocacy coalitions emerged. I created specific
labels for these coalitions that were reflective o f shifting interests and shared values
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and which characterized the attributes and interests o f coalition members. The
coalitions were revealed by the policy history and are depicted in Table 12 below:
Table 12 Evolution of Advocacy Coalitions by Policy Phase
Policy Phase
Actors
Coalition *
I. Initial Policy
Public officials (local
Coalition for
and federal), nonprofit
Debate and
Public Good
Creation (1985organizations and
86)
advocates
Private sector: builders,
Coalition for
Market Approach
investors, owners
Federal staff (GAO,
II. Technical
Coalition for
Corrections
Market Oversight
HUD, CBO)
(1987-90)
Local officials (elected
Coalition for
and appointed), private
Market Approach
sector actors
III. Reflection
Federal Staff (HUD,
Coalition for
(1988)
Market Oversight
GAO, CBO)
Federal elected officials,
Coalition for
local administrators,
Market Approach
private sector actors
Nonprofit community
Coalition for
Community
and advocates, local
administrators
Approach
IV. Advanced
Policy
Considerations
and Coalition
Expansion (199092)

V. Institutional
ization and
Industry
Specialization
(1990-present)

VT. Advanced
Analysis (1996 Present)

Coalition for a
Community
Approach

Federal and local elected
officials, nonprofit
community and
advocates, local
administrators

Coalition for
Market Approach

Private sectors actors:
home builders, investors,
owners, lenders,
architects, accountants,
attorneys
Academics and federal
agencies (HUD, GAO,
CBO)

Coalition of
Market Oversight

Coalition for a
Market-based
Community
Approach
Coalition for
Policy Oversight
and Improvement

Local administrators,
nonprofits, private
sector, local elected
officials
Academics, federal
agencies, and industry
research groups

Dominant Values
Equality o f opportunity, thrift
and prudence, compassion
for the poor
B elief in market forces,
individualism, self-interest
Thrift and prudence,
effectiveness and efficiency
B elief in market forces,
effectiveness, efficiency
Thrift and prudence,
efficiency and effectiveness
Effectiveness, efficiency,
belief in market, local control
Compassion for the poor,
local control, equality of
opportunity and civic
participation
Effectiveness, local control,
self-interest, civic
participation, belief in market
forces, self-sufficiency
Effectiveness, belief in
market forces, individual
self-interest
Thrift and prudence, efficiency
and effectiveness

Effectiveness, local control,
self-interest, thrift and
prudence, individualism, selfsufficiency
Thrift and prudence, efficiency
and effectiveness
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The policy history analysis reveals (and survey and interview results support)
several important trends. Some values became shared among coalitions while others
diminished in emphasis; actors moved between coalitions as priorities and objectives
changed and as secondary values receded. For example, nonprofits, advocates, and
private-sector actors embraced the attributes o f individualism, enlightened selfinterest, and self-sufficiency, resolving often-conflicting democratic and capitalist
goals by using the program's capitalist methods to achieve social and community
goals. Local control via Credit allocation and QAP authority satisfied both local
officials, who desired revitalization and increased local financial investment, as well
as advocates, who had strong leanings towards community-based development and
civic participation (allocation agency approvals o f QAPs required the public hearings
be held). Local control also appeased private-sector stakeholders, who generally
perceived local programs as being less burdensome than federal programs, such as
those implemented by HUD (e.g., this sentiment was reflected in responses to
interview question number one, Appendix C). Furthermore, local public, private and
nonprofit actors eventually joined federal administrators and policy analysts in
upholding efficiency and effectiveness as worthy characteristics (indicated by the
dominance o f these values in advanced policy phases). The following quotes from
stakeholder interviews exemplify the trend towards value-sharing:
•

the government really is a partner

•

the integration o f services into housing through allocation plans is positive

•

everyone involved is working towards a common goal
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•

mixed-income communities are important and effective for revitalization

•

the for-profit support has built strong national support for program

•

you can involve the public and private sector in "win/win" situation

•

locals can support quality low-income housing and improve the community too

•

people with money aren't all that bad
Because shared values and goals surfaced, the nature o f identifiable coalitions

changed, members shifted among coalitions (as interests expanded and alliances
formed), and the number o f coalitions eventually dropped from three to two. As
exemplified in Figure 3 on the following page, the Coalition for Public Good evolved
into a Coalition for Community Approach and then merged with the Coalition for
Market Approach, creating an expanded Coalition for a Market-based Community
Approach. Comprised o f private, public and nonprofit actors, this last broad-based
alliance has become dominant in the policy subsystem. The remaining coalition, the
Coalition for Market Oversight, is comprised primarily o f academics, professional
research firms, government agencies that continue to test and study the program.
Making recommendations for improvement, this coalition added depth to the policy
forum, and its members were eventually joined by private-sector research concerns
such as Ernst & Young LLP.
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FIGURE 3
EVOLUTION OF ADVOCACY COALTIONS

Coalition for Market
Approach: privatesector actors (1985)

Coalition for a
Market-based
Community
Approach: local
public, private and
nonprofit actors
(-1990)

Coalition for
Community
Approach: public
officials, advocates,
and nonprofit
developers (1988)

Coalition for
Public Good:
public
officials and
advocates
(1985)

Coalition for Market
Oversight: government
agencies, professional
research firms, and
academics (1987)
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The previously described trends o f mutating coalitions and value sharing within and
among coalitions collectively support tw o o f the three ACF advocacy coalition
hypotheses as being applicable to the Credit program: (1) "actors within an advocacy
coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core,
although less so on secondary aspects" and (2) "an actor (or coalition) will give up
secondary aspects o f his or her (its) belief system before acknowledging weaknesses
in the policy core" (Sabatier, 1999, p. 124).
The ACF's two policy change hypotheses are likewise supported by the Credit
program history: (1) attributes o f governmental programs will not be significantly
revised as long as the actors within the policy subsystem that instituted the program
remains in power within and (2) coalitions pursue power in order to incorporate their
core beliefs into policy. Powerful actors, in this instance private-sector participants,
will not relinquish core ideals but may desert secondary values or incorporate
opponents' secondary values into programs in order to remain in power (Sabatier,
1999). These two ideas are supported by several phenomena. First, the dominance o f
private-sector interests is evident in the increasing array o f private parties that became
active in the Credit program and lobbying efforts over time (e.g., property owners,
developers, managers, lenders, investors, attorneys, architects, accountants). The
private-sector, an established force within the policy subsystem, was highly influential
in formulating and obtaining legislative changes to enhance the utility o f the Credit
program.
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Second, there is significant precedence in the history o f federal policy for using
government subsidies via tax expenditures or tax credits to attract private-sector
investment in certain activities, a public policy attribute that was not changed
significantly and was strongly supported by the private-sector, again clearly the
dominant force in the policy subsystem. In the 20th century, tax credits have been a
politically popular means o f encouraging a variety o f activities, including the
expansion of research and development in pharmaceutical, high tech, energy and other
industries. As related to housing and community development, tax credits have been
widely used to promote home-ownership by moderate-income workers, to preserve
historic buildings, to spur economic development and job creation, and to develop
low-income rental housing o f all types15. Tax expenditures limit direct government
intervention, show faith in the ability o f the private sector to meet needs, facilitate
philanthropic and community-based approaches (third-party approaches) for the
provision o f social needs and, once passed, are generally considered less political over
the long-run (i.e., once in place tax credits tend to continue without much dissension)
(Howard, 1997).
Third, the fact that the Credit program was created during a time o f dramatic
cutbacks in tax incentives for real estate development and investment and during the
term o f an administration strongly supportive o f demand-side housing policies, such as
those provided by voucher systems, is testament to the power o f the market-based
coalition, the prevalence o f tax credits as a tool in the American welfare system, and a
political climate highly responsive to the Credit's capitalist approach. Although the
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popular Reagan Administration cut funding for housing programs and promote
demand-side policies, the government's tendencies towards using tax credits in general
and supply-side housing subsidies in particular were not thwarted.
In consideration o f policy learning, several attributes o f the Credit's policy
history fulfill three of the four ACF policy learning hypotheses. First, policy learning
is more likely when there is "informed conflict between the two coalitions" where
each has access to the technical resources required to engage in informed debates and
where conflicts are among secondary aspects o f one or both parties (Sabatier, 1999).
In considering these two ACF requirements, several observations are pertinent.
Members o f both advocacy coalitions, the Coalition for a Market-based Community
Approach and the Coalition for Policy Oversight and Improvement, had high levels o f
technical resources to facilitate policy learning. Many actors had extensive experience
working in or studying the low-income housing arena; thus, the knowledge base and
the forum for debate on social and economic issues related to low-income housing
were well established at the Credit program's inception. Further, the evolution o f the
Credit industry illustrated value sharing across coalitions (e.g., the shared deep core
value o f thrift and prudence reflected in commitments to efficiency and equity). Value
sharing encouraged collaboration, cooperation, and information sharing and, since
1990, technical resources available to participants in the policy debate have expanded
with industry specialization.
Second, policy learning is more likely when there is a forum for information
sharing that is "prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to

participate and . . . [is] dominated by professional norms" (Sabatier, 1999, p. 124).
Over the past decade, the Credit industry has experienced dramatic evolution and
enhanced sophistication, characterized by fierce competition among nonprofit and forprofit developers for the allocation o f Credits and by investors for the purchase of
Credits. An increase in the number o f articles in related industry journals (finance,
accounting, legal) and the creation and then expansion o f LIHTC industry journals has
spurred industry-wide debate and encouraged information sharing. Industry
publications, conferences, and professional associations such as the NCSHA expanded
the technical resources available and provided forums for discussion o f issues related
to potential technical improvements to the program. Additionally, academic interest in
evaluating the Credit has heightened, providing data that has been increasingly
discussed and considered by practitioners. H ousing Policy Debate now regularly
incorporates discussions among academics and practitioners regarding Credit policy
issues and program characteristics, and academics and government research specialists
are more often invited to speak at conferences for Credit professionals. Based on the
literature and the survey data, it is apparent that both coalitions remain committed to
enhancing the Credit's effectiveness and efficiency. Although analysts and
practitioners often disagree on the current status o f the program as it relates to these
characteristics (illustrated most recently in the 1999 H ousing Policy Debate articles by
Cummings and DiPasquale and Roberts and Harvey), their disagreements have
facilitated lively debate and spurred new research and exploration o f issues
surrounding the thrifty and prudent use o f the public subsidy.
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Lastly, according to the ACF, policy areas with generally accepted quantitative
data and theories, such as environmental policy, are "more conducive to policyoriented learning across belief systems than those in which data and theory are
generally qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking" (Sabatier, 1999, p. 124).
Discussed previously, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) had stated that the ACF
might have limited applicability to social policy issues that are generally analytically
intractable and more susceptible to varying interpretations that prohibit policy learning
and collaboration across subsystems. However, the tractability o f issues may change
over time as more resources are committed to research and more data is gathered
(Brown & Stewart, 1993; Schon, 1994). With roots in the philanthropic reforms o f the
19th century, low-income housing policies began as part of America's social policy
system, and early poor-relief efforts were meant to alleviate public health and safety
concerns by addressing the dire living conditions o f the poor (Katz, 1995). However,
low-income housing is also part o f a larger national economic policy arena—related to
housing production and private finance and influenced by national fiscal and monetary
policies (e.g., Federal Reserve interest rates, interest deductions, tax credits). In spite
o f housing policy's inception as a poorhouse issue, since the 1930s it has been
intimately connected to economic policy at both national and local levels and
significant quantitative research has been completed. Quantitative data is readily
available, continuously gathered, and widely distributed for use in policy debates and
policy learning, making it a highly tractable issue and subject to policy learning.

In summary, findings from the policy history affirm that core values, policy
learning, and advocacy coalitions have been instrumental in the successful evolution
o f the Credit program. Employing ACF principles in conjunction with policy history
methods helped to identify key actors and agendas, portray advocacy coalition
linkages and transformations, accentuate the ubiquity o f political culture and political
economy constructs throughout the policy-making process, and describe policy
learning experiences and debates. Furthermore, the process o f completing the Credit
policy history revealed a methodology for considering values and policy learning
within a policy conception model that can be applied in other social policy areas. This
model, the Coalition Maximizing Model, is introduced in the final chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT
PARADIGM EXPANSION: THE COALTION M AXIMIZING MODEL

In this concluding chapter, the policy analysis process previously described is
incorporated into a policy-planning tool, the Coalition Maximizing Model, and final
commentary and recommendations for future research are presented. Extrapolated
from the Credit program analysis, the Coalition Maximizing Model [CMM] is a
policy-planning tool. Because the identification of underlying values that influence
behaviors and attitudes o f policy- makers and stakeholders is critical to understanding
and creating public policies (Aaron et al., 1994), value considerations should be
explicit in policy analysis procedures. The CMM incorporates characteristics o f both
descriptive and prescriptive analyses as well as pertinent constructs o f the ACF. This
section introduces the CMM and lays a foundation for testing it using social policy
issues, specifically by proposing its application to problems associated with lowincome single-parent families and economic dependence.
The CM M is divided into two phases: a policy history process and an analysis
o f policy alternatives. In Phase I (Figure 4), a descriptive policy-planning process,
analysts execute many o f the steps completed in the Credit case study as described in
earlier chapters. They explore policy issues and historical documents to identify key
actors and institutions, the subsystem stakeholders; create listings o f stakeholder
concerns and beliefs as reflected in the documents; identify the stable parameters
applicable to the policy issue, as described by the ACF; and make observations about

159
external factors that have influenced decisions in the policy arena. Second, analysts
categorize the policy history into phases using chronological, topical, or other
appropriate classifications, based on attributes o f the policy arena. The categorization
process was helpful in the Credit case study; it revealed trends in policy arena and
unveiled new actors and issues, and the process can be replicated. For example,
analysts might divide a policy's evolution into five chronological categories, based on
a thorough review o f Congressional (or local legislative) documentation and policy
making activities. Further research o f the topic during those particular years would
likely expand the historical analysis beyond the researchers' expectations or
knowledge-base by disclosing the writings and research o f other stakeholders (e.g.,
academics, think-tanks, charitable foundations, activists) to enhance the assessment.
Third, the analysts evaluate the information to detect indications o f policy learning
over time and identify key stakeholder values; likely it will be revealed that,
throughout the policy history, some principles were more emphasized than others and
thus allowing for value prioritization (e.g., the ACF's deep core and core policy value
classifications).
The analysis methodology used would depend on time, resources, and
organizational goals and objectives. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) suggested
content analysis as a quantitative means o f accomplishing this assessment, and case
study methods offer an alternative qualitative methodology-using stakeholder surveys,
interviews, or focus groups could be used to substantiate or supplement findings, if
desired. Having gathered the data, analysts identify stakeholder positions and values
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that indicate coalitions, make observation about value sharing among coalition
members and across coalitions, and account for lessons learned from informationsharing among coalitions and from increased knowledge on the subject matter gleaned
from research in the policy arena.
FIGURE 4
COALITION MAXIMIZING MODEL: PHASE I
POLICY HISTORY ANALYSIS
Gather documents and complete interviews to
identify information in A-C

A. External Influences per
ACF, as applicable:
Changes in socio
economic conditions
Changes in systemic
governing coalitions
Policy decisions and
impacts from other
subsystems (Sabatier,
1999, p. 121)

B-l. Subsystem
actors or
stakeholders

B-2. Listing
of concerns
and beliefs
reflecting
values

C. Stable Parameters per
ACF, as applicable:
Basic problem
attributes
Resource distribution
Fundamental values
and social structure
Basic constitutional
structure (Sabatier,
1999, p. 121)

Identify values by deep core,
core policy, and secondary
aspects as well as indications
of policy learning

Categorize policy
history into phases

Make observations
about emerging
coalitions and value
sharing
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In Phase II o f the CMM as outlined in Figure 5, the assessment o f policy
alternatives, analysts identify policy goals and objectives and make a listing o f
potential program options and attributes (secondary aspects). The initial listing would
be as comprehensive as possible, assuming that all options are feasible and acceptable.
The selection o f potential program options is compared with the listing o f stakeholder
values to explore which alternatives, if any, fulfill the most widely shared principles,
creating a "short list" o f alternatives. Starting with the policies that maximize values, a
thorough examination o f the program options on the "short-list" begins the process o f
elimination. The intended result is a prioritization o f achievable policies or program
characteristics that fulfill stated objectives, maximize stakeholder values, and
minimize problems experienced in previous policies. At a minimum, assessments
completed for each potential program would include the following:
•

What new or additional information is available that is pertinent to the policy area?

•

Given the specific policy or program alternative, are there other stakeholders
whose positions and opinions should be considered? (i.e., has anyone been
omitted?)

• How many policy goals previously identified are accomplished?
•

What are the economic or financial barriers to implementation?

•

Is the program or policy administratively feasible?

•

Is the program or policy politically feasible?
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•

Are there external forces, from other policy subsystems or socio-economic
conditions in general, that affect feasibility (administratively, economically,
politically, or otherwise)?
FIGURE 5
COALITION MAXIMIZING MODEL: PHASE H
ANALYSIS OF POLICY
ALTERNATIVES
Identify policy alternatives
consistent with shared values o f
coalitions
Identify emerging
coalitions and shared
values

Identify o f policy goals

New
information
from policy
subsystems
and policy
forum

Potential
influence of
new
stakeholders
or values

List all possible
program attributes
consistent with values
(secondary aspects)
^T

Policy goals
fulfilled

Economic
and
financial
feasibility

Create "short
list" o f options
maximizing
value sharing
and minimizing
value conflicts

Administrative
feasibility

Potential
external
influences

Political
feasibility
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Concluding Remarks
Consideration o f values by public policy-makers is hardly a new concept;
indeed, it manifests daily in the use o f public opinion polls. Furthermore, numerous
researchers have considered the influence o f values, attitudes, and norms on public
decision-making, often struggling with how to better incorporate values in the
decision-making process (Aaron et al., 1994; Gans, 1995; Katz, 1995; McClosky &
Zaller, 1984). The Credit case study and program analysis presented here were based
on the belief that public policies will be more widely accepted, more readily
achievable, and more effective in meeting stated goals and objectives when grounded
in a deep understanding o f the underlying values that influence behaviors and attitudes
o f its policy-makers and stakeholders. Findings o f the case study and the methods used
to complete the analysis contributed to a paradigm expansion-the creation o f
procedures intended to operationalize value analyses during the policy-making process
in order to optimize public policy decisions. These final remarks offer a synthesis of
case study findings and suggestions for future research.
To explore the potential role o f values in making successful public policies, the
case study explored why the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, in contrast to other
low-income housing initiatives, has enjoyed tremendous popularity and usage over the
past decade. As demonstrated, the Credit has received broad support in spite of
criticisms largely because the policy is reflective o f several deep core values held
within the American political culture, incorporates values that are widely accepted
within this nation's political economy, and exemplifies policy learning, both during the
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initial creation o f the policy and its subsequent evolution. To support this assertion the
case study analysis, completed using policy history methods supplemented by survey
techniques, focused on the constructs o f political culture, political economy, and
policy learning using the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Specifically, this
assessment o f the policy history and the ACF analysis has revealed the following
significant findings:
1.

Norms and values based on national experiences dating back to America's
colonial revolution are entrenched in civic political culture. These norms and
values, referred to by the ACF as deep core values, are implemented by
conceptual tools within our political economy that can be identified by
carefully examining the issues important to policy-makers and stakeholders,
their decision-making processes, policy debates, and policy research
documents. Many of these constructs are imbedded in the Credit program,
attributing to its popularity among a variety o f actors.

2.

The ACF provides a powerful tool for understanding public decision-making,
focusing on alliances, values, policy learning, and policy change over time.
The framework encourages inclusiveness in its broad consideration o f actors
and offers a means o f reflecting on policy from a historical perspective.

3.

Combining the policy history methodology and the ACF has been an effective
means o f creating the Credit case study, given the analysis objectives. The
process revealed an array o f deep core values, core policy values, and
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secondary aspects that explain why the Credit has achieved virtually universal
acceptance and accolades across coalitions within the policy subsystem.
4.

The completion o f a stakeholder survey and interviews corroborated
observations that emerged from the policy history, creating a balance of
quantitative and qualitative research methods. Completing frequency analyses
o f the responses to several questions revealed that there was even more value
sharing among coalition members than expected. For example, the importance
o f social and civic goals voiced by private sector participants (e.g., providing
housing for the less fortunate and helping people have better lives and live
independently o f government assistance) revealed more than the archival
documents the level o f value sharing that had occurred between private,
nonprofit and public sector actors. Financial returns and prudent investments
remained primary objectives, but private-sector respondents were also
motivated by the fact that they were "doing good" by "doing well."

5.

Working together for common objectives (i.e., collaborating within and among
coalitions), stakeholders involved in the policy-making process were able to
maximize program goals by incorporating policy learning. Participants in the
Credit industry, including academics and administrators, have incorporated
lessons learned from previous programs, shared lessons learned from using the
Credit program, and disseminated research, data and new information—all of
which enhanced the policy forum and contributed to a rich environment for
debate.
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6.

The ACF can be more broadly applied to social policies. Some social policies
are more tractable than others; tractability o f some issues change over time;
and many qualitative issues can be quantified using carefully selected research
methods (e.g., content analysis and survey research).

7.

The ultimate goal o f this Credit case study has been to disclose policy analysis
processes that can be replicated, in essence operationalizing the ACF so that its
constructs can be applied during the policy-making process. This objective has
been realized in the formation o f the Coalition Maximizing Model.
Emerging from the Credit case study are exciting opportunities for future

research, the most obvious o f which is testing the efficacy o f the CMM as a policyplanning tool by applying it to other areas o f social policy such as health care and
child care. The essay by Garfinkel and McLanahan in (1994) contains meaningful data
on the issues, values, policy history, and program alternatives related to the economic
instability o f single-parent families: that information is sufficiently extensive to
initiate a CMM test case. Although not couched in the rhetoric o f the ACF, these
authors have completed or initiated many steps outlined in the CMM. They identified
stable parameters and external factors, completed an abbreviated policy history,
provided indications o f policy learning and opportunities for value sharing, created an
initial listing o f possible policy alternatives, and made some preliminary observations.
For example, Garfinkel and McLanahan proposed that, among other policy options,
child care and job training programs could be highly effective means o f reducing
economic dependence o f single-mothers. The CMM could be applied to determine if

167
and how these program options appeal to stakeholders' values as well as what,
historically, have been the important issues surrounding and barriers to similar policy
proposals. Application o f the CMM to such an important social policy area would not
only test the validity o f the CMM as a policy-making tool but would also advance
Sabatier's call for research on the implication o f the ACF in policy implementation
phases (1999, p. 153).
Second, more quantifiable survey and content analysis research o f the Credit
program could be completed, expanding on the research initiated with this case study.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) proposed the use o f quantifiable content analysis
techniques in social policy areas to enhance tractability, and the application o f content
analysis techniques to longitudinal studies o f belief systems could corroborate and
expand qualitative research findings. A thorough content analysis o f archival
documents would entail expanding the existing policy history and using sophisticated
content analysis software (Weber, 1990; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) and
augment the current research.
Third, additional survey data could be gathered, focusing more on policy
change aspects and attempting to "systematically relate ACF variables to actual policy
changes" (Sabatier, 1999, p. 52). Sabatier called for further application o f the ACF to
specific examples o f policy change. This Credit case study began the research
endeavor by focusing on Credit program trends and changes in light o f previous lowincome housing programs, and some deductions have been made from the policy
history. However, these findings could be further explored and substantiated by
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gathering more survey data and applying more powerful survey analysis techniques.
One specific focus of additional survey research could be the influence o f institutions
(i.e., organizational behavior) on the Credit's evolution, which is also an unexplored
ACF research topic o f recommended by Sabatier (1999).
Finally, the pertinence o f the ACF policy-analysis tool in regards to the Credit
program could be tested by applying other policy-analysis methods to the Credit.
Although not all theoretical lenses are appropriate for application to the Credit,
contributing authors in Theories o f the Policy Process (Sabatier, 1999) offered several
alternative theories that may have potential for revealing further reasons behind for the
success o f the Credit as a low-income housing program (e.g., institutional rational
choice, multiple-streams formulation, punctuated-equilibrium theory, organizational
process, government politics) (Allison, 1971; Sabatier, 1999). As emphasized by
Sabatier (1999), the policy-making process involves extremely complex and
interacting elements, and the goal o f theoretical research is to find ways of simplifying
and understanding phenomena. Giving credence to this interaction through an analysis
o f values, economy, and politics, as demonstrated here, can only further strengthen
such efforts.
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End Notes
1 HUD’s Mark-to-Market program is an extensive effort to amend rents on privately
owned, HUD-subsidized units. Allowable rents are adjusted either up or down to
equate market rents-with HUD paying the difference between 30% o f the low-income
renters' adjusted gross incomes and the “real market rents.” Mark-to-Market has been
implemented by HUD to allow projects with lower-than-market rents to charge more
(keeping units in the program) and to reduce rents for projects that have had rents
previously approved that now are higher-than-market rents (thus reducing HUD
subsidies).
2 HUD's Section 236 projects are commonly referred to as "expiring-use" projects
because the 20-year project affordability requirement imposed by HUD in exchange
for low-interest financing is expiring. Owners have the option to refinance and convert
projects to market rate.
3 Face validity is the most informal and least scientific o f tests. Face validity is tested
by asking lay-people if, "on its face," the survey instrument looks fine given its intent;
this is a highly subjective test. Content validity is also subjective and is completed by
asking several people with special knowledge o f the subject matter to assess if the
survey instrument includes appropriate questions; content validity provides arguably a
more knowledgeable assessment than face validity. Criterion validity includes
comparing one survey instrument to another previously used; the survey instrument
used for comparison should be considered a successful tool for assessing variables
surveyed and predicting outcomes, events, or attitudes.
4 Questions 4, 5 and 6 were removed from the tally of results. The questions were
intended to reveal how the perceived importance of actors' roles changed over time. A
few people refused to answer the questions but mostly there was little to no change in
responses. Where there were changes in the ways that people viewed the prominence
stakeholders, the changes were largely related to increased knowledge o f the Credit
program or natural program evolution (e.g., nonprofits became less dependent on
experts, federal administrators appeared more important at first and state bureaucrats
were more important later). The answers were not useful, and the questions should
have been eliminated during pilot stage.
5 This comment was given prior to the December 2000 legislation that provided this
exact increase.
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6 The connection between the American Revolution and dominant values o f capitalism
was underscored by Lindblom (1988), who referred to the American Revolution was a
“commercial revolution" lead by businessmen who desired freedom from inhibitions
on trade even more than a government controlled by the greater populace.
7 Efficiency is defined here as “performing or functioning effectively with the least
waste o f time, effort or other resources;” effectiveness is defined as “producing the
intended or expected result.” (Webster's, 1996).
Martha Derthick, in Policym aking fo r Social Security (1979), argued that broad
inclusion o f moderate-income beneficiaries likely increases the acceptability o f social
programs. Like the housing acts o f the 1960s, the Credit program was created initially
to be a predominantly low- a nd moderate-income program.
9 The extension o f depreciation schedules eliminated the ability o f investors to "front
load" losses, and the passive loss rules allowed for passive losses only to be used to
the extent that they could be offset by passive income-eliminating passive losses as a
tax shelter for many limited partners.
10 In response to “redlining” and other discriminatory lending practices, the
Community Reinvestment Act [CRA] was passed in 1978. This Act requires that all
commercial banks prove that, within the guidelines o f their lending and other business
policies, they serve all areas o f their defined market, including low-income
communities. For banks that fail to meet minimum standards, there can be significant
financial consequences (e.g., financially advantageous mergers can be delayed or
halted). Because banks can receive CRA credit for investing in low-income housing,
LIHTC investments have become very attractive to commercial lenders.

11 Limited Partners contribute capital and are liable only up to the amount o f capital
contributed; general partners are responsible for conducting the business and are liable
for losses (Talamo, 1991).
12 The 10-year holding rule mandated that, in order to use Credits to purchase and
renovate existing rental development, the current owner had to have held title to the
property for at least 10 years. The presumed intent was to maximize the public subsidy
by ensuring that Credits were used to improve and preserve existing, older housing
stock that was most likely in need o f substantial improvement (and therefore more
likely to be serving low-income populations). The waiver o f the 10-year holding rule
for HUD subsidized properties allowed the program to be used to preserve and
improve expiring-use projects, which may have changed ownership as allowed by
HUD guidelines.
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13 Over the years, as more investors entered the market place and more states used the
program, the equity investment increased from producing roughly 30% o f the project
funding needed (McClure, 2000) to 50% to 70% o f the project funding needed (with
investors paying at times as high as $0.82 to $0.85 on the dollar for Credits).
14 Denise DiPasquale, whose research has focused on urban economics and housing
policy issues, received her Ph.D. from MIT and has served on the faculties o f
Camegie-Mellon University, MIT, the University of Chicago, and Harvard University.
Jean Cummings has completed extensive research in housing policy and finance as
well as urban planning and spent six years as a research analyst at Harvard University.
In 1998, the two analysts founded City Research, a research and consulting firm
focusing, among other issues, on topics o f urban policy and economics and real estate
markets and finance (City Research, 2000).
15 Howard (1997) refers to the pervasive use o f tax credits as subsidies, in lieu o f
direct tax spending through welfare programs, as part o f the "hidden welfare state."
This "hidden welfare state," which also includes loan government guarantees (i.e.,
student loans for education and mortgage loans for housing), is largely overlooked by
the broader public yet is strongly supported by beneficiaries which include not only
recipients o f the tax credits (both corporations and individuals) but also charitable
organizations (i.e., churches, social welfare charities, etc.) Because tax expenditures
are less visible that direct spending allocations, encourage private sector provision o f
public goods, stimulate entrepreneurism and economic development, and often benefit
(albeit not equally) the non-poor and poor alike they appeal to many aspects o f our
political culture.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE SURVEY INTRODUCTION LETTER
Date
Recipient Name
Street Address
City, State, Zip
Dear (Recipient Name):
Thank you for speaking with me regarding participating in this research. As you may know, for the
past several years, I have worked in the affordable housing development arena-both as a nonprofit
developer and a development consultant Additionally, I have been pursuing my Ph.D. in Urban
Studies at Portland State University, and last year I was officially elevated to “candidate status." I
am now completing my dissertation research. The purpose of my research is to complete a policy
analysis o f the federal low-income housing program, and a portion of my research process includes
the gathering and analysis of survey data. Survey participants will complete a short written survey,
to be followed up by a brief interview. I am writing to request that you consider participating in the
survey portion of my research.
Should you agree, your participation will involve the completion and return o f a short written survey
(enclosed). After the return of the written survey, my research assistant, Gillian Leichtling, w ill call
you to establish a date and time for a brief, follow-up interview. The interview will be conducted by
phone and, with your permission, will be taped. The purpose of the interview is to follow up with
additional questions on the tax credit policy and your perceptions/opinions on various points. Your
participation will only require that you thoughtfiilly complete the written survey instrument, return it
to me in a timely manner, and agree to complete the follow-up interview. I anticipate that the entire
process, including completion of both the written survey and interview, should take no more than 30
to 40 minutes. I have enclosed a self-addressed stamped envelope for the return of the written
survey, and the interview will be scheduled at a time of your convenience.
Of course, your participation in this research process is purely voluntary. Nonetheless, I have
selected you for inclusion in my research endeavors because o f your depth o f knowledge and
expertise in the subject matter.
Thank you for taking the time to consider this request. I am extremely hopeful that you will be able
to assist me through your participation. If I have not received your written survey within the next
two (2) weeks, either Gillian or I will call to follow up on your interest in participation. Please note
that all responses are confidential in that no name will be assigned to the results. In the event that
you should you choose not to participate, please accept my thanks for your consideration.
Respectfully requested,

Terri H. Silvis
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APPENDIX B
W RITTEN SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. What factors most influenced your investment decisions as they relate to
specific tax credit projects? Please list your top five (5). (For syndicators,
lenders, developers, and administrators only.)
1. _____________________________________________________________________________________
2.
3. ______________________________________________
4. ______________________________________________
5. ______________________________________________
2. Please rank what you personally consider to be the greatest advantages offered
by tax credit program, with 1 being the most advantageous, 2 being the second
most advantageous, etc. The following are widely identified in the tax credit
literature as being advantages, but you should feel free to add your own and
enumerate them as you feel appropriate. Please use numbers only once (i.e., do
not identify two items with “ 1”). I f you do not agree that an item is an
advantage, please put N/A beside that item. (For all respondents.)
Flexibility
Local control
Effectiveness in meeting housing goals
Efficiency in leveraging private funds
Maximizing role o f private sector in meeting needs
Means for creating new public/private partnerships
Means for influencing community revitalization
Avenue for facilitating non-profit growth
Promotes holistic approach to achieving self-sufficiency
O ther:_________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
Other:__________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
Other:
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3. Please rank what you personally consider to be the greatest disadvantages of
the tax credit program, with 1 being the m ost disadvantageous, 2 being the
second most disadvantageous, etc. The following are widely identified in the
tax credit literature as being disadvantages, but you should feel free to add your
own and enumerate them as you feel appropriate. Please use numbers only once
(i.e., do not identify two items with “ 1”). I f you do not agree that an item is a
disadvantage, please put N/A beside that item. (For all respondents.)
Administratively inefficient
Economically inefficient
Gives unfair preference to often inexperienced nonprofit developers
Entices private money unfairly away from other housing investments
Compete with private market investment in rental housing
Impossible, or nearly so, to adequately monitor
Too complicated programmatically
Too restrictive (please state in what way: ____________________)
O ther:_________________________________________
O ther:_________________________________________
O ther:_________________________________________
O ther:_________________________________________
Other:
4.

How long have you been involved with LIHTC program? (For all respondents;
please check one.)
Less than 2 years
Over 2 but less than 5 years
Over 5 but less than 10 years
Since 1986
Only during its initial creation

5. Please list what you consider to be the top three (3) advantages of the program?
(For all respondents.)
1.
2.
3.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

6. Please list what you consider to be the top three (3) disadvantages o f the
program? (For all respondents.)
1. _______________________________________________
2.
3.
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7. Please rank the following goals o f the tax credit program, with 1 being the most
important, 2 being the second most important, etc. The goals have been widely
identified in the literature as program goals, but you should feel free to add your
own and enumerate them as you feel appropriate. Please use numbers only once
(i.e., do not identify two items with “ 1”). (For all respondents.)
Affordable housing development
Involvement o f private sector in low income housing
Facilitation o f self-sufficiency o f residents
Stabilization or revitalization o f communities
Introduction o f affordable housing in non-low income communities
Leverage o f private funds in public/private partnership
Equitable distribution o f subsidies based on local goals/objectives/needs
Efficient means o f providing needed housing subsidies
O ther:__________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
Other:
_______________
8. The following questions are intended to provide demographic and other
background information. This information will be kept confidential, so please
feel free to answer honestly. (For all respondents.)
a. Which o f the following best describes your age group?
20 to 29
30 to 35
36 to 40
41 to 45
46 to 50
51 to 55
Over 55
b. Which o f the following best describes your educational level?
High School Diploma or equivalent
Some college education
Bachelors Degree
Some Graduate work
Masters Degree
Doctoral Degree (including J.D.)
Other
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c. W hat best describes your academic background (e.g., political science,
business, law, accounting, finance, public administration). You may
indicate more than one.
1. _______________________________________________
2.
3.

d. Which o f the following describes your professional background? (Please
select as many as apply.)
Education
Government Administration
Banking/Finance
Social Work
Real Estate Development
Real Estate Construction
Legal
Accounting
Community Development
Social Work
Property Management
Business Administration
Oth e r:__________________________________________
O ther:__________________________________________
Other:
e. Thinking o f the categories listed above, please identify what you consider to
be your professional qualification now (i.e., lawyer, accountant, financial
consultant, for-profit developer)?

f.

Which best describes your political affiliation?
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other:
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. In question #2 o f the survey, you identified the top three (3) advantages of the
program. Can you identify now the top 3 that come immediately to mind and
why?

2. In question #3 o f the survey, you identified the top three (3) disadvantages of
the program. Can you identify now the top 3 that come immediately to mind
and why?

3. In what ways do you view the Credit program as being most dramatically
different from other federal low income housing programs (please identify five,
current or past)?

4. Which entities/individuals did you consider to be the most valuable players in
the Credit program when you first entered the field ? Please rank from 1 to 9,
with 1 being the most valuable and 9 being the least valuable (For all
respondents. There are 10 categories below; please leave your category blank).
Federal and state politicians
____
Bureaucrats and administrators (federal and state)
____
Private developers that utilize the program
____
Non-profit developers that utilize the program
____
Tax credit consultants
____
Tax credit syndicators/direct investors
____
Conventional lenders (construction/bridge/permanent)
____
Local housing authorities
____
Attorneys specializing in tax credit deals
____
Accountants specializing in tax credit deals________________ ____
5. Which entities/individuals do you consider to be the most valuable players in the
Credit program nowl Please rank from 1 to 9, with 1 being the most valuable
and 9 being the least valuable (For all respondents. As above, there are 10
categories; please leave your category blank. If the answer is the same as #4,
please simply re-list these numbers.)
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Federal politicians (members o f the U.S. Senate and Congress)
____
Bureaucrats and administrators (federal and state)
____
Private developers that utilize the program
____
Non-profit developers that utilize the program
____
Tax credit consultants
____
Tax credit syndicators/direct investors
____
Conventional lenders (construction/bridge/permanent)______________ ____
Local housing authorities
____
Attorneys specializing in tax credit deals______________________________
Accountants specializing in tax credit deals_______________________ ____
6. In questions #4 and #5 above, if the partners you considered most valuable
changed, what during your years o f experienced caused you to change your
mind? (if applicable)

7. The following is a listing of goals/objectives listed in question #7 from the
survey (provide or read a flash card with values listed by survey and all of those
added by respondents) Considering the following definitions: “Core values” are
those that you are not willing to compromise; “secondary values” are those that
are important but which may be subject to compromise to achieve goals. Which
o f these are consistent with your core values?
1. Affordable housing development
2. Involvement of private sector in low income housing
3. Facilitation of self-sufficiency of residents
4. Stabilization or revitalization o f communities
5. Introduction o f affordable housing in non-low income
communities
6. Leverage o f private funds in public/private partnership
7. Equitable distribution o f subsidies based on local
goals/objectives/needs
8. Efficient means o f providing needed housing subsidies
8. What personal or professional values do you feel you have had to compromise,
if any, in order to work successfully within the tax credit program? What
values will you absolutely not compromise?
9. What program changes that have been implemented since the program’s
inception do you feel have been most important to the program and why?
10. What top three (3) changes would you propose to modify the program, if any?
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11. Think o f your previous experiences with the Credit program. W hat would you
say is the most significant or poignant lesson you have learned . . . something
that has changed your way o f working, thinking, etc?

12. What do you consider the top five (5) most important outcomes or results o f the
Credit policy?

13. Do you work with this program in states other than Oregon? I f so, what
differences do you see in how the program functions?
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APPENDIX D
SURVEY AND INTERVIEW CODING SHEET
Program Goals: Codes (either + or -) used in survey questions 1-3 and 5-7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Effectiveness in meeting housing needs
Flexibility o f program to meet various goals
Economic Development
Permanency
Financial viability
Private Investment/Leverage
Public/Private Partnership
Intergovernmental Relations/goals and administration
Efficient means to distribute housing benefits
strong coalition of support
serves need not met by private market
promote quality real estate development (team capacity)
Self-sufficiency o f Residents
Community Revitalization/Development
Integration o f low income housing
local government objectives driven
Administrative efficiency
nonprofit development
simplicity
enhanced monitoring in program (as opposed to predecessors)
long term property viability
private sector involvement in LI housing
Economic efficiency
Sufficient subsidy
Sufficient return on private investment
Displaces private investment

Professional Codes - Used in survey questions 8.c. and 8.cL
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Education
Government Administration
Banking/Finance
Social Work/Sociology
Real Estate Development
Real Estate Construction/Design
Legal
Accounting

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Community Development/Planning
Property Management
Business Administration
Economics
Political Science
Public Policy
Nonprofit Administration
Liberal or Fine Arts

56
57
58
59
60

Syndicator/Investor
Lender/Financier
Local Housing Authority
Attorney
CPA

Actor Codes - Used in survey question 8.e.
51
52
53
54
55

Federal/State Politician or Aide
Bureaucrat/Admin
Private Developer
Nonprofit Developer
Consultant

APPENDIX E
CODED SURVEY RESULTS
1. What factors most influenced your investment decisions as they relate to specific tax credit projects? (five responses; response codes from
Appendix D)
Respondent #:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1
5 5 1 25 12 12 5 na na na na 1 na na na na 11 5 1 0 1 7 25 1 na
2
12 12 5 5 16 5 25 na na na na 4 na na na na 1 1 21 1 27 6 16 0 na
3
25 1 12 12 21 25 12 na na na na 21 na na na na 27 27 12 18 4 24 12 0 na
4
14 2 0 1 1 5 1 na na na na 13 na na na na 0 12 13 8 7 12 0 0 na
5
0 0 0 16 5 1 2 na na na na 12 na na na na 0 25 16 0 18 18 0 0 na
2. Please rank what you personally consider to be t he greatest advantages oifered by tax credit program, with 1being t te most advantageous, 2
being the second most advantageous, etc. (up to 11 responses; responsecodes from Appendix D)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Respondent #:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

1
6
22
7
14
16
18
12
13
0
0

7
16
22
6
2
1
14
18
13
20
0

22
6
1
16
7
14
13
18
0
0
0

1
22
7
16
14
18
2
1
0
0
0

1
22
14
16
2
6
7
18
13
0
0

6
22
1
14
2
16
7
18
13
0
0

6
22
7
16
14
0
0
0
0
0
0

16
2
6
1
22
14
18
7
13
18
0

24
18
16
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

22
6
7
16
13
18
2
1
0
0
0

6
22
7
16
1
18
14
2
13
0
0

6
22
7
18
22
14
1
16
2
0
0

6
22
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
6
7
22
14
18
16
2
13
0
0

6
22
1
16
7
2
14
18
13
0
0

1
6
22
7
14
18
2
13
0
0
0

14
1
6
16
7
22
18
13
2
0
0

7
6
22
1
14
16
18
2
0
0
0

1
6
22
16
2
7
14
18
13
0
0

22
7
14
6
13
18
2
1
11
19
0

1
16
6
18
22
7
14
13
0
0
0

1
6
7
22
14
18
16
2
13
27
21

18
6
1
14
7
16
2
22
13
0
0

6
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

6
4
10
14
16
2
17
22
7
1
27
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3. Please rank what you personally consider to be the greatest disadvantages of the tax credit program, with 1being the most disadvantageous, 2
being the second most disadvantageous, etc. (up to 9 responses; response codes from Appendix D)
Respondent #:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
-19 -18 -23 -17 -23 -23 -23 -19 -23 -24 -19 -20 -23 -23 -19 -23 -24 -23 -23 -17
1
-20 -17 -17 -19 -17 -19 -17 0 -26 -11 -9 0 -19 -19 -17 -17 -11 -17 -17 -23
2
3
-17 -23 -24 -18 -19 -17 -18 0 -1 -17 -26 -19 -8 -17 -11 -19 -23 -19 -19 -20
-5 19 -19 -23 0 -2 -19 0 0 -19 -11 -17 0 26 -2 0 0 -2 -11 -19
4
-18 -2 -20 0 0 -20 -2 0 0 0 18 -23 0 -2 -20 0 0 -20 -8 -18
5
6
0 -11 -18 0 0 -24 0 0 0 0 -20 -8 0 -26 -23 0 0 -11 0 -26
7
0 -16 -11 0 0 -18 0 0 0 0 -23 0 0 -20 -18 0 0 -18 0 -2
8
0 -17 -2 0 0 -11 0 0 0 0 -17 0 0 -18 -26 0 0 -26 0 -11
9
0 -8 0 0 0 -26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4. How long have you been involvec wit nLIHTC program?
Respondent #;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
<2
2 -<5
X
X
X
5-10
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Since 1986
X
X
X
X
5. Please list what you consider to be the top 3 advantages o(the program? (response codes from Appendix D)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Respondent #:

-19
-11
-18
-23
0
0
0
0
0

-23
-17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-5 -17 -23 -24 -23 -24 -23 -20
-15 -8 -19 -20 -24 -21 -24 -24

0
0

-19
-17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-24
-23
-17
-2
-19
0
0
0
0

21 22 23 24 25
X
X

X
X

X

21 22 23 24 25

1
1 7 6 1 1 6 6 1 0 7 20 21 6 1 1 6 6 6 6 22 1 16
2
6 21 21 16 15 1 1 3 0 1 22 22 22 7 24 10 1 22 16 7 27 6
3
2 1 16 22 14 7 0 13 0 6 23 7 1 18 6 22 0 17 7 18 6 1
6. Please list what you consider to be the top 3 disadvantages of t le program? (iip to 3 resiponses; response codes from Appendix D)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Respondent #:
1
2

-23
-17
-19
-20
-11
-2
-18
26
0

24 0
6 0
2 0

6
4
0

23 24 25

-8 -23 -23 -23 -23 -19 0 -24 -23 -23 0 -19 -19 -23
-24 -9 -2 -19 -19 -23 -23 -19 -19 -19 -19 -23 0 -20

0
0

-24
-23
o

3
-21 -27 -24 -23 -19 -23 0 -18 0 0 -19 -2 -8 0 -24 -19 -23 -8 -24 -23 -18 0 -19 0 0
7. Please rank the following goals of the tax credit program, with 1 being the most important, 2 being the second most important, etc. (up to 9
goals provided; response codes from Appendix D)
Respondent #:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1
1 9 1 1 1 1 6
2
14 1 22 14 22 22 1
6 6 6 22 14 14 0
3
22 22 15 6 16 15 0
4
5
16 16 16 13 9 6 0
6
17 14 23 16 15 9 0
7
13 15 14 15 6 13 0
8
15 13 13 23 13 14 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9
8,a. Which of the following best describes your age group?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Respondent #:
20-29
X
30-35
36-40
X
X
X
X
X
4145
X
46-50
51-55
>55
8.b. Which of the following best describes your educational
Respondent #:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HS or GED
Some College
X
Bachelors Degree
X
X
Some Graduate Work
Masters Degree
X
X
X
Doctoral Degree
X

22
6
1
16
9
0
14
13
15

1
9
6
22
16
15
14
13
0

22
6
15
1
13
14
16
9
0

1
9
22
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
22
6
16
15
14
13
9
0

1
22
6
15
9
14
16
13
0

1
14
0
6
15
22
13
16
9

1
22
13
14
0
16
9
6
15

22
16
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
14
13
15
16
9
6
22
0

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

4
1
22
6
0
0
0
0
0

1
16
6
22
13
14
9
15
0

1
22
15
6
14
0
16
13
9

1
22
6
13
9
16
15
14
0

1
22
6
14
13
0
9
16
15

1
14
15
16
6
22
13
9
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
6
15
14
22
16
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X
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X
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8.c, What best describes your academic background?, (up to 3 response; response coces from Appendix D)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Respondent #:
1
33 41 41 43 33 46 37 46 37 41 37 41 46 33 46 46
2
42 33 0 42 0 41 0 0 42 43 38 0 42 38 41 0
3
43 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 0 38 0 0 37 0 39 0
8,cL Which of the following describes your professional background? (Please se ect as many as app y)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Respondent #:

36 35 32 34 0 34 34 33 43
0 0 0 39 0 41 43 37 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 46 42 0
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1
33 33 33 32 33 32 37 35 35 38 37 35 37 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 35 32 34 33 32
2
35 35 0 35 0 33 0 33 37 0 38 39 0 33 35 0 33 33 36 35 36 39 45 35 35
3
0 38 0 45 0 0 0 39 39 0 0 45 0 35 0 0 0 35 39 39 38 34 0 41 39
0 41 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 0 34 39 40 0 0 0
4
5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 41 0 0 0
6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0
7
8,e. Please identify what you consider to sc your professional qualification now? (response co<es from Appendix D)
Respondent #:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 n 24 25
57 56 57 56 5' 56 59 55 55 60 59 53 59 52 51 51 52 57 52 52 54 58 54 58 54
8.f. Which best describes your political afli iation?
Respondent #:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
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APPENDIX F
CODED INTERVIEW RESULTS
Respondt. # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Actor Codes 55 55 55 54 54 54 57 57 57 56 56 56 56 58 58 53 52 52 52 52 59 59 59 60 51 55 54 58 59 60
1. In question #2 of the survey, you identifiec the top t iree (3) advantages of the program. Can you identify no’wthe top 3 that come immediately to
mind and why? Cross reference for survey questions # I & #5 (up to 3 res xmses given; response codes from Appendix D)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
16 6 1 2 18 18 6 1 14 6 16 6 6 6 1 1 1 1 7 14 6 6 22 6 14 6 1 6 1 16
1
2
1 1 2 6 6 22 16 6 16 2 7 22 22 7 6 2 6 2 18 1 22 1 2 14 16 7 16 22 2 1
3
18 2 18 18 1 16
22 2 1 2 7 18 16 27 0 7 7 6 6 1 18 7 18 7 18 6 1 18 14
2. In question #3 of the survey, you identiilec the top tJhree (3) clisadvantagesof the program. Can you identify now the op 3 that come immecliately to
mind and why? Cross reference for survey questions# 3 & #6 (np to 3 res ponses given; response codes from Appendix I»
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 124 25 26 27 28 29 30
•
1
0 -17 -23 -19 -23 -19 -19 -19 -23 -23 -12 -23 -17 -23 0 0 -19 -19 -17 -26 -23 -19 -19-17 -17 -2 -19 -19 -19 -17
0 -23 0 -17 -19 -23 -23 -20 -17 -17 -19 -17 -23 -24 0 0 0 0 -23 -20 -19 -23 -26 -19 -23 -19 -26 -17 -2 -20
2
0 -20 0 -20 -17 0 -17 -17 0 -19 0 -19 -19 0 0 0 0 0 -19 -24 -2 0 -18| 0 -19 -20 -23 -23 0 0
3
7. Which of these goa s are consistent with your core values? C = Core Value S = Secondary Value 0 = no answer
Respondt. # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

C S
c S
c S
c C

s
s
c
c

C C
0 s

s s
s c
s s s
c 0 s
c s s
s s s

C C C C C C C C C c S C C
s S s c S C c C S S s c C S
c c c s s C s s s c s s S c
c c c s s C s s s c c s s s
c s s s s s s s s s c s c s
s c s s s c c c 0 0 s c c c
s c s s c s s s s s c 0 s s
c c s s s c c c s c c 0 s s

C

C C C 0
S c S 0
s c s 0
s c c 0
s c s 0
s c s 0
s c s 0
s c s 0

S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

C C C
C s C
s c C
c c C
s s S

C C
s C
c C
c C
c S

C
S

C

s
c c
c s
s 0
s s c s s s c
s s s c s c c
s s s c c s 0
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APPENDIX G
ARCHIVE DOCUMENT REFERENCE LIST

Policy Phase I: Initial Policy debate and Creation (1985-1986)
Comprehensive tax reform: Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means,
U.S. House of Representatives. 99th Cong., 1st sess. (1985).
Implications o f H R . 3838. the Tax Reform Act. Hearings before the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U. S. Senate. 99th Cong., 2nd sess.
(1986).
Policy Phase II: Technical Corrections and Reflection (1987-1990)
General Accounting Office. (1990). Use o f housing subsidies. GAO/T-RCED-9034. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
General Accounting Office. (1990V Low-income housing tax credit utilization and
syndication. GAQ/T-RCED-90-73. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
General Accounting Office. (1990V Rental housing: Observations on the lowincome housing tax credit program. GAO/RCED-90-203. Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Impact, effectiveness, and fairness o f the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Hearings before
the Committee on Ways and Means, House o f Representatives. 101st
Cong., 2nd sess. (1990).
Miscellaneous Revenue Act o f 1988. Report o f the Committee on Ways and
Means, House o f Representatives. 100th Cong, 2nd sess. (1988).
Present law and issues relating to the low-income housing and rehabilitation tax
credits. Scheduled for hearings before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue
Measures o f the House Committee on Ways and Means, Joint Committee
on Taxation, U. S. Congress. M ay 12, 1989.
Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1989: Explanation o f provisions approved bv the
Committee on October 3. 1989. Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate._101st
Cong., 1st sess. (1989).

195

Summary o f H.R. 3838 (Tax Reform Act o f 1986) as passed bv the U.S. Senate.
Joint Committee on Taxation. June 5, 1986.
Tax provisions affecting low-income rental housing. Scheduled for hearings before
the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures o f the Committee on Ways
and Means. Joint Committee on Taxation, U. S. Congress. March 1, 1988.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act o f 1990. U.S. House o f Representatives.
101st Cong., 2nd sess. (1990).
The Technical Corrections Act o f 1987. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Taxation and Debt Management o f the Committee on Finance, United
States Senate. 100th Cong., 1st sess. (1987).

Policy Phase III: Philosophical Reflection (1988)
Low-income housing tax credits and the role o f tax policy in preserving the stock
o f low-income housing. : Hearings before the Subcommittee on Select
Revenue Measures o f the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House o f
Representatives. 100th Cong., 2nd sess. (1988).

Policy Phase IV: Advanced Policy Debate and Coalition Expansion(1991-1992)
Description and analysis o f tax provisions expiring in 1992. : Scheduled for
hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means. Joint
Committee on Taxation, U. S. Congress. January 27, 1992.
General Accounting Office. (1992). Rural rental housing: Excessive profits and
proexam abuses in multifamilv housing. GAO/T-RCED-92-63. Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Revenue Act o f 1992. Report o f the Committee on Ways and Means, U. S. House
o f Representatives. June 30, 1992.
State o f the U.S. economy, federal budget policy, and the President’s budget
proposals for fiscal year 1992 and bevond. including estimated costs o f
Operation Desert Storm and expiring tax provisions. Hearings before the
Committee on Ways and Means, U. S. House o f Representatives. 102nd
Cong., 1st sess. (1991).
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Stegman, Michael A. (1991). The excessive costs o f creative finance: Growing
inefficiencies in the production o f low-income housing. Housing Policy
Debate. 1. rAprin. 357-373.
Tax Extension Act o f 1991. U. S. Senate, 102nd Cong., Is1sess. (1991).
Tax Extension Act o f 1992. U. S. Senate. 102d Cong., 2nd sess. (1992).
Policy Phase V: Institutionalization and Industry Specialization (1990-Present)
Economic Growth Acceleration Act o f 1992. U. S. House o f Representatives, 102nd
Congr., 2nd sess. (1992).
Fortenbach, Eric J. and Novogradac, Michael J. (1990). LIHC program can
subsidize rental building costs; industry leaders advise entrepreneurs to
participate. National Real Estate Investor. fM archl 87-90 &140.
Green, Richard K. (1991). Housing policy in America: Taking stock. Mortgage
Banking. October. 14-22.
Grigsby, William G. (1990). Housing finance and subsidies in the United States.
Urban Studies. 27. 831-845.
General Accounting Office. (1993). Public housing: Low-income Housing Tax
Credit as an alternative development method. GAO/RCED-93-31.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
General Accounting Office. (1993). Public housing: Projects developed with Lowincome Housing Tax Credit differ from traditional public housing
development projects. GAO/T-RCED-93-54. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
General Accounting Office. (1993). Tax policy and administration: 1992 annual
report on GAO’s tax-related work.. GAO/GGD-93-68. Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Permanent extension of certain expiring tax provisions. Hearings before the
Committee on Ways and Means, U. S. House o f Representatives. 102nd
Cong., 2nd sess. (1992).
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Policy Phase VI: Advanced Program Analysis (1996-present)
Abt. Associates, Inc. (1996). Development and analysis o f the national low-income
housing tax credit database. HUD-1629-PDR. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Cummings, Jean L. and DiPasquale, Denise. (1999). The Low-income Housing
Tax Credit: An analysis o f the first ten years. Housing Policy Debate. 10.
251-308.
E & Y Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate Group, Ernst & Young LLP. (1997). The
Low-income Housing Tax Credit: The first decade. Washington, D.C:
National Council o f State Housing Agencies.
General Accounting Office. (1996). Public housing: Partnerships can result in cost
savings and other benefits. GAO/RCED-97-11. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
General Accounting Office. (1997). Tax credits: Opportunities to improve
oversight o f the low-income housing program.. GAO/GGD/RCED-97-55.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
General Accounting Office. (1997). Low Income Housing Tax Credit.
GAO/GGD/RCED-97-55. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
General Accounting Office. (1997). Housing finance: Procedures and costs for
developing San Diego project were reasonable. GAO/RCED-97-190.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
General Accounting Office. (1999). Tax credits: Reasons for cost differences in
housing built bv for-profit and nonprofit developers. GAO/RCED-99-60.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Hobart, Susan, & Schwartz, Robert. (1997). The low-income housing tax credit.
Urban Land. (November). 49-51, 78-81.
Listokin, David. (1990). Federal housing policy and preservation: Historical
evolution, patterns, and implications. Housing Policy Debate. 2. 157-185.
Lomansney, David F. (1997). Poor asset management, underwriting explain many
LIHTC portfolio problems. Affordable Housing Finance. 5. 22-25, 72.
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Malpezzi, Stephen, & Vandell, Kerry. (1995). Evaluation o f the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit: Initial analysis o f statewise data. Unpublished
manuscript, University o f W isconsin at Madison.
Mayer, Neil S. (1990). Preserving the low-income housing stock: What nonprofit
organizations can do today and tomorrow. Housing Policy Debate. 2. 499533.
McClure, Kirk. (2000). The Low Income Housing Tax Credits as an aid to housing
finance: How well has it worked? Housing Policy Debate. 1. 91-114.
Mclntire, James L. (1996). The costs o f producing affordable housing: A
comparative analysis o f profit and non-profit multifamilv housing
production in Washington State. Seattle, WA: University o f Washington.
Mclntire, James L. (1996). Allocating Low Income Housing Tax Credits based on
housing needs. Seattle, WA: University o f Washington.
National Council o f State Housing Agencies. (1997). Do nonprofits get too much
housing credit? A debate. State Housing Finance. 5. 4-11.
Nenno, Mary K. (1990). State and local governments: New initiatives in lowincome housing preservation. Housing Policy Debate. 2. 467-497.
Orlebeke, Charles J. (2000). The evolution o f low-income housing policy, 1949 to
1999. Housing Policy Debate. 2. 489-520.
Roberts, Benson F. and Harvey, F. Barton III (1999). Comment on The Lowincome Housing Tax Credit: A n analysis o f the first ten years. Housing
Policy Debate. 10 CAprilL 309-320.
Shashaty, Andre (Ed.). (1998). Nonprofit and for-profit developers reap joint
venture dividends [Special issue]. Affordable Housing Finance. 6. 18-29.
Stegman, Michael A. (1999). Comment on the Low-income Housing Tax Credit:
An analysis o f the first ten years. Housing Policy Debate. 10 (April). 321332.
Stemlieb, George and Hughes, James W. (1990). Private market provision o f lowincopje Jipusing: Historical evolution, patterns, and implications. Housing
Policy Debate. 2. 123-15^.
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Wallace, James E. (1995). Financing affordable housing in the United States.
Housing Policy Debate. 6. 785-814.
White, William L., Bole, Robert, & Sheehan, Brett. (1997). Affordable housing
cost study: An analysis o f housing development costs in Portland. Oregon.
Portland, OR: Portland Development Commission.
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Appendix H
Listing o f Actors by Policy Phase
The people and interest groups listed below are provided in the order o f their
appearance in the archival documents. The listing includes people and
organizations who provided testimonies at Congressional hearings and written
statements for the Congressional Record, as well as people and organizations who
authored studies, assessments, and articles on the Low-income Housing Tax Credit
program. The listing o f participants is not comprehensive, as there were names of
people and organizations mentioned in the Congressional archives that are not
included. Nevertheless, the people and organizations included in the listing below
are representative o f the types actors involved in the evolution o f the Credit
program.

Policy Phase I (1985-1986): Initial policy debate and creation
1. Representative Dan Rosenkowski (D, Illinois),
Chair o f Ways and Means Committee, House o f Representatives, 99th Congress
2. Senator Robert Packwood (R, Oregon)
Chair of Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Congress
3. James Rouse, Founder and CEO o f The Enterprise Foundation
4. Michael Sviridoff, President, Local Initiatives Support Coalition [LISC]
5. Representative Sam M. Gibbons (D, Florida)
6. Representative Richard Gephardt (D, Missouri)
7. Representative Charles Rangel, (D, New York)
8. Representative Hall Daub (R, Nebraska)
9. Mayor Wilson Goode (D, Philadelphia)
10. Representative Judd Gregg (R, New Hampshire)
11. National Association o f Home Builders: private trade association
12. National Apartment Association: private trade association
13. Mortgage Bankers Association: private trade association
14. National Housing Conference: industry-wide housing advocacy group
15. Representative Frank J. Guarini (D, New Jersey)
16. National Low Income Housing Coalition: advocacy coalition comprised o f
tenants, advocates, and owners o f assisted housing, at state, national and local
levels
17. National Corporation for Housing Partnerships: owner and operator o f low and
moderate income housing
18. National Leased Housing Association: association of private and public sector
organizations involved in providing affordable rental housing for low- and
moderate-income households
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19. Council for Rural Housing and Development: trade association for
organizations financing and developing rural housing for low-income and
elderly populations under HUD Section 515 and farmers home programs
20. Coalition for Low and Moderate Income Housing: trade association comprised
o f business, organizations and individuals involved in the financing,
production, rehab and operation o f government assisted housing
21. National Multi-Housing Council: trade association
22. National Investment Development Corporation: investor in low- and moderateincome housing
23. National Association o f Realtors: trade association
24. National Apartment Association: trade association
25. National Association o f Housing and Redevelopment Officials: trade
association o f local and state agencies who administer housing and community
development and redevelopment programs
26. American Association o f Retired Persons: interest group
27. American Federation o f Labor and Congress o f Industrial Organizations:
interest group
28. Manufactured Housing Institute: trade association
Policy Phase II (1987-1990): Technical corrections and reflection
1. Senator Max Baucus, Chairman (D, Montana)
2. Council o f State Housing Agencies: national association for state housing
agencies
3. Staff o f the Joint Committee on Taxation
4. Representative Marty Russo, (D, Illinois)
5. Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D, Illinois)
6. National Association o f Home Builders
7. National Multi-Housing Council
8. National Realty Committee
9. John M. Ols, Jr., Director, Housing and Community Development Issues;
Resources, Community and Economic Development Division, General
Accounting Office
10. Subcommittee on HUD/Moderate Rehabilitation Investigations, Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. United States Senate, 101st Congress
Policy Phase III (1988): Philosophical reflection and value sharing
1. Representative Charles Rangel (D, New York)
2. Senator George Mitchell (D, Maine)
3. Senator Alfonze D ’Amato (R, New York)
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4. Eugene Steuerle, Deputy Assistant Secretary o f the Treasury
5. C. Duncan MacRaw —General Deputy Assistance Secretary on Policy
Development for HUD
6. Vance L. Clark, Dept o f Agriculture, Farmers Home Administration
7. Association o f Local Housing Finance Agencies
8. National Council of State Housing Agencies [NCSHA]
9. Terrence Duvemey, NCSHA and Michigan State Housing Development
Authority
10. NYC Housing Development Corporation: nonprofit corporation
11. Denis A Blackett, HE Corporation, Boston, M A private developer
12. Greater Boston Community Development Inc.: a nonprofit developer
13. A J. Johnson, Beacon Construction Co., Newport News, V A private developer
14. Council for Rural Housing and Development
15. Stephen Ross, Related Companies: syndicator o f credits
16. F. Barton Harvey, HI, Deputy Chair o f The Enterprise Foundation
17. Andrew Ditton, LISC
18. Larry H. Dale, Multifamily Activities, Federal National Mortgage Association
[FNMA]: investor
19. Representative Barbara B. Kennelly (D, Connecticut)
20. Thomas T. Demery, Assistant Secretary for HUD
21. John H. Luke, Associate Director, Resources Community and Economic
Development Division, General Accounting Office
22. Marvin Siflinger, NCSHA and Massechussets Housing Finance Agency
23. William B. Eimicke, Director o f Housing, N ew York State Division o f Housing
and Community Development
24. Representative Barney Frank (D, Massechussets)
25. Representative Steve Bartlett (R, Texas)
26. Representative Raymond J. McGrath (R, New York)
27. J. Roderick Heller HI, National Corporation for Housing Partnerships: for-profit
owner o f subsidized housing
28. Bruce Rozet, Associated Financial Corporation: owner o f low-income housing
29. Bary Zigas, National Low-income Housing Coalition: advocacy group
30. Associated Builders and Owners o f Greater NY, Inc.: trade association
31. Sheldon Baskin, Esq. (Chicago): attorney
32. California Association o f Housing Cooperatives: nonprofit group
33. Common Ground, Seattle: nonprofit developer/consultant
34. National Housing Preservation Task Force: private interest group
35. Meadow Management: private property management company
36. Mid-Peninsula Housing Coalition, Palo Alto, C A nonprofit developer/manager
37. Mitchell-Lama Council, New York, NY: advocacy group
38. Mortgage Bankers Association o f America
39. National Association o f Home Builders
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Policy Phase IV (1990-1992): Advanced policy debate and coalition expansion
1. Angelo J. Aponte, NY State Division o f Housing and Community Renewal and
NCSHA
2. John P. Manning, Coalition to Preserve the LIHTC, Board o f National Leased
Housing Association, and Boston Capital
3. Pamela K. Burton, Council for Rural Housing and Development and Southwind
Management Services in Clearwater, FL: coalition of developers, financiers,
and managers
4. Stephen G. Leeper, Association o f Local Housing Finance Agencies, Director
o f Dept o f Housing and Urban Redevelopment Authority o f Pittsburgh
5. Paul S. Grogan, LISC
6. Representative Daniel Rostenkawski (D, Chicago)
7. Representative Charles Rangel (D, New York)
8. Representative Raymond J. McGrath (R, New York)
9. Council for Rural Housing and Development
10. Eagle Mark Corporation: private investor and manager
11. Mortgage Bankers Association
12. Mayor David Dinkins (D, N ew York)
13. Public Securities Association: international trade association o f brokerage firms
and banks dealing in federal, state, and local government securities
14. Representative Romano L. Mazzoli (D, Kentucky)
15. Alexander B. Grannis, Chair, Committee on Housing, New York State
Assembly —for National Conference of State Legislators (D, Manhattan)
16. Governor Jim Edgar (R, Illinois), on behalf o f National Governor’s
Association, Chair of the Economic Development and Technical Innovations
Committee
17. Ted R. Chapter, Iowa Finance Authority
18. Peter M. Berkely, Jr., National Society o f Public Accountants
19. Kathleen Brown, California State Treasurer
20. Representative Nancy Pelosi (D, California)
21. Paul Celluci, Lt. Governor o f Mass.
22. William W. Higgins, Chicago Equity Fund, Inc.: private investor
23. Norman L. Mishoe, Jr., HOPE Community, New York and National Low
Income Housing Coalition: low-income resident
24. Peter L. Beard, General Council for Habitat for Humanity
25. Robert J. Buchart, National Association o f Home Builders
26. American Bankers Association
27. American Institute of Architects
28. Mayor Richard M. Daley (D, Chicago)
29. National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
30. National Association of Housing Cooperatives
31. National Association of Remodeling Industry
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32. Oakland County, Michigan, Department o f Community and Economic
Development
33. Ohio Department o f Development
34. United Way o f America
Policy Phase V (1990-present): Institutionalization and industry specialization
The listing below includes people who wrote or spoke on the program as well as
publications that carried articles on or were exclusively dedicated to the Credit
program.
1. Judy A. England-Joseph, Director, Housing and Community Development
Issues; Resources, Community and Economic Development; General
Accounting Office.
2. Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 102nd Congress
3. Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House o f Representatives, 102nd
Congress
4. John Manning, President of the Coalition to Preserve the Low-income Housing
Tax Credit and CEO o f Boston Capital Partners, Inc.
5. Jeffrey Goldstein o f Boston Capital
6. Daniel Markson o f National Housing Corporation
7. Mark Sissman o f The Enterprise Foundation
8. Mary Tingerthal o f the National Equity Fund
9. John McEvoy o f NCSHA
10. H ousing Policy Debale
11. Urban Land
12. Affordable Housing Finance
13. Low-income H ousing Tax Credit Handbook
Policy Phase VI (1996-present): Advanced program analysis
The listing below includes people who wrote on the program as well as
publications that carried articles on the Credit program.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

N ational Real Estate Investor
The Enterprise Foundation Web Page
H ousing Policy Debate
James L. Mclntire, Fiscal Policy Center, Institute for Public Policy and
Management, University of Washington
General Accounting Office
NCSHA
Urban Land
Abt Associates, Inc. for U.S. Department o f Housing and Urban Development,
Office o f Policy Development and Research

205

9. E&Y Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate Group, a Division o f Ernst & Young LLP,
for NCSHA
10. Jean L. Cummings
11. Denise DiPasquale, Ph.D.
12. Benson F. Roberts o f Low Income Support Coalition
13. F. Barton Harvey, HI o f The Enterprise Foundation
14. Michael A Stegman, Ph.D.
15. Kirk McClure, Ph.D.
16. Charles Orlebeke, Ph.D.
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APPENDIX I
POLICY PHASE CHART

The Policy Phase Chart to follow was created as a research tool from which
the policy history and paradigm analyses emerged. Portions o f the chart will seem
familiar, as similar information is found in various forms in Chapters Five and Six.
Using the table format, information gleaned from the policy history was divided
into phases, and prominent actors and issues were identified within each phase.
Referencing the constructs discussed in Chapter Three, observations regarding how
and if issues reflected attributes o f political culture, political economy, and policy
learning were inserted. The chart is not intended to stand alone as an interpretation
o f the policy history or stakeholder values; rather, the narrative previously
presented completes the descriptive analysis. Nevertheless, the Policy Phase Chart
is an important mechanism for organizing information so that linkages can be
recognized and interpretations formed.

Policy Phase

Actors

Federal-level elected
I. Initial Policy
Debate and
officials: Congressional
Creation (1985-86) Representatives and
Senators

Primary Issues & Concerns

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

Avoiding abuse of the system by setting up Thrift and
checks and balances
prudence

Yes

Ensuring equity and fairness

Desire to
influence
behaviors;
efficiency
Equality of
Compassion for
the poor
opportunity
Compassion for
Enlightened
self-interest
poor
Thrift/prudence Efficiency
Thrift/prudence Efficiency
Individual and Superiority of
enlightened
free market
self-interest
Individual and Superiority of
enlightened
free market
self-interest

No

Limited
government
Individual selfinterest
Limited
government

No

Targeting the needy
Practicing fiscal prudence
Ensuring program simplicity
Encouraging economic growth
Private Sector: home
builders, investors,
owners, managers, trade
associations

Political
Culture
Indicators

Continuing historical precedence for
encouraging housing production for
economic development in poor
communities
Using tax policies to entice private
investment
Maximizing capital value, risk, return on
capital, and profit
Maximizing flexibility

Superiority of
free market
Superiority of
free market
Efficiency

No
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
Yes
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Policy Phase

Actors

Nonprofit investors and
advocates: The Enterprise
Foundation, Low Income
Support Coalition, other
advocacy groups

Local elected officials

Primary Issues & Concerns

Political
Culture
Indicators

Ensuring that public involvement and
Civic
subsidies encourage community-based
engagement
development and economic revitalization in government, &
poor communities thus exercising social
enlightened
responsibility
self-interest
Encouraging public/private/nonprofit
Civic
partnerships
participation
and limited
government
Targeting the very poorest households
Enlightened
self-interest
Ensuring equity and fairness

Equality of
opportunity
Avoiding abuse of the system
Thrift and
prudence
Targeting the most needy through specific Enlightened
program requirements
self-interest

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

Compassion for Yes
poor, civic
participation,
voluntarism,
and local control
Pursuit of self- No
interest, belief in
market forces
Compassion for Yes
poor and
effectiveness
Compassion for No
poor
Yes
Efficiency

Compassion for Yes
poor and
effectiveness
Thrift/prudence Efficiency
Yes

Exercising caution over potential abuses
II. Technical
Staff and bureaucracy:
Corrections (1987- General Accounting Office from previous experiences (developers'
90)
[GAO] and administrative fees, long-term affordability)
staff
Avoiding over-subsidization as a potential Thrift/prudence Efficiency and
outcome as seen in previous programs
effectiveness

Yes
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Policy Phase

Actors

Local and state officials,
elected and appointed

Primary Issues & Concerns

Political
Culture
Indicators

Maximizing income targeting

Equality of
opportunity

Ensuring adequate controls and monitoring
so that all are treated equally under the
program and so as to avoid abuses to the
system
Correcting technical flaws to encourage
investor interest

Thrift and
prudence

Reducing risks, increasing certainty, and
increasing financial feasibility

Political
Economy
Indicators
Effectiveness

Effectiveness
and desire to
influence
behaviors
Individual self- Superiority of
interest
free market,
efficiency and
effectiveness
Individual self- Superiority of
interest
free market,

Policy
Learning
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

efficiencyand
Increasing program flexibility
Private-sector actors

Limited
government

effectiveness
Efficiency and
local control

Increasing certainty, decreasing risk, and Individual self- Superiority of
increasing financial feasibility to encourage interest
free market,
growth in the new syndication market
efficiency and
effectiveness
Increasing program flexibility '
Limited
Efficiency,
government
superiority of
free market

Yes
No

No
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IIL Reflection
(1988)

Actors

Federal level elected
officials: Representatives
and Senators
Private sector: developers,
investors, Federal National
Mortgage Association
[FNMA]

Nonprofit investors and
advocates: CDCs, The
Enterprise Foundation,
LISC, national advocate
groups

Primary Issues & Concerns

Political
Culture
Indicators

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

Enhance efficiency and flexibility through Limited
local administration; increase effectiveness government
of the Credit
Limited cash flow from restricted rents,
Self-interest
limited capital appreciation of asset, and
limited tax benefits create need to make
technical changes and attract more investors
Maintain partnership between tax code and Limited
housing
government

Local control,
efficiency and
effectiveness
Superiority of
free market
Superiority of
free market

No

Decrease risk to increase ROI and thus
attract more investors

Superiority of
free market

No

Self-interest;
thrift and
prudence
Need to lower rents to serve lower income Equality of
households; Credits alone are not sufficient opportunity
to lower rents; additional state and local
subsidies are needed
Decrease risk and increase ROI for
investors to produce higher Credit prices,
facilitating lower rents
Increase coordination and cooperation
between housing and tax agencies
(intergovernmental issues)

Enlightened
self-interest

Yes
No

Effectiveness, No
compassion for
the poor

Superiority of
free market;
pursuit of selfinterest
Thrift and
Local control,
prudence, local effectiveness,
control
efficiency

Yes

Yes
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Actors

Primary Issues & Concerns

Expand Credit for use in homeless and
special needs housing
Staff and bureaucracy:
HUD, RD, GAO

Political
Culture
Indicators
Equality of
opportunity

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

Compassion for No
the poor

Credit an improvement over previous
Thrift and
Efficiency and Yes
programs because of targeting and controls prudence
effectiveness
on developers
Need to assess costs versus benefits
Thrift/prudence Efficiency and Yes
effectiveness
Concerns over quality of construction and Thrift and
cost per unit
prudence

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Potential property maintenance and
compliance concerns

Thrift/prudence Effectiveness

Yes

Preference for supply-side over demandside subsidies still debatable and requires
more study
Federal housing programs should be more
compatible (intergovernmental issue)

Self-interest,
thrift and
prudence
Self-interest,
thrift/prudence

Efficiency and
effectiveness

Yes

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Enlightened
self-interest,
thrift and
prudence

Superiority of
free market,
pursuit of selfinterest

Yes

Local officials: state and Need to incorporate provisions to decrease
local housing finance
investor risk by increasing financial
agencies, National Council feasibility, thus increasing investor pricing
of State Housing Agencies, for Credits by increasing competition for
community and economic Credits
development officials

Policy Phase

Actors

Primary Issues & Concerns

Need to increase basis for high cost areas
for community revitalization and
investment

Political
Culture
Indicators
Equality of
opportunity

Political
Economy
Indicators
Effectiveness

Policy
Learning
Yes

Limited
Federal level elected
Permanent extension of the Credit is
IV. Advanced
government
Policy Debate and officials: Representatives supported to encourage continuing and
Coalition
and Senators
increased private investment as provider of
Expansion (1991low-income housing
92)

Yes
Desire to
influence
behavior to
achieve intended
results, belief in
the free market
Private sector: professional Permanent extension, standardized rents, Individual self- Superiority of No
lobbyists, investors,
and more clear program guidelines for the interest, thrift free market,
property managers,
Credit needed to decrease financial risk and and prudence pursuit of selfbankers, public securities increase usage and investment
interest
agencies, architects, home
builders, public
accountants
Local elected and other Affirmation of the Credit as the only
Self-interest, Superiority of Yes
public officials: housing significant program left for bringing private individual and free market and
pursuit of selfand community renewal investment to low- and moderate-income enlightened
housing and bringing economic
agencies, state
interest
development to low income areas in need of
representatives, state
housing finance agencies, economic revitalization
state treasurers, lieutenant
Support for the permanent extension of
governors, mayors,
Credit
NCSHA
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Actors

Primary Issues & Concerns

Success of public/private/nonprofit
partnerships
Significant economic impact realized
Recognition that multiple goals can be
achieved: social services, housing
provision, economic development and
revitalization
Effectiveness as an intergovernmental
resource

V. Institutionali
zation and
Industry
Specialization
(1990-Present)

Nonprofit investors and
advocates: Habitat for
Humanity, United Way,
Low Income Support
Coalition, residents
Federal level elected
officials: Representatives
and Senators

Political
Culture
Indicators

Political
Economy
Indicators

Limited
Local control,
government
volunteerism
and civic
and civic
participation participation
Self-interest, Local control
both individual
and enlightened
Enlightened Local control,
self-interest; compassion for
thrift and
the poor and,
effectiveness,
prudence
self-sufficiency
Self-interest
Local control

Policy
Learning
No

No
Yes

No

Support for Credit as providing more than
just housing; provides increased security
and safety, achieves social goods, and
changes lives

Equality of
Compassion for Yes
the poor,
opportunity,
promotes
effectiveness,
individualism self-sufficiency
and self-interest
Establishment of increased need for and
Compassion for Yes
Equality of
recognition of Credit program as providing opportunity,
poor, desire to
influence
housing, services and private investment - enlightened
behavior, belief
support for permanency grows
self-interest
in free market,

213

Policy Phase

Actors

Primary Issues & Concerns

Political
Culture
Indicators

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

GAO and Congressional
staff

Higher than needed Credit subsidies and Thrift and
Yes
Efficiency
excessive developer fees are a concern with prudence
RD projects
Need to be address to encourage better
Thrift and
Efficiency and Yes
coordination among Credit and other
prudence
effectiveness
federal housing programs
Provision of social services to increase self- Equality of
Yes
Desire to
sufficiency of low-income residents is an opportunity,
influence
improvement over previous housing
individualism behaviors, strong
programs
and self-interest work ethic,
effectiveness,
self-sufficiency
Need to compare of public housing
Thrift and
Effectiveness Yes
development with tax credits to other HUD- prudence
and efficiency
funded programs
Need increased intergovernmental
Local control Yes
Civic
coordination among the IRS, states, and
participation
localities
Private sector: professional Need permanent status and standardized Individual and Superiority of Yes
lobbyists, investors,
rents to decrease risk to investors and thus enlightened
free market,
self-interest, competition,
increase investor interest in Credit,
property managers,
bankers, public securities stimulate competition and increase Credit thrift and
effectiveness
agencies, architects, home prices (allowing more money to go into
prudence
builders, public
housing per Credit dollar invested by the
accountants
federal government)
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Actors

State and local public
officials: housing and
community redevelopment
agencies, NCSHA,
housing finance agencies,
mayors, state
representatives, state
treasurers, governors

Primary Issues & Concerns

Political
Culture
Indicators

Political
Economy
Indicators

See increasing use of Credit by nonprofits, Civic
commitments to longer terms of
participation,
affordability, and economic revitalization of thrifi/prudence,
distressed areas
enlightened
self-interest
Incentive for public/private/nonprofit
partnerships

Volunteerism,
local control,
effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Multiple goals achieved (housing,
partnerships, economic development,
community revitalization)

Local control,
effectiveness,
efficiency

Yes

Thrift and
prudence,
enlightened
self-interest
Significant economic impact
Thrift and
prudence,
enlightened
self-interest
Flexible program meets many varied local Limited
needs
government

Effectiveness,
efficiency, and
belief in free
market
Effectiveness,
efficiency, and
local control,
Nonprofit organizations: Increased safety and security comes with Equality of
Compassion for
Habitat for Humanity,
community development - more than just opportunity and poor, desire to
LISC, residents of Credit housing -- Credit meets numerous social
enlightened
influence
projects
behavior,
goals and changes lives
self-interest
volunteerism
Industry journals
Education of potential investors and
Individual and Effectiveness,
developers is needed mainly to increase
enlightened
efficiency,
Credit activity
self-interest
competition

Policy
Learning

No

Yes
Yes

Yes
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Actors

Primary Issues & Concerns

Shared knowledge and experiences
(property management, investors,
developers); evolution of mechanics of
Credit programs; explanations of technical
changes and updates
Expressed concerns over efficiency and
effectiveness

Political
Culture
Indicators

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

Equality of
Effectiveness
opportunity,
and efficiency
self-interest &
individualism

Yes

Thrift and
prudence

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Made recommendations for improving state Thrift and
allocation processes
prudence

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Reviewed nonprofit vs. for profit
development costs

Thrift and
prudence

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Federally-sponsored
VL Advanced
Need for improved oversight, auditing and Thrift and
Program Analysis research findings (staff and compliance monitoring
prudence
(1996 - Present) administrators)

Efficiency and
effectiveness

Yes

Over the long-term, the Credit reached
Thrift and
lower incomes and achieved greater
prudence
affordability than required
Over all, costs are reasonable, with the
Thrift and
differential between nonprofit and for-profit prudence
developments attributable mainly to types
of housing produced

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Academic journals
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Actors

Academic findings

Primary Issues & Concerns

Syndication costs have decreased so that
more Credit dollars are invested in the
projects
Credits still require additional subsidies to
have decreased rents

Political
Culture
Indicators

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

Thrift and
prudence

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Thrift and
prudence

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Effectiveness
and efficiency,
local control

Yes

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

The value of housing produced is less than Thrift and
the value of governments costs of the Credit prudence
over the long-term
Increasingly safeguards were put in place to Thrift and
prevent developers from taking excessive prudence
fees or charging excessive construction
costs
The subsidy is too inflexible
Thrift and
prudence,
limited
government
Housing is still expensive and nonprofit
Thrift and
developed housing is more expensive than prudence
for-profit developed housing
Increased investor interest in projects has Thrift and
increased competition and Credit equity
prudence
pay-ins

217

Policy Phase

Actors

Primary Issues & Concerns

Non-academic and locally- Credit program has become more cost
sponsored research
effective than vouchers, especially for very
findings
low-income families
Credit projects are more expensive to
develop than other types of housing but
adds economic value to communities as
well (often the economic development
impetus in distressed areas)
Nonprofit developed housing is not more
costly than for profit developed housing
when one considers type and location

Political
Culture
Indicators
Thrift and
prudence

Political
Economy
Indicators

Policy
Learning

Effectiveness
and efficiency

Yes

Thrift and
Effectiveness
prudence, local and local
control
control

Yes

Thrift/prudence Effectiveness, Yes
and equality of Compassion for
opportunity
poor
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